Lecture: Fighting Ends in
Minnesota
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The bloody repulse dealt to Col. Sibley's forces at Birch Coulee on September 2 temporarily stalled the military forces of the United States...Minnesotans led by their former governor. While the Sibley's army regrouped and received reinforcements, contingents of Dakota fighters moved out of the Minnesota River valley in search of targets. Little Crow headed north toward Forest City and Hutchinson.
On September 3, a relief column of about 55 men, led by Capt. Richard Strout of Minneapolis fought a running battle with Little Crow's men, before retreating to Hutchinson with the loss of six killed and as many as 23 wounded. This encounter, known as the Battle of Acton, again demonstrated the fighting ability of the Dakota. The Indians then divided into two parties and advanced against Forest City and Hutchinson. In both cases their attacks found the settlers secure in hastily constructed but well built stockades. 1
Settlers in other locales north of the Minnesota also began building fortifications and soon a chain of forts reached from Little Falls to Glencoe. St. Cloud's "Fort Holes," one of three defensive sites in the town, had a bulletproof tower and loopholes for snipers. Sauk Centre's tamarack log stockade was so well built that soldiers later converted it into an impressive fort.
On the river's south side, Governor Ramsey put Charles Flandrau, the hero of the battle of New Ulm, in charge of a militia. Flandrau planned a defensive line with forts at regular intervals from New Ulm to the Iowa border. His major fortifications were at Garden City, Winnebago, Blue Earth, Martin Lake, Madelia and Marysburg. Again the typical fort featured logs, sometimes earthen works, with houses inside to provide shelter.
Rumors that the Ojibway might join in the fighting alarmed those in the St. Croix valley. Volunteers quickly formed units at Stillwater, Marine, Taylors Falls, and in the Chisago Lakes areas.
Fighting now reached across the Red River into
Dakota Territory were Fort Abercrombie, garrisoned by a company of of
the Fifth Minnesota, was besieged in early September. Dakota
attackers kept the soldiers and civilians in the fort pinned downed
for a week. On Sept. 6 an estimated 125-150 Dakota made a dawn attack
on the fort. Abercrombie's defenders, with the help of cannon fire,
helped hold off the Indian advance. The siege continued with more
skirmishing before the Dakota left on Sept. 29 as relief columns
neared. 2
NOTE: Fort Abercrombie was abandoned in 1877 but restored in 1938.
It's a North Dakota state historic site
Warfare sustained for long periods of time was not typical of Dakota
military tactics. Despite a series of combat successes, the Indians'
offensive was now stalling. Gov. Ramsey did not know this and
bombarded President Lincoln, governors of nearby states, and the war
department for help. Lincoln, instead, asked northern governors to
raise more troops for the Federal army struggling through a series of
reversals dealt to it by Confederate forces in the South.
Ramsey protested to Lincoln on August 26 asking for a month postponement of the draft, noting, "The Indian outbreak has come on us suddenly. Half the population of the state are fugitives. It is absolutely impossible that we should proceed (with the draft)...No one not here can conceive the panic in the state." Ramsey's comments were echoed by William Dole, U. S. commissioner of Indian affairs, and Minnesota senator Morton Wilkinson who wrote to Lincoln, "We are in the midst of a most terrible and exciting Indian war. Thus far the massacre of innocent white settlers has been fearful. A wild panic prevails in nearly one-half of the state. All are rushing to the frontier to defend settlers." 3
Lincoln calmly replied to Ramsey on August 27. "Yours received. Attend to the Indians. If the draft cannot proceed of course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law. The Government cannot extend the time." 4
Col. Sibley, crippled by the loss of so many horses at Birch Coulee, had just 25 mounted men on September 13. On that same day, he issued an offer of protection to "half-breeds and Sioux Indians who have not been concerned in the Murders and Outrages," promising protection if they surrendered to his forces. Meanwhile, Sibley drilled his men daily, preparing them for the fighting yet to come. He had earlier left a message for Little Crow on an upright split stake at the Birch Coulee battlefield. Little Crow replied on September 7 explaining why the Dakota were warring and hinted that he would talk further. 5
Little Crow and the colonel made no progress when the Indian leader would not budge on giving up prisoners. Meanwhile, word reached Sibley from Wabasha and Taopi that they would like to receive Sibley's protection.
There was also good news for Sibley on the 13th. The Minnesota's Third Regiment, under Major Abraham E. Welch was but a short march away. With the Third's arrival, Sibley's force swelled to nearly 1,600 men. 6
Men of the Third Regiment still grumbled over their inglorious surrender to Confederate forces at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. On July 12, 1862 the able CSA cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest attacked the Ninth Michigan and Third Minnesota. The northerners, although surprised, fought well, keeping Forrest's horse soldiers at bay. The Confederate leader managed to overcome and capture the Third's small, 20-man camp guard, but only after three separate charges. 7
Brigade commander Col. W. W. Duffield of the Michigan regiment suffered a serious wound during the fighting and asked Forrest for a truce to consider his options. Duffield wished to meet Col. Henry Lester, the Third's commander. Lester, a Winona man, had come to the regiment following a transfer and promotion from the First Minnesota. The Confederate Forrest allowed the meeting, carefully gathering his men along the path Lester would take. Forrest hoped to convince the Minnesota officer that the southerners badly outnumbered them. The ploy worked. After a council of war, the shaken Lester polled his officers regarding surrender. The Minnesota leadership argued vehemently among themselves before finally deciding to give in. They notified Forrest. 8
The surrender came as a shock to the Minnesota men who fought well and maintained strong defensive positions throughout the day. They laid down their weapons with sorrow and indignation. The Third Regiment's non-commissioned officers and men received paroles, agreeing not to bear arms until completion of prisoner exchanges. They then marched back to Union army control. The unit's officers headed to a Georgia prison camp from which they were paroled three months later. The "disgraceful" affair badly tarnished the reputation of the Minnesota and Michigan regiments. The men of the Third Minnesota considered themselves betrayed by the timid Lester and could only hope for an opportunity to erase the stain upon their honor. On December 1, President Lincoln ordered Lester and all officers who voted for surrender dishonorable dismissal from the army. 9
The Third's Capt. Hans Mattson returned to his unit shortly after the surrender and was given the duty of escorting the regiment's enlisted men to St. Louis for formal parole. The officer wrote to his wife, "It is a horrible affair that this proud and splendid Rgt. was surrendered to the enemy - the men feel awful bad about it and some of our highest officers will have to look out for themselves if they ever get out of the southern prison, the men swear vengeance." 10
Abraham Edwards "Ed" Welch was now leading the Third. Brave and impetuous, the young Welch fought heroically with the First Minnesota at Bull Run and had been wounded and captured. Welch was later released in a prisoner exchange and now prepared to fight as leader of the Third Regiment.
On September 19, Sibley, believing his force ready for offensive operations, left Fort Ridgely and headed up the Minnesota River valley with 1,619 men.
Sibley was hopeful that his advance would silence critics around the state who called him a "snail...who refuses to march," and the " State undertaker, with his company of grave diggers." It was also said that Sibley had friends and relatives among the Indians and he did not wish to injure them. Brown County sheriff Charles Roos complained to Ramsey writing, "Col. Sibly lying lassy in the Fort and the damnd dutsch in Brown County may go to hell..." Jane Grey Swisshelm wrote, "For God's sake put some live man in command of the force against the Sioux & let Sibley have 100 men or there about in his undertaker's corpse." The frustrated leader offered his resignation to the state adjutant general within a week of his arrival at Fort Ridgely. 12
Sibley was far from confident about his men's abilities. He wrote Department commander John Pope on the Sept. 17 saying that although he expected to defeat the Dakota, his command was "entirely undisciplined, excepting the few belonging to the Third Regiment." His army was composed of the Sixth Minnesota Regiment, minus one company; five companies of the Seventh Minnesota under future governor Lt. Col. William R. Marshall; 270 men of the understrength Third Minnesota led by Major Welch; one company of the Ninth Minnesota; 38 Renville Rangers; 28-mounted citizen guards and 16 citizen artillerists. They moved slowly along the government road and after three days of marching neared the Yellow Medicine River. Sibley made camp near a small lake of good water. 13
While Sibley, minus cavalry outriders and aggressive scouts, moved blindly up the Minnesota valley, the Dakota army was secretly marching down. While their enemies settled into camp, the Little Crow and his force of 738 planned an assault. (Little Crow had two of his men hand each fighter a stick as they marched toward to battle. When the sticks were counted, they totaled 738). The Dakota leader planned a three-pronged strike against Sibley on the morning of September 26 while the units were underway and spread along the road. The Dakota hoped to ambush the soldiers and cause a panic that they could exploit. During the night Little Crow, Big Eagle and Mankato put their men into position.
The surprise attack was foiled accidentally when some men of the Third Minnesota set out at seven in the morning to "capture" some potatoes thought to be ripening in Indian gardens near the mouth of the Yellow Medicine. They had gone about a half-mile when they were fired upon by Dakota lying in the tall grass. The Indian ambush had been prematurely sprung.
The firing aroused Sibley's camp and the soldiers of the Third Regiment moved forward without orders. They assembled by company as they ran, forming a line as Major Welch ordered, some said permitted, a continued advance. It was an aggressive and dangerous decision, made without instructions from Sibley. Welch's assault exposed the Third to counterattack. A sergeant in the unit yelled out repeatedly, "Remember Murfreesboro, fight boys!" The Dakota's main force was not fully assembled because of their earlier dispositions, and the Indians fell back as the Welch's unit advanced about a mile from camp. The Indians soon reorganized and attacked the Third with a favorite tactic - a double envelopment in which their assault tried to overlap their enemy's flank and surround them. 14
Sibley believed Welch to be in danger and order
him back but the confident young major delayed obeying. Sibley
repeated his order and the Third fell back. Welch was shot in the leg
and commanded his men to carry him to a nearby knoll where he could
see the fight. Meanwhile, five companies of the Seventh Regiment
advanced and cleared Dakota soldiers from a ravine to Sibley's right.
Mankato was killed by a cannon ball during fighting there. Two
companies of the Sixth fought off an attack on the left and the
battle settled down into exchanges of gunfire. After two hours the
Indians broke off the fighting. 15
Upon return to the Dakota base of operations, a captive listened to a
despondent Little Crow advise his people to scatter out over the
plains like buffalo and wolves. He lectured his men saying that
although they were outnumbered, that "was no reason we should not
have whipped them, for we are brave men while they are cowardly
women." Little Crow and 200 to 300 of his followers left the camp on
Sept. 24. 16
Sibley's forces arrived at the Indian camp on the 26th finding about 150 lodges near-present day Montevideo. Within a few days there were 243 lodges with 1,918 Dakota and 270 of their captives - 162 captured mixed bloods, 104 white women and children, and 4 white men. The prisoners were turned over to Sibley peacefully. When provisions ran low on October 4, the Indians were moved to Yellow Medicine were they were put to work gathering corn and digging potatoes. During this period all the Indian men, except 46 considered above suspicion, were arrested, disarmed and chained together in pairs. Several Dakota men escaped before they were taken into custody.
Little Crow understood that there could be no surrender for soldiers like himself who had assumed leadership roles in the uprising. Those who refused to give in took their families and scattered over the western plains. Theirs was a wise decision. In a dispatch to Col. Sibley on September 28, General Pope made clear his intentions toward the Indians. He wanted no treaty with the people who committed "horrible massacres of women and children." Said Pope, "It is my purpose utterly to exterminate the Sioux...They are to be treated as maniacs or wild beasts." 17
Reading Assignment: Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan R. Woolworth (eds.), Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862, "Wood Lake and Camp Release," 219 - 229.
"Official Reports and Correspondence," 224-237, from Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861-1865. Note the tenor of the dispatches that moved between government and military officials.
Footnotes for Lesson 5.0
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lecture text.
1 Here and below, Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862, 45-53
2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 2:187-189.
3 Ibid. 2:200-201.
4 Folwell, A History of Minnesota, 2:172.
5 Carley, 60-61.
6 Ibid. 229.
7 Gen. Christopher C. Andrews, "Narrative of the Third Regiment," in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, vol. I:151-158.
8 Ibid.
9 Andrews, in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, vol. 1, 157-158. See also Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, vol. 2, 116-124, 178. Folwell, 2:92-94.
10 Hans Mattson to Dear Wife (Cherstin), July 25, 1862, Hans Mattson and Family Papers, MHS.
11 Nick Coleman and John Camp, "The Great Dakota Conflict," St. Paul Pioneer Press supplement, 1992, 24.
12 Folwell, A History of Minnesota, 2:176 (see also footnote 48.)
13 Here and below, Folwell., 2:176-182; Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 2:233-237.
14 Ezra T. Champlin, Recollections of the Battle of Wood Lake," in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 2:233-237.
15 Henry H. Sibley, Battle of Wood Lake - Sept. 23, 1862 in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 2:240-243.
16 Here and below, "Samuel J. Brown's Recollections," in Through Dakota Eyes, 222-227.
17 Ibid. vol. 2:182-185, 191.
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Updated 6/14/02