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Chapter |
Page |
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1.
Introduction |
3 |
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2.
History |
5 |
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a.
Turkey |
7 |
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b.
Iraq |
8 |
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c.
Iran |
10 |
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11 |
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5.
The Kurdish
Diaspora in |
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a.
Finland |
12 |
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b.
Germany |
16 |
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c.
Australia |
21 |
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6.
Conclusion |
24 |
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7.
Bibliography |
25 |
In the end of 1998 a political event made the world
look at an ethnic group, which is usually not in the center of international
attention.
It
was the arrest of the leader of the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan “PKK”, Abdullah
Ocalan, that led to demonstrations, often violent, of Kurds around the globe
and made the world aware of the Kurdish diaspora.
Due to their difficult situation in their countries
of origin, many Kurds have fled to other countries, where they form a diaspora.
The commonly used definition of diaspora is “a minority ethnic group of migrant
origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin.”[1]
As
the reaction of the Kurds to the arrest of Ocalan shows, they certainly do have
links to their land of origin, Kurdistan, for which the PKK fights.
But why and to what extent do they keep their ties to this land, when
they are living in a diaspora in a host country?
To
explain this phenomenon, the following work is going to rely on a theoretical
framework by Milton J. Esman. Esman claims in his article “Diasporas and
International Relations”: “The continuing links between diasporas and homelands
can be politicized, (…). Diasporic solidarities can be mobilized and focused to
influence political outcomes in the home country, to provide economic,
diplomatic and even military assistance to the home country or to seek
protection and help from its government.”[2]
He
also claims that “Social marginality is likely to support that solidarity [with
the homeland], and communities will organize for self-maintenance, defense and
advocacy.”[3]
Further he determines seven classes of activity of either the home
government, the host government or the diasporic community, which can be
observed in the context of international relations. Two of these activities
will be shown in the examples given in the paper. The first one is the attempt
of the diasporic community to influence directly events in the home country,
and the second one is the attempt of the diaspora to seek protection from the
home government, which is true for the majority of the Kurdish diaspora.
Based on this theoretical framework, this work tries to make clear the
following point: The Kurds living in a diaspora are marginalized in their host
society and therefore try to keep their strong ties to their homeland
Kurdistan. The major means to do this is the support for the PKK, through which
the Kurds hope to liberate Kurdistan, so that they eventually can return.
In order to understand the reasons for the
Kurdish people to flee from their host countries, it is necessary to get an
overview of the history and the present circumstances in these countries.
Further, the situation of the Kurdish diaspora will be shown in three examples.
The Kurds are on of the most ancient people in the
Near East. They live in a region they call Kurdistan, which is as large
as France and is located within the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
There are also Kurds living in the territory of the former Soviet Union, but
their number is rather small.
There are approximately
35 million Kurds living in Kurdistan. They have their own language, Kurdish,
which is an Iranian language. The Kurds are an Indo-European people and are
unrelated to their Arab neighbors. The religious majority of them are Sunni
Moslems with 75% and Alevite Moslems with 15%, but unlike in the neighboring
Arab countries, Islam is not a part of the Kurdish identity.
In ancient times, the Kurds founded several states in this
region, until the Turks, which have their roots in Middle Asia came over Iran
to Anatolia and founded first the Selchuk and then the Ottoman States.
From that time on, Kurdistan became the place of clashes between the
Ottoman and the adjoining Persian Empires. In order to keep their autonomy, the
Kurdish princes sided first with one side, then with the other.
In the 1638 “Treaty of
Kasri Shirin”, Kurdistan was officially divided between these two states. It
followed armed attacks from both sides on the Kurdish princedoms, in order to
destroy them.
From the beginning of the 19th century on, Kurdistan fought
for unity and independence, but got defeated every time.
After World War I, the
Ottoman Empire fell and new states were founded on its soil. In the ”Treaty of
Sevres” of August 10th 1920 it said that the State of Kurdistan was
supposed to be officially established in this region. But this agreement has
not been directly implemented, so that in the following “Treaty of Lausanne” of
July 24th 1923, Kurdistan could be legally carved up again, with the
largest part going to Turkey and other parts going to Iran, Iraq and Syria.
These artificial borders divided villages, towns and even families and made the
Kurds the largest ethnic group without a nation of its own.
3. Development and Present Situation
The Ottoman Empire never questioned the existence of Kurdistan at all.
At first, Turkey also acknowledged its existence and defined its borders as the
“borders of the Misak-I Milli (National Pact), which include the areas settled
by the Turkish and Kurdish majority.”[4]
The Turkish representative declared 1923 in Lausanne: “The Kurds and the Turks
are the essential components of the Republic of Turkey. The Kurds are not a
minority but a nation; the government in Ankara is the government of the Turks
as well as the Kurds.”[5]
After the signing of the
Treaty, the Turkish policy changed rapidly. The government only pursued the
Turkish interests and the Kurds’ existence was denied from that point on.
Kurdish language,
culture and even the mere concepts of “Kurdish” and “Kurdistan” were forbidden.
The Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal ‘Ataturk’, pursued a policy of melting other
languages and cultures into the Turkish language and culture. Kurdish was
forbidden as a language, especially in the media. Speaking about the Kurds and
criticism about the Turkish politics concerning the Kurds was considered a
serious crime and was harshly punished.
There have been several
uprisings since 1925, but they were all defeated. Since 1979, Turkey rules
Kurdistan through military law and a State of Emergency.
In Iraq, the Kurdish people have experienced a similar development as in
Turkey.
They have also been
resisting oppression since World War I. They rose up against the government
several times, but have always been defeated.
Iraq never denied Kurdish identity, but on
the contrary granted the Kurds certain cultural rights as a result of their
uprisings. They got for example their own schools, universities and radio
broadcasts, so that
the Kurdish culture is pretty well developed there, in comparison to
Turkey.
The greatest uprising
broke out in 1961 and lasted until 1970. It was led by Mustafa Barzani. In
1970, the Kurds reached an agreement with the central government and they were
granted an autonomous region. But the government ignored the agreement and in
1975 a war broke out that was going to last until 1991.
During that war, Iraq
needed financial support from Iran and they made territorial concessions to get
it. But Iraq eventually wanted to win the land back and started a war, which
devastated Kurdistan. It even used poison gas in its attacks against the Kurds.
After the Gulf War,
when Iraq was defeated, the Kurds had to flee, but the UN managed to create a
security zone for them in Northern Iraq with an own parliament and national
government.
But even now, the Kurds
in Iraq are facing a very difficult situation, still being persecuted by the
Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.
In Iran, the Kurds are experiencing a similar kind of oppression as in
Turkey.
After World War II,
Iran was occupied by the Soviet Union in the north and by Great Britain in the
south. During this time of occupation, the Kurds had time to organize
themselves and founded the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. But this Republic has
been annihilated by Teheran with support from Great Britain and the United
States.
After this short period
of autonomy, the Kurds are again in the same situation of oppression.
4. PKK-Workers’ Party of Kurdistan
The Worker’s Party of Kurdistan was founded in 1978 as an extreme
leftist, Marxist-Leninist party.
It is led by Abdullah
Oecalan, who guides the party in a dictator-like manner. Its primary goal is to
fight against the State of Turkey to achieve an “independent and democratic
Kurdistan”, but not only Kurds from Turkey but also from Iran, Iraq and Syria
support the cause of the PKK.
The PKK is highly
brutal and merciless in pursuing their aims and up to now, about 30 000 people
have been killed by PKK fighters, among them many Kurds who did not support the
actions of the party or wanted to leave it.
The PKK is the major
instrument of influence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in diasporas around
the world. It has groups in all major diaspora countries and tries to mobilize
Kurds living in diasporic communities to fight for the liberation of Kurdistan.
5. The Kurdish Diaspora in
There are currently approximately 1300 to 2000
Kurds living in Finland. Among these, 300 to 550 are from Turkey, 550 to 800
from Iraq and 450 to 650 from Iran.
Most of these Kurds arrived in Finland in the 1990s. The Kurds from
Turkey are mostly asylum seekers, who flee from prosecution, whereas those from
Iran and Iraq are mostly quota refugees through UNHCR.
The Kurds are usually dispersed in small groups around the country.
There is the tendency though for them to
move later to the capital area or to some of the regional centers. The Turkish
Kurds usually move near the capital.
The emphasis of the Finnish resettlement policy lies on a positive
integration of the Kurds into society. Some of the measures taken to facilitate
the integration are for example language training and orientation courses. The
main aim of the Finnish government is to get the refugees employed, because
employment is often seen as a major factor in the integration of refugees.
There are severe differences though between theory and practice in the
Finnish immigration policies, as to how fast refugees can be integrated or even
assimilated into society. Refugees are often seen as people who have lost
everything; material, social and cultural capital. That is why they are often
looked down upon or even treated hostile.
One thing in the Finnish immigration policy that is often seen
negatively is the dispersal of refugees all over the country. The Kurds for
example do not get to built their own cultural communities, which would probably
be helpful for them in order to feel at home in this new country. Instead, the
Finnish authorities are more concerned about integration into Finnish society.
What is positive about
the Finnish immigration policy is for example that the refugee’ stay in the
country easily becomes permanent. Furthermore is the language tuition very
helpful and the social services for the refugees are very good.
There are two major
obstacles to a positive integration of Kurdish refugees into Finnish society.
One is the bad employment situation in Finland and the other is the racism and
xenophobia they often have to face.
Unemployment among
refugees is really high: In 1992, 61.4% of the refugees were unemployed,
whereas the national average was 13.1%.
Most Kurdish refugees are unemployed, too; probably none of these that
arrived in the 1990s has managed to get a permanent job. Some are interpreters
and Kurdish language teachers, or they are working in fast food shops. Many of
the Kurdish refugees are highly educated, but still can’t get a job, which
suggests that they face discrimination in the labor market.
There is also a small
but outspoken xenophobic and racist minority in Finland. Although obvious
violent attacks are pretty rare, all of the Kurdish refugees are affected by
the racist or xenophobic attitudes many Finns show. This also hinders any major
social contact between Kurds and Finns.
Kurdish refugees in
Finland are obviously experiencing isolation and social exclusion.
One thing that could
possibly help integrating the Kurdish refugees is to take into account their
transnational social networks. Although Kurdistan is divided and the Kurdish
refugees therefore come from very different political backgrounds, they pretty
much all agree with the goals of the PKK and can therefore connect through
their active or inactive membership in the PKK. Although the PKK is fully
oriented towards Kurdistan and not towards any country where a Kurdish diaspora
exists, it can help people cope with the problems in their new country. The
strong emotional connection of the Kurds in Finland with the PKK becomes
obvious in the following quotation from a Kurd from Turkey: “I am extremely
satisfied with the fact that in every place there are supporters of the PKK
(…). And I believe that if this information centre did not exist in Finland, in
that case the Kurds could all become mentally ill. But when there is the
information centre, and when we are working and we are getting information
about our own country, it helps us a lot. It is like morality, our life. For
example without this party I am nothing.
And with the Kurds, with the PKK, we have contact. Because of the party,
in the name of the party. If there were no party, no PKK, we could not perhaps
even say hello to the Kurds. But because of the PKK, because this PKK is the
key, this key opens the door to us all Kurds, that is how, with the name of PKK
and with the support of PKK.”[6]
Obviously, the PKK and
their struggle for a free Kurdistan are the main connection of Kurds in
Finland. They are not able to integrate successfully into Finnish society and
therefore look to their imagined homeland Kurdistan, to which they wish to
return one day. They support the actions of the PKK, because they hope that
they will in the end achieve in liberating Kurdistan and make it possible for
them to go back.
The question here, as in all other case studies, is, if the
marginalization of the Kurds is only the cause for their wish to return
to Kurdistan, or also a result. If the Kurds in Finland would try to
more actively participate in Finnish society, instead of looking back to
Kurdistan, they would maybe have a better chance to integrate.
The next case study we
want to look at is the case of Kurdish immigrants in Germany.
After World War II, many Turkish guest workers came to Germany and with
them also Kurds. From the beginning on, the Turks and the Kurds have brought
their struggle to Germany. Germany has always been the main focus of PKK
activity against the Turkish government.
In 1953, foreign
workers in Germany were given the right to assemble and to hold demonstrations.
In 1964 they were allowed to establish their own associations, and in 1967 membership
in political parties was granted. But the German government can still forbid
political action by foreigners when they endanger important national interests.
There are about 2
million Turks in Germany, of which 500 000 are Kurds. According to Turkish
authorities, there are 70 000 PKK followers. According to the German
government, there are only 11 000, but at demonstrations, several thousand
Kurds are on the streets.
The conflict between
the Turks and the Kurds is a major concern in German politics. The following
quotation is from a speech of former chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag in
the beginning of the nineties, when there were lots of violent PKK-attacks on
the streets of Germany:
“These groups are
deeply opposed enemies to each other… One can assume that there are just under
4 000 supporters of revolutionary-Marxist groups, 18 000 extremist [Islamic]
fundamentalists, and just over 7 000 extremist Turkish and Kurdish
nationalists…. All these extremist groups have one thing in common: they are
bitterly opposed to their own government and the constitution of their own
country, and want to achieve their objectives, both here and there, by the use
of violence. Those who are threatened with prosecution in their homelands for
this reason are often granted the right to stay in Germany…. Under no
circumstances must this be allowed to develop into a license for them to wage
violent disputes with each other here in our country…. This disrespect for our
law on foreign guests has to be countered with all our determination. Anyone
who commits criminal offenses here, no matter what the political or ideological
motivation was, has to be made responsible for them. We expect every foreigner
to adhere to the democratic rules of play, namely living together in peace and
in a civilized manner. Anyone who does not do this must expect to be deported
from Germany. The task of our constitution and the result of our experiences in
history means that we offer the politically, racially, or religiously
persecuted protection and asylum. But we will not tolerate being the location
for civil wars.”[7]
In 1992 and 1993, there
have been six major waves of attacks committed by the PKK in Germany. They were
directed against Turkish nationals and consisted of firebombings of Turkish
shops or simply violent attacks on the streets. The PKK started to be openly
terrorist in Germany in 1993. There was a series of attacks in 50 German cities
on November 4th 1993, which resulted in one death.
The PKK justified taking actions on German soil by saying that
the German government was partially responsible for the persecution of Kurds in
Turkey, because the government sold arms to Turkey. The PKK even called Germany
“Enemy No. 2” after Turkey.
The German government
banned the PKK on November 26th 1993, which had not really changed
much. The PKK continued its activities underground, and there have been further
firebombings in 1994, 1995 and 1996.
In March 1995, there has been an increase of violence after the start of
the Turkish offensive into northern Iraq against Kurdish strongholds.
In March 1996, thousands of
Kurds throughout Germany used the Kurdish New Year celebrations to protest
against the situation in Turkey. The outcome was especially violent in
Dortmund, 40 police officers and 300 demonstrators were injured, 600 were
arrested, and 1900 temporarily held. After this, the German government
announced to deport foreigners who take part in illegal demonstrations.
Abdullah Ocalan announced later in 1996 to stop using
violence in Germany, and actually violence has decreased from that point, but
there were still demonstrations going on.
After the arrest of PKK
leader Ocalan, a new wave of Kurdish violence shook German cities.
In Heilbronn, Muenster,
Stuttgart and elsewhere across Germany, Kurds demonstrated on the street and
set Turkish businesses on fire.
The most severe incident though occurred in Berlin. The obvious
responsibility of the Israeli secret service Mossad in the arrest of Ocalan led
to fury on the side of the Kurdish people in Germany. 200 Kurdish protesters tried to storm the Israeli consulate and
the security guards opened fire. Four Kurds were killed and 20 more were injured.
As we can see, the life
and actions of the Kurds living in Germany
are mainly determined by influences from their homeland. The Kurdish
people are connected through the PKK, which has its main base outside Turkey in
Germany.
Germany is by its very
nature no immigration country and no multicultural society. It is very hard for
immigrants to integrate into German society and they mostly stay in their own
ethnic communities.
So, it is understandable that Kurds in Germany keep their ties to their
homeland and try to fight for the liberation of Kurdistan from their host
country. The increase of violence after the Turkish invasion of northern Iraq
and after the arrest of Ocalan shows how much the Kurdish diaspora in Germany
is affected by events in their homeland.
But again, there is the
question, if it is not partly the Kurdish extremism that prevents any
integration into German society. Kurds were always allowed to demonstrate for
their nationalistic cause, but violent attacks that threaten the host society
are not way any ethnic group can integrate into a society.
But what about
immigration countries and highly multicultural societies like Australia? Is it
possible for the Kurds to integrate into Australian society or are they hoping
to get back to Kurdistan, too?
The first Kurdish immigrants in Australia arrived from Turkey in the
late 1960’s and early 1970’s.
The first Kurdish
association was founded in Sydney in 1979 with 30 members, the majority of them
being from Turkey. From that year on, the number increased steadily, mainly due
to immigration and family reunification programs. The number of Iraqi and
Iranian Kurds increased in the late eighties and especially in the years
following the Gulf War.
It is hard to get the
exact number of Kurds living in Australia, because immigration statistics
record people according to the country they come from. One possibility of
obtaining the number of Kurds is to look at the language they speak at home. A
current census did that and revealed an approximate number of 10 000 Kurdish
speaking people in Australia, the majority living in Sydney and Melbourne.
The problems the
Kurdish immigrant face in Australia are similar to their problems elsewhere.
Unemployment among
Kurdish refugees is very high, so that they face financial as well as
psychological problems. The fact that many Kurds are illiterate in their own
language makes it even harder for them to cope with life in their host land. A
small number of Kurdish doctors have recently managed to get employed in their
own field, most others, who were highly qualified in their homeland could not
have their degrees recognized.
So, like in most other
countries of immigration, the Kurds in Australia are facing a hard time
integrating into their host society.
Also like in most other countries of immigration, the Kurds in Australia
are highly connected to their homeland.
When the leader of the PKK,
Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested in late 1998, Kurdish protesters in Sydney and
Melbourne demonstrated in the streets and set Turkish shops on fire. There were
even cases of Kurds setting themselves on fire in the streets.
Australia is commonly
believed to be a multicultural society, in which people from all over the world
can be integrated, but the Kurds obviously keep their strong connections to
their imagined homeland Kurdistan and are united through their support for the
PKK.
Again, maybe it is this
clinging to Kurdistan and their extremist views and actions that prevent an
integration of Kurdish immigrants into Australian society.
As this paper tried to make clear, it is the marginalized situation of
the Kurds in their host countries that makes them look to the liberation of
Kurdistan and therefore keep their ties with the PKK.
In Finland as well as
in Germany and Australia, the Kurds in their diasporic communities try to
influence the politics in their homelands, from which they sought protection.
This supports Milton J. Esman’s thesis of the politicization of the links
between diaspora and homeland.
Another factor in the
attempt of the Kurds in a diaspora to maintain a close relationship to their
homeland is the social exclusion they are facing in all three countries
observed. This also supports Esman’s thesis, although we have to ask, if it is
not the extremist and violent Kurdish nationalism that precludes any further
integration into the host society.
Finally, it should be
clear from what we saw in the three case studies presented that it is still the
hope of Kurdish people living in a diaspora to liberate their homeland
Kurdistan, mainly by supporting the PKK and demonstrating for their common
cause, so that they can eventually return and form a nation of their own.
[1] Esman, Milton J., Diasporas And International Relations. In: Modern Diasporas in International Politics.
Gabriel Sheffer (Ed.), London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986. p.333
[2] Ibid. p. 335
[3] Ibid. p. 339
[4] Burkay, Kemal. The Kurdish Question-Its History and Present Situation. http://members.aol.com?Khilfsvere/Kurds.html, p.2
[6] Wahlbeck, Oesten. Diasporic Relations and Social Exclusion: The Case of Kurdish Refugees in Finland. Siirtolaisuus-Migration, 1996. http://www.utu.fi/(nopic)/erill/instmigr/art/wahlbeck.htm
[7] Chapin, Wesley D.. The Turkish Diaspora in Germany, in: Diaspora, Vol.5, No.2. Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1996. p.286