[INDONESIA-POLICY] Menguak Fakta Seputar Peristiwa G30S PKI

Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2001 03:07:00 -0700 (PDT)
From: Hanny Hidayat <hanny_hid@yahoo.com>
Subject: Menguak Fakta Seputar Peristiwa G30S PKI
To: apakabar@radix.net

Dear Netter,

Beberapa tulisan dan catatan dibawah ini saya ambil
dari berbagai sumber, library, CIA files dll. untuk
mencoba menguak fakta seputar peristiwa G30S PKI yang
sampai saat ini masih misterius.
___________________________________

"Covert Operations: Indonesia 1965"

[October 1995 note from David Johnson: This is a paper
I wrote in 1976. It is presented here in its original
version. It was written to encourage Congressional
investigation of the issue by the Church Committee at
the time. This paper was circulated privately but
never published. It may have some enduring merit.
Comments and criticisms are welcome.
As evidence that the subject matter is still relevant,
please note this recently declassified quotation:
"From our viewpoint, of course, an unsuccessful coup
attempt by the PKI might be the most effective
development to start a reversal of political trends in
Indonesia."
Then-US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones March 10,
1965
Chiefs of Mission Conference, Baguio, Philippines
Quoted in Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin,
"Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia," 1995, p.225]

David T. Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20005
202-862-0700
email: djohnson@cdi.org
CDI web page

GESTAPU: The CIA's "Track Two" in Indonesia*

[written in 1976]

    Introduction
    U.S. Assessment of Indonesia
    Background to October 1st
    The Events of October 1st
    Conclusion

Introduction

This paper presents the preliminary outline of a new
interpretation of the events in Indonesia in 1965 that
climaxed in the "coup" attempt of October 1st and the
actions of the September 30th Movement (GESTAPU). It
is argued that the September 30th Movement was not an
action by "progressive" or dissatisfied middle-level
military officers, nor a creature of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), nor was it stimulated by
President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly
in the hands of General Suharto (and probably General
Nasution) [1995 note from David Johnson: today I would
delete the reference to Nasution] and most likely a
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the
purpose of "saving Indonesia from Communism" in a
desperate situation. GESTAPU served the crucial
function of providing a legitimate pretext for the
drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to
put the reins of power quickly into the hands of
Suharto and to place Sukarno in a restricted position.

GESTAPU worked. It is probably the most successful
covert operation that the CIA has ever carried out.
The participation of the CIA in GESTAPU—its
"fingerprints on the gun"--cannot be proven unless the
Congress digs hard to find the truth, as was done
partly in the case of Chile. The CIA connection is
hypothesized because it seems a logical outcome of
U.S. policy toward Indonesia and because of the
relative sophistication and complexity of the GESTAPU
operation. Because of the close contact between the
Indonesian Army and U.S. Defense Department advisers
and attaches it is probable that certain of these
personnel were also involved.
It is not maintained that the thesis of this paper is
necessarily correct or proven. The author's hope is to
demonstrate that it is sufficiently plausible that
further research along these lines will be conducted
by those more knowledgeable than he and that those in
a position to do something about it will begin to look
into the secret official record. The thesis is
presented without a great deal of hedging but the
author is aware that many of the facts he uses are
open to a number of alternative explanations. Of
course, many "facts" are in dispute. This first draft
assumes some knowledge on the part of the reader of
the basic events of the time and of the existing
interpretive controversy. No special attempt is made
here, however, to refute alternative theories. Only a
portion of the supporting material is indicated.
The events of October 1, 1965, in Indonesia and their
origin may truly be called "a riddle wrapped in an
enigma.~ There is no consensus among students of
Indonesia about the "correct" explanation. All
existing theories have their articulate and plausible
critics. Probably the majority of careful Indonesian
scholars have abandoned the search for explanation.
GESTAPU is an enormously complicated puzzle in which
the pieces never fit together, their shape constantly
changes, and new pieces keep appearing.
In an earlier age of innocence, the attributing to the
CIA of a significant causal role in international
affairs was a disreputable enterprise in which most
professional analysts seldom engaged. With the
revelations of recent years, however, the inhibitions
on serious study of CIA activities have somewhat
broken down. We also know far more than we did ten
years ago about the extent of CIA operations and how
the CIA works. In many cases, including Indonesia, we
still know very little about what the CIA actually did
over the years. But more than before we can feel on
safe ground to think that the CIA was active. This is
not CIA scapegoating, left-wing propaganda, conspiracy
fascination, or a search for simple-minded solutions.
It is a necessary and important research effort that
must be undertaken before it can be seriously
rejected. Of course, the great secrecy that envelops
the subject places substantial restrictions on what
normal academic research can accomplish.
This paper is based in the first instance on the
author's reading of the recently released CIA Research
Study "Indonesia-1965: The Coup That Backfired." The
author has also read nearly everything available in
English in the Library of Congress on the events of
1965. The major source material that has not been
examined, except as described in secondary sources, is
the large body of records of post-October 1
interrogations of prisoners held by the Indonesian
Army and the records of the numerous trials that have
been held. Undoubtedly new insights can be derived
from these materials. The author's knowledge of
Indonesia in general is relatively sparse, although he
has visited the country and spent some time in
previous years studying Indonesian political
development. The present paper is the product of a
month of very intensive research on the events of 1965
as well as some limited examination of studies on the
CIA.

U.S. Assessment of Indonesia

At some point in 1964 or 1965 (probably late 1964) the
deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia and the
left-ward drift of Indonesia had gone so far that the
U.S. faced the need to reassess its policy toward
Indonesia with an eye toward adopting new policies.
Howard Jones, the American ambassador at the time, has
described the extremely pessimist official assessment
of how bad things had gotten from the American point
of view. Ewa Pauker and Guy Pauker at RAND have
described the projection of near-term PKI takeover and
the pessimism about the ability of the Indonesian Army
to reverse the apparently inevitable flow of events.
Jones indicates that a number of important meetings
were held in which U.S. policy toward Indonesia was
reassessed, beginning at the State Department in
August 1964 after Sukarno's Independence Day speech,
his most anti-American statement up to that time. The
March 1965 annual meeting of U.S. mission chiefs held
in the Philippines with Averell Harriman and William
Bundy, was also important. Ellsworth Bunker, personal
representative of President Johnson, spent 15 days in
Indonesia in April 1965 evaluating the situation.
There were undoubtedly other secret and perhaps more
important meetings in which U.S. policy was put
together.
The U.S. seems to have faced essentially six options
with regard to Indonesia:

  1.A hands-off policy of continuing much the same as
before, letting things drift. (Of course, the U.S. had
never been passive toward Indonesia and this can only
be characterized as a hands-off policy in contrast to
the other options.) The probable result would be that
Indonesia would go Communist. There seems to have been
near unanimous official agreement on the inevitability
of Communist takeover in Indonesia if existing trends
continued. The most important country in Southeast
Asia would be lost. The U.S. effort to save Vietnam
(bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965)
would probably be frustrated and all of Southeast Asia
would be threatened. Clearly, this was an unacceptable
option.
  2.Try to get Sukarno to change his apparent policy
of leading Indonesia toward Communist rule. The
Embassy under Ambassador Jones had been pursuing this
course for years, with little success (in American
eyes). Sukarno had made more than clear his
determination to continue his left-ward drive, both
domestically and in foreign policy. Most Washington
officials had given up on Sukarno and many agreed that
"Sukarno has to go." Some identified him as a "crypto-
Communist." This option was simply unworkable.
  3.Eliminate Sukarno. Apparently this was considered,
but rejected. The consequences would be too
unpredictable. The Communist Party and its affiliates
were so large and so extensively embedded in
Indonesian society and political life that even in the
absence of Sukarno's protection they might be able to
hang on and prosper. An effort to go after the PKI in
such circumstances would probably result in a very
unpredictable and dangerous civil war which the United
States, preoccupied with Vietnam, was not in a
position to handle. A danger of killing Sukarno was
that those who might be identified with it would be
discredited because of Sukarno's enormous popularity
in Indonesia, which efforts to undermine over the
years had been unable to shake. Blaming an
assassination on the left would not be credible
because of the close alliance between Sukarno and the
Communists. The PKI would have no plausible motive for
such an action. An arranged "natural" death for
Sukarno would leave the PKI as a very important force
in Indonesia, and perhaps as the logical successor.
  4.Encourage the Indonesian Army to take over the
government. The Embassy had been pushing this option
for years with some success but without achieving the
final objective. Disunity within the Army had
prevented any such explicit step to date and there
seemed to be other inhibitions on a direct military
takeover. The Army as a whole was still unwilling to
move directly against Sukarno. Sukarno's determination
to resist any further expansion of the Army's role was
clear. In fact, he was doing much to try to
"domesticate" and undermine the Army as an
independent, anti-Communist force. Even in the event
of an Army coup, without a solid pretext for quickly
eliminating the PKI and a means of controlling
Sukarno, the prospect of civil war would arise for the
same reasons indicated in Option 3. While the U.S.
could continue to cultivate military officials and try
to stiffen their "backbone," Army takeover via some
sort of coup would not resolve the problem in
Indonesia.
  5.Try to undermine the PKI and get the Communists to
take actions that would discredit themselves and
legitimize their elimination. (Option 6, the
fabrication of such a discrediting, is a variant of
this option.) Such a step would also necessitate
moving against Sukarno as he probably would never
permit the Army to act forcefully against the PKI no
matter how objectionable the PKI might appear to be. A
variety of covert efforts were mounted to try to
damage the PKI's reputation and provoke it to
misbehavior. These included linking the PKI with
China, trying to show that the PKI did not really
support "Sukarnoism" (the BPS episode), and the
fabrication of documents and the attributing of
provocative statements to PKI spokesmen (printed in
non-Communist papers). But Sukarno helped to frustrate
these efforts by banning almost all non-Communist
political and press activity. The PKI was careful not
to go too far and not to provide the excuse for its
elimination. As PKI Chairman Aidit said, "We are
prepared to tolerate insults and threats. We will not
be provoked. If the army spits in our faces we will
wipe it off and smile. We will not retaliate." Option
5 was continually tried but it did not seem to be
working.
  6.If the PKI would not provide its own death
warrant, the pretext for extermination had to be
fabricated for it. The optimum implementation of this
option would serve to eliminate both the PKI and
Sukarno as dominant forces in Indonesian political
life. This option appears to have been the one finally
chosen, although the point at which commitment to it
was irrevocable is very uncertain. Parts of the other
options, other "tracks" continued at the same time.

Background to October 1st

Undoubtedly, elements of the Indonesian military (and
other anti-Communist groups) were also considering
what to do about the drift of Indonesia toward
Communist rule. It was highly unlikely, however, that
the U.S. could sit passively and expect that
Indonesians on their own would do what had to be done.
American analysts seemed to have concluded that no
Indonesian group on its own had the capability and
will to do what was necessary to prevent Communist
takeover. American initiative and cooperation were
necessary.
The U.S. over the years had built up close
relationships with many Indonesians, particularly in
the Army. In fact, this was the essence of U.S. policy
toward Indonesia over the previous five or more years.
The coincidence of U.S. and anti-PKI Army interest
would make natural, and simply a continuation of
patterns already established, a collaboration and
pooling of resources to carry out the best means
available for stopping the PKI and "saving" Indonesia.
The CIA provided a pool of expertise and technical
capability for devising and implementing a relatively
sophisticated and delicate maneuver.
The problem of lack of Army internal cohesion, as
indicated in Option 4, remained a stumbling bloc.
Efforts were made to achieve unity in moving against
the PKI (and necessarily Sukarno) but although most
generals agreed that the PKI had to go, some very
important officers--notably the Army Chief of Staff
General Yani--were apparently unwilling to take steps
that would severely damage Sukarno. After the failure
of attempts to secure Army unity, the U.S. and the
collaborating generals (principally Suharto and
Nasution) [1995 note: again, I would today delete
Nasution] decided that the urgency of the threat and
the need for quick action required working with those
who were willing. It was necessary to move in spite of
the absence of Army unity.
Actions were undertaken to try to polarize Indonesian
politics between the Communists and others, an effort
that it was hoped might move the reluctant generals to
the "right" side. The Gilchrist letter seems to have
been part of a covert effort to stimulate distrust and
antagonism between Sukarno and General Yani. It
appears, however, that General Yani remained something
of a Sukarno-loyalist. General Yani had become
dispensable and probably he stood in the way of what
had to be done.
The "Generals' Council" rumor, frequently considered
the product of PKI work, was probably an important
element of the CIA-Suharto covert operation in
preparing the ground for GESTAPU. The rumor served a
number of useful purposes. It helped to further the
heightening of tension and uncertainty in Indonesian
political life. It served to stimulate mistrust
between Sukarno and certain generals that the CIA
wanted to break with Sukarno. It alarmed the PKI and
might even make it take the provocatory step that was
hoped for. It provided a focus for debate and rumor
that distracted attention from the real "conspiracy."
It bore a resemblance to something that actually
existed, General Yani's "braintrust," and thus
provided a ready target group for the GESTAPU
operation, plausible victims for the "PKI's"
atrocities. The rumor helped to create a climate in
which people would find GESTAPU at least superficially
plausible, especially immediately on October 1st.
There would be widespread belief in the imminent
threat of a Generals' Council coup and "unwitting"
people (notably the soldiers used by GESTAPU on
October 1st) would be willing to take actions that
they might otherwise question. The General's Council
rumor helped to create something of a "controlled
environment" in which certain planned stimuli would
produce a relatively predictable response. Finally,
the rumor was an important part of the cover story for
why the PKI might be believed to have taken the action
to be attributed to it.
The exploitation of the Sukarno's health rumor mill
was another important part of the cover for GESTAPU.
Unfortunately for the cover story, however, it turns
out to have been one of the weak links. The post-1965
explanation of why the PKI allegedly carried out
GESTAPU attributes a major role to the presumed fear
on the part of the PKI that Sukarno was about to die.
Chinese doctors are alleged to have convinced Aidit of
this. The problem is that Sukarno recovered rapidly
from his illness in August 1965 and Aidit, who was in
constant contact with Sukarno, had more than
sufficient time to find out about Sukarno's health for
himself and to turn off any plans that were based on
Sukarno's imminent demise. (The implausibility of this
story may in part account for the growth of theories
that attribute the authorship of GESTAPU to Sukarno
and place the PKI in a subordinate role. Even the
Suharto government seems to have adopted this
"explanation.~) In 1965, however, the circulation of
rumors by the CIA-Suharto group served to create a
climate that would make GESTAPU plausible as well as
the PKI's complicity in it. It does seem clear that
the PKI Politburo held meetings in August 1965 at
which the health of Sukarno was discussed, as well as
the Generals' Council rumors, and probably the
existence of "progressive" officers. What was actually
said about these subjects, however, is far from clear.
The official Army version, presented through
"confessions," probably took real events, kernels of
truth, and spun them into the required pattern.
A very interesting question is whether the Untung
group made contact with the PKI, perhaps to get the
PKI to directly implicate itself or at least to take
actions that could later be interpreted as
"participation in GESTAPU." It seems likely that the
GESTAPU conspirators would have considered it risky to
acquaint anyone not "in the know" with what was going
on. The danger would have been very great that the PKI
would be suspicious and pass the information to
Sukarno who would investigate. The PKI was constantly
on the alert for "provocations." There is a
possibility, however, that some vague intimation of
GESTAPU was passed to Aidit via a source that Aidit
would have found credible. If so, it appears that
Aidit rejected PKI participation, despite later trial
evidence.
An overlooked source of information on the
relationship, if any, between the PKI and a
"progressive" officers GESTAPU group is an article by
the leftist journalist Wilfred Burchett that was
originally published in November 1965. Burchett,
relying on "an Indonesian whom I know as having close
contact with the PKI leadership and who escaped the
army dragnet in Jakarta," states that the PKI received
"documentary" evidence of the existence of a Generals'
Council in August and informed Sukarno about it.
Burchett continues:
"In late September, Colonel Untung, head of the
presidential guard, learned of the planned coup from
independent sources. He approached leaders of the PKI,
among others, revealing what they had known for some
time, and urged joint action. to thwart the coup. The
PKI leaders reportedly refused on the ground that such
an action would be "premature" and that as long as
Sukarno remained at the helm everything possible
should be done to maintain unity, while all patriotic
elements within the armed forces should remain
vigilant to deal with any coup from above."
Of course, we have no way of knowing if this is what
happened but it is possible.
The backgrounds of Lt. Col. Untung, the alleged leader
of the September 30th Movement, and his colleagues
have been examined by a number of independent
scholars. The picture that emerges is not that of a
group of "progressive" or disgruntled officers, but
rather of a group of successful and professional
military officers who had exhibited signs of anti-PKI
views, had been given sensitive positions in which
their past and present political affiliations and
views would have been subjected to careful
examination, and some of whom--perhaps the most
important ones--had recently been trained in the U.S.
(General Supardjo and Col. Suherman) and undoubtedly
exhaustively "vetted" by the CIA and U.S. defense
intelligence.
What seems to link most of the GESTAPU officers
together is not their "progressiveness" but their
association, both past and present, with General
Suharto. Those participants, particularly in the Air
Force, not overtly linked with Suharto may be
considered CIA-Suharto "assets" activated to play
their role in the GESTAPU scenario. The penetration of
the Air Force and the Palace Guard by anti-PKI Army
forces (and the CIA) is at least as plausible as the
degree of penetration attributed to the PKI. The
vigilance of the anti-PKI generals in keeping PKI
influence out of their officer corps is well known, as
is the effort to keep track of and penetrate the more
leftist branches of the military services.
Before examining what took place on October 1st it is
important to recognize that (if the thesis of this
paper is correct) we are looking at a collection of
actors and a sequence of events that were put together
primarily to accomplish a very immediate and urgent
task: the discrediting of the PKI (and its allies) in
as dramatic and quick a fashion as possible, and the
immobilization of factors that might complicate the
situation. While some thought had obviously been given
to cover, it is doubtful that extensive effort was put
into constructing a cover story that would withstand
close, dispassionate scrutiny . The ability of the
Cornell researchers, after only a few months of
research using primarily written materials, to reveal
the weaknesses of the immediate cover story is
testimony to its inherent crudeness. The CIA-Suharto
group probably felt that, if they moved quickly and
drastically enough, there was little likelihood that
much foreign effort would be put into examining
GESTAPU in detail. Certainly no Indonesian would he
disposed to raise doubts.
A certain refinement of cover and justification for
actions that, for the most part, had already been
taken (the murder of hundreds of thousands of
Indonesians) was provided by the obviously spurious
Aidit "confession" and the fabricated confession and
show trial of Njono. Untung was also put on trial
early in 1966. Even sympathetic foreign journalists
have raised questions about these early trials (no
foreign journalists were permitted to attend and only
selected Indonesians). We do not know at what point
the Indonesian authorities found out about the Cornell
study and other evidence that apparently their story
was not going over abroad as well as they had hoped.
It seems probable that the trials of Dani and
Subandrio were primarily milestones in the campaign to
remove Sukarno and less parts of the GESTAPU cover
story. It was the trial of Sudisman in 1967 and that
of Sjam in 1968 that were explicitly calculated for
their effect on the foreign skeptics. Of course,
Suharto has had other reasons as well for continuing
the show trials.

The Events of October 1st

The major military units involved on the side of the
September 30th movement were officially under the
command of General Suharto's KOSTRAD, the Army's
Strategic Reserve. The semi-official Indonesian Army
history of GESTAPU states: "Both the 454th and 530th
Battalions together with the 328th Kudjong Battalion
of the Siliwangi Division were under the operations
command of the 3d Paratroop Brigade of the Army's
Strategic Reserve." The Army book observes further
that "KOSTRAD troops were scattered all over
Indonesia, as [sic] that at the time of the coup
General Soeharto had only the dc Kudjava and dc
Parakomando battalion around Djakarta. Other KOSTRAD
troops were at 'the other side.'
The major mission of these KOSTRAD "coup" units was to
take up positions around the crucial Merdeka Square,
controlling Sukarno's Palace, the Indonesian Radio
station, and the central telecommunications
facilities.
One company of soldiers from the Palace Guard, the
Tjakrabirawa, are said to have participated, together
with KOSTRAD elements, in the kidnapping-murder of the
six army generals. Lt. Col. Untung had been since May
1965 commander of one of the three Tjakrabirawa
battalions. Considering Untung's position, this
participation is quite possible, although it could
have introduced a perhaps unnecessary complication
into the proceedings. General Sabur, the commander of
the Palace Guard, played a very unclear role in the
GESTAPU and its aftermath. Although jailed for a
period after 1965, he has been released and no charges
have been brought against him. Whether Untung could
have acted without Sabur's knowledge is uncertain.
Only a few Tjakrabirawa troops were really necessary
on October 1st, and they could have been KOSTRAD
soldiers in Palace Guard uniforms. The extraordinary
lack of professionalism in the execution of the
"kidnappings" makes it unlikely that "unwitting"
Tjakrabirawa troops played a significant role. Their
role seems to have been that of making the first
contact at each of the victim's home.
In the early morning hours of October 1st GESTAPU
troops went to the homes of seven generals. Three of
the generals, including Army head General Yani, were
killed immediately and their bodies and three other
generals were taken to a place called Lubang Buaja
(Crocodile's Hole) on the outskirts of Halim Air Force
Base.
More than 100 troops surrounded the house of General
Nasution but in a "near miraculous" escape, Nasution
got away by climbing over a wall and hiding in the
bushes. The fiction that one of his aides was captured
and successfully impersonated one of the best known
men in Indonesia for some hours afterwards (a crucial
element in the CIA Research Study version of events),
need not puzzle us. No such thing happened and General
Nasution was meant to "escape," (The shooting of his
daughter, apparently by accident through a door, seems
too ghastly to have been part of the GESTAPU plan,
although her death and funeral were very important in
whipping up the subsequent fury against the PKI.
Nasution's much commented upon "moodiness" after
October 1st may in part be accounted for by his
remorse about not taking better precautions to protect
his family.)
General Nasution, the leading anti-Communist military
figure in Indonesia, had to be on the list of victims
of GESTAPU. His absence would have been incredible.
He was not, however, a member of General Yani's
"Generals' Council." The fact that it was General
Suharto, rather than the more well known Nasution, who
took the leadership of the counter-GESTAPU forces may
have a complicated explanation. We do not know the
subtleties of the Suharto-Nasution relationship. The
most probable explanation is that the immediate
appearance of Nasution as the head of the anti-PKI
effort would have aroused suspicions. Some stories
have Nasution being kept "protected" in a hidden place
on October 1st from 6 AM until 7 PM when he finally
appeared at KOSTRAD headquarters. Other reports have
him at KOSTRAD headquarters on the morning of October
1st. Nasution is alleged to have broken his ankle in
climbing over the wall, probably part of the cover
story for why it had to be Suharto who took the lead.
Among the more incredible "mistakes" of the GESTAPU
movement was the failure to try to kill or kidnap the
two generals in Djakarta who had operational command
of military forces in the area, General Suharto and
General Umar. Ruth McVey has commented on how
extraordinary this omission was, in view of the fact
that Col. Latief was one of the major GESTAPU
conspirators: "Col. A. Latief headed the mobile force
of the Djaya (Djakarta) Division and had commanded a
series of interservice capital defense maneuvers; he
must have known the basic provisions for an emergency
in the capital." In fact, Col. Latief seems to have
been one of Suharto's men. McVey states: "Latief, also
a Diponegoro Division officer (Suharto's former
division), had fought under Suharto during the
revolution; at the time of the Irian campaign he was
at the Mandala Command headquarters in Ambone....He
was assigned to KOSTRAD; his command at the time of
the coup, Brigade I, was one of the KOSTRAD infantry
brigades." Latief, according to Suharto himself,
visited him on the night of September 30th at the
hospital where Suharto was seeing his ill son. Another
account has Col. Latief paying a visit to the military
hospital on the morning of October 1st where
Nasution's injured daughter had been brought. General
Suharto and General Umar worked closely together
almost immediately from the beginning on October 1st
in "defeating" GESTAPU.
One general who was supposed to have originally been
on the list of GESTAPU victims because of his position
on General Yani's staff was General Sukendro. He was
in Peking on October 1st. In fact, Sukendro was a
close associate of Nasution and had the reputation of
a man with intimate associations with the American
military and the CIA. Sukendro came back from Peking
with the story that on October 1st Chinese officials
had shown Indonesians a list of the murdered generals
before it had been announced. (Intimations of Chinese
involvement in GESTAPU were rampant in the early
months after October 1st but faded to nothing after
their purpose had been served.) What exactly occurred
at Lubang Buaja where the six murdered and captured
generals were taken and eventually dumped into a well
is uncertain. Why they were taken there seems clear.
Lubang Buaja, despite stories that "secret" military
training of PKI people was occurring there, was well
known as a place where Air Force officers since July
had been conducting training of volunteers for the
Malaysian Confrontation. Those trained included youths
from both PKI and other organizations. The quick
murder of the generals and their alleged mutilation by
Communists was the core of the GESTAPU scenario.
Whether there were people from Communist organizations
present at Lubang Buaja is uncertain. It is possible
that unwitting volunteers had been brought there to
lend their presence to the proceedings. This could
have been complicating however. It was sufficient that
the dastardly deed be done at a place that was known
as a gathering spot for the training of PKI
volunteers. "Confessions" could be produced later.
There are a few indications that if, in fact, there
were "volunteers" present at Lubang Buaja on the
morning of October 1st they were not necessarily from
PKI organizations. The eye-witness account used in the
CIA Research Study states that there were civilians
crowding around the prisoners yelling "kill the
unbelievers," rather extraordinary words for
Communists to be uttering. Accounts seem . to agree
that the generals were almost unidentifiable, bloodied
and beaten up, wearing pajamas, and blindfolded.
Mortimer states that, among other non-Communist
youths, people from the Moslem Ansor youth
organization were expected at Lubang Buaja for
training on October 1st. We may speculate that the
GESTAPU officers present may have told anti-PKI youths
that they had captured the killers of the generals.
Whoever killed and "mutilated" the generals, their
murder served several important purposes for GESTAPU.
Most importantly, it could be blamed on the PKI. The
murder of General Yani opened the way for Suharto to
take over control of the Army and implement the
wrap-up of GESTAPU. It was standing procedure for
Suharto to become acting Army head whenever Yani was
not available. Suharto's behavior on October 1st seems
to be that of someone who is immediately aware that
Yani is dead. We find no discussion in accounts of
October 1st of efforts by Suharto to locate and rescue
captured generals until late in the day. He acted very
quickly to take charge. He exhibited none of the
uncertainty and hesitancy that characterized nearly
everyone else on October 1st.
The killing of the generals was also important in
inhibiting Sukarno from declaring in favor of the
September 30th Movement, a danger that could have
upset the scenario but which had been taken into
account. The fact that Lubang Buaja could also be
associated with the Air Force (although, contrary to
general impression, it was not in fact located on
Halim Air Force Base) was also useful in assuring that
General Dani and the Air Force would not be tempted to
throw their military forces behind the September 30th
Movement. Once it became known what an enormous crime
had been committed by the "progressive"
GESTAPU--political murder was very rare in
Indonesia--no one was likely to jump on the band-wagon
and complicate the planned failure of GESTAPU. Of
course, the discrediting of the leftist Air Force and
General Dani was part of the purpose of GESTAPU.
It is probable that the killing of the generals was
communicated as rapidly as possible to Sukarno so that
he would not think of backing GESTAPU. Accounts have a
helicopter flying over Lubang Buaja, perhaps part of
Sukarno's (or Suharto~s?) efforts to verify absolutely
that it was true. Sukarno was also probably told how
the PKI was linked to the murders. His early knowledge
that Nasution had probably "escaped" also served to
inhibit any impulse to support GESTAPU.
When the first message of the September 30th Movement
was broadcast over Radio Indonesia around 7 AM it was
announced that Sukarno was being protected and that
certain prominent persons who were to be targets of
the Generals' Council action had also been taken under
"protection." This was actually part of a deliberate
action to control the behavior of and information
available to leading non-GESTAPU political figures
whom, if at large, could interfere with the GESTAPU
scenario. PKI Chairman Aidit was brought to Halim very
early on October 1st. (His wife states that he was
kidnapped from his home.) Dani was brought to Halim.
(Accounts differ on this.) Sukarno was brought to
Halim. Most of Sukarno's advisors, such as Subandrio,
Njoto, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, were not in Djakarta.
Reports have it at if they had been in Djakarta they
were on the list of persons to be "protected."
Although there was some contact between these
individuals at Halim, much of the time they were kept
separated from each other in different houses with
GESTAPU messengers going back and forth. (The phones
had been cut in Djakarta. Only the Army had an
emergency communication system functioning.) Aidit in
particular was kept "protected" from any contact with
Sukarno. From the CIA Research Study account we learn
that "Aidit definitely was accompanied by two
bodyguards, who stayed with him the whole day of the
1st while he was at Halim and who accompanied him on
the plane on his flight from Halim to Jogjakarta on
the morning of the 2nd." The actual function of these
"bodyguards" seems obvious. (It is remarkable how
little role, even in the official accounts, Aidit
seems to have played at Halim in guiding the movement
that he is alleged to have been responsible for.)
Back at Merdeka Square, the GESTAPU-KOSTRAD troops had
occupied the radio station at about the same time that
the generals were being kidnapped. The use of the
radio to broadcast a carefully prepared series of
messages was a crucial part of the GESTAPU operation.
The fact that Suharto, located just across the square
in KOSTRAD headquarters, took no action until the
evening to put the radio off the air--although he says
that he very quickly decided that something was
wrong--was suspicious and "explained" in the official
version in terms of Suharto's desire to avoid
violence. (His tolerance toward troops who had
apparently killed or abducted six leading Army
generals is remarkable.) In fact, Suharto deliberately
waited to "retake" the radio station until the planned
messages were completed.
This he accomplished without firing a shot. (In the
whole GESTAPU affair, including outside of Djakarta,
only a handful of people were killed other than the
generals.)
The most important characteristic of the first 7 AM
GESTAPU radio broadcast in which the existence of the
September 30th Movement was announced was that it was
unclear whether GESTAPU was pro- or anti-Sukarno. The
deliberate creation of uncertainty was necessary in
part so as to prevent anyone "unexpected" from
involving themselves. The fact that the name of
Sukarno was not invoked in support of GESTAPU, which
any genuine leftist coup attempt would probably have
faked if necessary in order to increase the chances
for success, probably made GESTAPU seem somewhat
anti-Sukarno. The emphasis on its being "inside the
military" was calculated to prevent anyone, especially
the PKI, from taking to the streets and getting in the
way. Basically, the impact of the 7 AM message was to
confuse people and keep them sitting still waiting for
the next message. In any event, given the climate of
rumor in Djakarta, GESTAPU was not an implausible
event, although who was behind it and what it was to
accomplish was uncertain.
Another apparently calculated aspect of the first
radio broadcast was the statement that a Revolutionary
Council was going to be set up, with the
implication—later made very clear--that it would be
the new government. It was not until the afternoon
that the "rather peculiar assortment of names" on the
Revolutionary Council was announced. The indication of
the abolition of the existing cabinet, however, was
apparently partially intended to provide a rationale
and gloss of legality for General Suharto to take
quick command of the Army without consultation with
Sukarno. In justifying his behavior afterwards,
Suharto has cited the fact that GESTAPU had overthrown
the existing government and therefore he was free to
act on his own. (One of the contradictions in the
post-1965 explanation of GESTAPU is that if the Untung
group was primarily concerned to execute a limited
operation to purge the Army of leading anti-PKI
generals, why was it necessary to set aside the
existing government, giving the operation the clear
flavor of a political coup?)
Even the term "Revolutionary Council" may have been
devised as another bit of dust thrown in the eyes of
the confused public. Apparently the last time that
"Revolutionary Councils" had been established in
Indonesia was in 1956 and 1957 when some of the
dissident anti-PKI regional military commanders had
done so.
Although the radio announcement of the membership of
the new Revolutionary Council, "the source of all
authority in the Republic of Indonesia," was not
broadcast until about 2 PM, we will discuss it here.
It seems possible to discern several functions for
this message. The rather heterogeneous and lack-luster
membership seems calculated to discourage anyone from
rallying to support. (Clearly, few, if any, of the
non-military members of the Council had been informed
before hand. A better selection could have been faked
if assuring the success of the "coup" had really been
important.) The unknown middle-ranking officers took
the top positions for themselves. The heads of the
non-Army military services were prominently displayed
as members of the Council, perhaps part of the overall
plan to prevent uncontrolled military forces from
involving themselves in the GESTAPU events. Linking
the heads of the Air Force, Navy, and Police with
GESTAPU would make it possible to label any unwanted
military action by these forces as part of the GESTAPU
revolt.
It is uncertain how much additional calculation was
put into the membership list. A handful of PKI
officials from affiliated organizations were included,
but none of the top PKI leaders. This again would
discourage unplanned PKI involvement Later analyses of
the membership indicate the possibility that the CIA's
"experts" on communism may have devised the list
according to their calculation of a plausible "stage"
which the "revolution" in Indonesia had reached. In
October 1965 The Washington Post published a story by
Chalmers Roberts, apparently based on CIA briefings,
that said U.S. officials reported to have evidence
that Sukarno, through a coup, had ~intended to turn
his country into an Indonesian version of a Communist
'People's Democracy.'" We may guess that as part of
the devising of a cover story for GESTAPU the CIA
experts tried to simulate the kind of government that
the PKI and Sukarno (apparently little distinction was
made) might plausibly have been expected to set up if
a pro-Communist coup occurred in Indonesia in the fall
of 1965.
The 1968 CIA Research Study states that "the
Revolutionary Council was the perfect Communist front
organization." Justus van der Kroef has provided the
most extensive exposition of the "People's Democracy"
thesis, along the lines of Eastern European
experience. Actually, judging by a more careful study
of Soviet and Chinese examples, the PKI membership on
the Revolutionary Council was too limited and the
composition of the Council was far from being a
"perfect" simulation.
(The eight year old CIA Research Study contains
several rather amateurish efforts to show the traces
of Chinese Communist ideology or practice in the
GESTAPU events, reflective of the spirit of the
times.)
The behavior of Sukarno on October 1st, the subject of
much speculation later on, seems to be that of someone
who is unsure of what is going on, but wary and trying
desperately to get a handle on the situation. The
GESTAPU officers did not actually keep him prisoner at
Halim Air Force Base--General Supardjo's role seems to
have been that of a rather skilled handler of Sukarno,
keeping up the GESTAPU pretence--and permitted him to
send and receive messages and selected visitors. To
the extent possible, however, information and advice
available to Sukarno was controlled. (Sukarno's later
emphasis on his being at Halim of his own free will
was in the context of the rising anti-PKI hysteria.
Sukarno struggled to keep it under control and did not
want people to think that the "PKI-GESTAPU" had
kidnapped him.)
We must assume that the CIA had prepared a
psychological assessment of Sukarno which was an
ingredient in planning the GESTAPU operation. How
accurate and insightful the CIA's profile may have
been we do not know. Considering the obsession of
Westerners with Sukarno's sex life and the image of
irresponsibility and irrationality that had been built
up about him, we may suspect that the assessment was
not highly useful. Some Americans seem to have
considered Sukarno a coward and Howard Jones cites a
Washington view, circa 1958, that Sukarno "did not
have the intestinal fortitude to order the Indonesian
military into action since it would split the country.
Sukarno had worked all his life to unite his country;
he was the last man to take an action that would
result in a division that might be irrevocable." The
view of Sukarno as unwilling to take decisive and
divisive military action against other Indonesians
could have been a factor in the planning of GESTAPU.
Sukarno's lack of ruthlessness would be exploited.
One of the clearer indications of the absence of
collusion between Sukarno and the GESTAPU officers,
and of their willingness to ignore him when necessary,
is the fact that (according to the CIA Research Study)
at about noon on October 1st Sukarno told General
Supardjo to stop the September 30th Movement. However,
some important radio broadcasts had yet to be made,
and the rationale for the apparently fabricated
incriminating October 2 Harian Rakjat editorial would
have been destroyed if General Supardjo had
immediately stopped GESTAPU. The GESTAPU actions
continued in Djakarta until the evening.
At about 1 PM an announcement, over General Sabur's
name, was broadcast that "President Sukarno is safe
and well and continues to execute the leadership of
the State." This seems to have been a genuine
statement from Sukarno, and implied his rejection of
the September 30th Movement. Sukarno did not leave
Halim until about 8:30 PM when he went to Bogor,
having failed to prevent Suharto from taking over the
Army.
In addition to the GESTAPU radio broadcasts containing
the details of the Revolutionary Council, the other
important afternoon message was a statement attributed
to General Dani, the leftist Air Force Chief of Staff,
expressing support for the September 30th Movement.
This was broadcast at 3:30 PM. The means by which this
"Order of the Day" was elicited from Dani, or whether
it was fabricated, is uncertain. The statement carried
a dating of 9:30 AM, before Sukarno's radio message,
although it was not actually broadcast until six hours
later.
The CIA Research Study comments on this "incredibly
poorly timed" message of General Dani: "Two hours
after Sukarno had studiously avoided committing
himself over the radio the Air Force Chief Dani had
pledged support of the Air Force to the coup." The
peculiarity of this was accentuated by the fact that
Dani was considered to be a man who carefully
calculated his steps to fall in line with Sukarno. It
seemed impossible that Dani could take such an action
without Sukarno's endorsement. Perhaps in the confused
and controlled circumstances at Halim the GESTAPU
officers had managed to convince Dani earlier in the
day that Sukarno wanted him to prepare a pro-GESTAPU
Order of the Day to have on hand in case of need. (The
possibility of straight fabrication exists, although
the author has found no emphatic assertion to this
effect by Dani.)
Assuming that the Dani message was a planned part of
the GESTAPU scenario, it's purpose, of course, was to
incriminate the leftist Dani and the Air Force in the
GESTAPU coup attempt and the murder of the generals.
(In the early days after October 1st Suharto seems to
have been even more interested in defaming the Air
Force than the PKI. After all, the Air Force had
weapons and the PKI did not.) The Dani message also
helped to enhance the plausibility of a PKI newspaper
editorial expressing similar views on the next day.
Early and unambiguous identification of Dani with
GESTAPU would also inhibit him from taking unwanted
military action.
Following the broadcast of the Dani statement, there
were only a few steps left for GESTAPU, except for the
action in Central Java to be examined later. Another
incident of incriminating PKI involvement in GESTAPU
was the alleged appearance late in the day near
Merdeka Square of Pemuda Rakjat (the PKI youth
organization) youths armed with Chinese weapons
supposedly given to them by the Air Force. They were
quickly disarmed by units of the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU 530th
Battalion which had already "rejoined" the loyal
forces. (Perhaps the incident was arranged in part to
demonstrate that the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU units were not
really bad.)
This futile arming of "PKI" youths with marked Chinese
weapons that were never used is another of the almost
endless string of GESTAPU "mistakes." The CIA Research
Study comments: "The weapons were all small arms of
Chinese origin, with the 'Chung' trademark stamped on
them. The Indonesian army was known not to have any
weapons of that type. There is absolutely no doubt
that the arms were the property of the Indonesian Air
Force." (Suharto is later said to have thrust one of
these "Chung" guns before Sukarno as proof of
GESTAPU's evil.)
While the CIA analyst may have "no doubt," another
explanation seems more probable. (Stories of Chinese
arms shipments to Indonesia were rife after October
1st but even the CIA Study, in other places, questions
their accuracy.) The CIA is known to have had a large
store of Chinese weapons at this time, which were used
for a variety of purposes, including such
"incriminating" schemes. This incident was simply
another planned part of the GESTAPU effort to
incriminate the PKI in GESTAPU in dramatic fashion.
The youths might have been unwitting Pemuda Rakjat but
that could have been too dangerous and it seems more
probable that they were other youths, or possibly it
did not even happen at all.
Apparently there were armed anti-PKI youths in
Djakarta already on October 1st who had some idea of
what was going on. Donald Hindley has written the
following:

"October 1 was an even more confusing day for the
civilians of Djakarta....And yet, while the situation
was still in doubt, a few civilians did take action to
use the September 30 Movement as the excuse for a
public attack on the Communist Party.
"By the evening of 1 October, several Moslems had met
and agreed to form a Moslem Action Command Against
Communism. These initial, and very few, activists were
members of HMI (Moslem University Student's
Association), PII (Moslem High School Students),
Gasbiindo (Indonesian Moslem Trade Union Association),
and the Muhammadijah, all of them organizations
formerly affiliated with Masjumi. The only politician
willing to be involved on that first day was Subchan,
a vice-chairman of the NU and, in many ways, atypical
of his party's leadership. That evening the group made
contact with the army leadership, in the person of
Djakarta commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma,
who agreed to give them a few weapons. More important,
Umar approved the formation of KAP-Gestapu (Action
Front for the Crushing of Gestapu: Gestapu being an
abbreviation of the Indonesian for 'September 30
Movement'). The plans for the more narrowly based,
specifically Moslem Action Command were quietly
dropped. Already, then, the army leadership had
proffered its encouragement and (as yet less clearly
apparent) protection for those who would spearhead a
civilian campaign against the PKI."

If this is true, it indicates either remarkable
prescience (it occurred before any evidence of PKI
connection to GESTAPU had been announced) or, in our
interpretation, that the GESTAPU action was a
CIA-Suharto creation. The list of organizations
involved on October 1st reads like a list of those
civilian groups who would most likely have been
working under CIA guidance. The use of anti-PKI
students by the Army after October 1st is well known.
The use of similar groups in many countries is also
standard CIA practice. The extraordinarily early
creation of KAP- GESTAPU with Army support is evidence
of how the groundwork for the subsequent exploitation
of the GESTAPU events was laid right from the
beginning, if not before.
By about 7 PM on October 1st the Army had retaken the
Indonesian Radio station and at 8:45 PM an
announcement was broadcast that the
"counter-revolutionary" September 30th Movement had
kidnapped a number of generals but that Sukarno and
Nasution were now safe and "the general situation is
again under control."
Then occurred what subsequent observers have
considered one of the most puzzling GESTAPU
"mistakes," the appearance on October 2nd (after
almost all other papers had ceased publication) of an
issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat containing an
editorial and cartoon endorsing the September 30th
Movement.
There is a remote possibility that the PKI editors
were taken in by the messages they heard over the
radio and had thrown caution overboard and in fact
wrote such an editorial, but it is more probable that
it was a fabrication. The Cornell study examined the
October 2nd issue of Harian Rakjat at length and
raised some doubts about the authenticity of the
editorial and cartoon. The Cornell researchers,
however, did not go so far as to declare them phony.
The Cornell study does state that "the Djakarta
garrison commander, Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumae,
issued an order dated 6:00 p.m. on the 1st to the
effect that no publications of any kind were to appear
without permission of the Djakarta war authority, save
for the Army newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan
Bersendjata, whose buildings were to be guarded to
ensure that they did come out." The Cornell study
states that it is "quite likely that the Harian Rakjat
office and plant...was occupied by government troops
at or not long after the time that Gen. Umar gave this
order."
The Cornell researchers rejected "the most obvious
explanation, that of an Army falsification" for the
appearance of the October 2nd issue on rather weak
grounds:
"Everything is written in the normal Harian Rakjat
jargon, and the competence of the PKI's enemies at
falsifying party documents has always been abysmally
low."
The Cornell study had already pointed out that the
editorial, and the cartoon, were not in typical Harian
Rakjat style; the mere appearance of "authentic"
jargon does not exclude the falsification hypothesis.
The clumsiness of some earlier falsifications might
lead one to suspect that the Army had help on this
one, from the falsification experts in the CIA.
The CIA Research Study finds the October 2nd editorial
"mystifying," "an act of political suicide." The
Study's explanation for how it happened is that Aidit
was too busy doing other things to contact the Harian
Rakjat editors and tell them to stop: "They could
certainly have prevented its circulation....In the
confusion of the moment, Aidit obviously did not have
the time or the opportunity to contact the editors of
Harian Rakjat if the matter of the editorial even
occurred to him. He was totally occupied at the time
with more important matters." With Sukarno having not
endorsed the September 30th Movement, it is highly
unlikely that Aidit, if he had been able to act, would
have permitted the PKI to come out in public so
quickly in favor of it. The Suharto-CIA thesis seems a
more plausible explanation than "oversight. "
The activities of the September 30th Movement outside
of Djakarta were restricted almost completely to
Central Java and officers of the Diponegoro Division,
General Suharto's former command. The CIA Research
Study states: "In the three key cities of Central
Java, there occurred the same basic pattern of
military action followed by a public statement of
support for Untung's movement and an announcement of
the formation of a Revolutionary Council." Officers of
the Diponegoro Division, led by Col Suherman, the
Chief of Army Intelligence for Central Java (who had
returned from training in the U.S. a month before),
carried out these actions. (A number of analysts,
including the semi-official Army historians, have
noted that apparently the PKI had infiltrated the
intelligence and civic action branches of the Army
most successfully. It would seem more probable that
the Suharto-CIA group had infiltrated those branches
where American influence, guidance, and training were
strong.)
The Djakarta pattern was followed even to the extent
of having another remarkable "escape" of the leading
military figure, General Sujosumpeno, the Division
Commander, who then put down the coup with ease. Only
two officers were killed by GESTAPU, Col. Katamso, the
commanding officer in Jogjakarta, and his deputy. The
subsequent discovery of their bodies was again used to
whip up anti-PKI emotions. The interesting wrinkle in
this case is that Col. Katamso was a most unlikely
victim of the "progressive" GESTAPU. According to Ruth
McVey's research, Katamso was a relatively pro-PKI
military officer and, in Rex Mortimer's words, "the
singling out of Colonel Katamso for destruction seems
decidedly perverse." (We may speculate that as no
further victims of the Yani-type were needed, the
CIA-GESTAPU group decided that they might as well make
a pro-PKI officer the sacrificial lamb in Central
Java.)
There were a few alleged PKI demonstrations of support
for GESTAPU in Central Java but it appears that, as in
Djakarta, most, if not all, were fabricated. The "PKI"
action that received most attention was a
demonstration in Jogjakarta on October 2nd. Major
Muljono, a civic action officer in the Diponegoro
Division, was the GESTAPU leader in Jogjakarta. He
seems to have been the one that put together the
demonstration and other pro-GESTAPU actions. The CIA
Research Study states that "The major PKI mass
organizations were restrained from
action....Apparently Muljono was able to influence the
Communist youth more than the PKI leadership." The
Cornell study states that the demonstration in
Jogjakarta "appears to have been chiefly a function of
connections between the local coup leader, Major
Muljono, and civilian youth groups. The demonstration
was notable for the absence of PKI, SOBSI, Gerwani,
and BTI participants." Major Muljono was the only
important officer in Central Java who was later put on
trial. He "confessed" everything.
The wrap up of GESTAPU in Central Java took slightly
longer than in Djakarta but followed the same pattern
of "Suharto-style" negotiations and immediate,
cooperative surrender.
Our analysis is that the basic reason why the
CIA-Suharto group decided to extend GESTAPU outside of
Djakarta is that they wanted to show that the
PKI-GESTAPU was a nation-wide threat so as to justify
a nation-wide repression of the PKI. Central Java was
the easiest place for Suharto to arrange the necessary
GESTAPU actions and PKI "implication." GESTAPU was
limited to a few cities where the Diponegoro Division
was concentrated. As the CIA Research Study states,
"Nothing of the sort that happened in Semarang,
Jogjakarta, and Solo happened anywhere else in Java,
not even in East Java, where there were many powerful
centers of Communist strength." The Cornell study
comments on the Central Java coup efforts that "what
is extraordinary is not the amount of Communist
participation in the initial phase of the affair but
the lack of it."
Before concluding, let us consider the fate of the
leading GESTAPU conspirators. Some of them were tried
and sentenced to death (Lt. Col. Untung, General
Supardjo), others were said to have been killed in
military clashes (Col. Suherman), and others (Col.
Latief) have never been brought to trial or had their
execution announced. It is our assumption that all of
the leading military officers involved in GESTAPU on
October 1st were "witting" actors in the CIA-Suharto
plan. There is a remote chance that someone like
Untung could have been unwitting but considerations of
security would seem to have excluded the possibility
of using someone who might easily have informed higher
authorities of GESTAPU's existence or plans. We
believe, particularly if the CIA connection is
accurate, that these conspirators have subsequently
been provided with new identities by the CIA and
resettled outside of Indonesia. This kind of
resettlement and looking after one's assets is
relatively standard CIA procedure. The temptation to
tie up loose ends and prevent any possibility of leaks
raises the suggestion that the GESTAPU officers have
been eliminated after serving their purpose but, not
to be ironic, the honorable men at the CIA would
probably consider this to be in violation of their
code of conduct.
The official announcements of executions of GESTAPU
officers, such as there have been, have been rather
vague. For example, although Untung was tried and
convicted in early 1966, it was not until September
1968 that Suharto stated for the first time that
Untung and three other military leaders of the coup
had been executed in December 1967. The 1968 CIA
Research Study speculated that Latief was one of those
executed in 1967 but in 1972 Latief made his first
public appearance as a witness in the trial of Pono,
an alleged PKI coup organizer. General Supardjo
remained at large after October 1965 and was not
arrested until early 1967. Apparently the Army knew
where he was and his arrest was timed to serve a
purpose in the ouster of Sukarno. In December 1965 it
was announced that Col. Suherman and the other
important GESTAPU officers from the Diponegoro
Division headquarters had been shot dead in a clash
with government troops in Central Java. Other Army
sources have said that they were actually captured
before they were shot. The evidence available to the
author indicates that there have been no public or
independently verified executions of any of the
GESTAPU officers.

Conclusion

Discounting the dubious confessions displayed at the
post-1965 show trials, the CIA-Suharto hypothesis
seems to have the following advantages over other
explanations of GESTAPU:

  1.It is consistent with PKI policy and behavior
before, during, and after the October 1st events. It
explains PKI unpreparedness.
  2.It is consistent with President Sukarno's behavior
before, during, and after the events of October 1st.
Sukarno had never resorted to political murder.
  3.It explains why the coup was launched in such a
disadvantageous military situation, why it was carried
out with such incompetence, and why it failed so
easily.\
GESTAPU was meant to fail, and quickly.
  4.It is consistent with expected U.S. activism. It
is highly implausible that the U.S. would have
passively permitted Indonesia to "go Communist."
Something had to be done. A desperate situation
required desperate measures.
  5.It relates the GESTAPU action to those who
benefited from it.
  6.It is consistent with what we know of the
backgrounds of the GESTAPU officers. They were, for
the most part, Suharto's men and there is no evidence,
except for that obtained through "confessions," that
they had any pro-PKI inclinations.
  7.It explains why General Yani and his associates
were killed (and not merely kidnapped or put on
trial). There were several strong motives for the CIA
and Suharto to get rid of Yani. Victims of the "PKI"
were required and in the Indonesian context, Yani was
a "constitutionalist," loyal to the existing regime,
as General Schneider was later in Chile.
  8.It is inconsistent (a positive value) with a
series of highly suspicious trials that were
stage-managed by the Indonesian Army for obvious
political purposes. As Justus van der Kroef wrote in
1970, "What Indonesians have been reading about
Gestapu thus far is likely, in retrospect, to be more
valuable as an index to the manipulation of the
opinion and feelings concerning the September 30
events than as a contribution to an understanding of
the coup itself." That a few trials, those of Sudisman
and Sjam, impressed some foreign observers is only
indicative of the fact that the state of the art has
advanced since the 1930's in the Soviet Union.

The Cornell study in 1966 perceived the absence of
links between GESTAPU on the one side and the PKI and
Sukarno on the other and the essentially reactive
behavior of the latter. The Cornell researchers
concluded that the GESTAPU actors were entirely within
the military establishment. A number of analysts noted
the many associations between the GESTAPU officers and
General Suharto. In the climate of 10 years ago,
however, prior to the revelations of CIA operations,
few were willing to take the next step and draw the
logical connections that most adequately explain
GESTAPU and its origins.

The Gestapu "coup"

In the late evening of 30 September 1965, on the
orders of a commander of President Sukarno's Palace
Guard, Lt. Col. Untung, and a commander of the Army's
Jakarta region, Col. Latief, six top generals of the
Army were seized in their houses and taken to Halim
air base near Jakarta. The generals were: 1. Gen.
Ahmad Yani, Army Commander and Minister; 2. Maj.Gen.
Suprapto, Second Deputy Commander of the Army,
specially charged with administration; 3. Maj.Gen.
Harjono, Third Deputy Commander, in charge of
financial management and public relations; 4. Maj.Gen.
S.Parman, First Assistant of the Army Commander, in
charge of intelligence work; 5. Brig.Gen.D.I.
Pandjaitan, Forth Assistant of the Army Commander, in
charge of logistics; 6. Brig.Gen. Sutojo
Siswomihardjo, Prosecutor General of the Army. A
seventh general who was also haunted by the
kidnappers, managed to escape. This was the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution.
In order to carry out the aims of the kidnapping,
three task forces were established some time between
14 August and 30 September 1965: 1. Pasopati Task
Force (headquarter: SENKO I; commander: Lt. Dul Arief
[Tjakrabirawa Regiment], a subordinate of
Lt.Col.Untung) consisted of: soldiers
of Untung's batallion in the Tjakrabira- wa,
complemented by two platoons of the First Infantry
Brigade of the Military District Jakarta and a unit of
the Paratroop Brigade of that territory, 2.
Pringgodani Task Force (headquarter: SENKO II;
commander: Maj.Sujono [responsible for guarding the
Halim air base]) had two
influential members Sjam (alias Kamaruzaman) and Pono
(alias Bono) "allegedly" from the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI), 3. Bimasakti Task Force (headquarter:
SENKO I; commander: Col.Latief) consisted of two
parts; the first part consisted of the 454th
Diponegoro Division and the 530th Brawijaya Division,
plus other smaller units; the second part consisted of
a radio broadcasting team headed by Captain Suradi of
the Intelligence Service of Col. Latief's Brigade.
Later it became known that all six generals were
murdered at the LUBANG BUAYA (Crocodile Hole) near
Halim air base. From that time on, every year the
Indonesian people celebrate the Pancasila Sacredness
on October 1, as a reaction to the so-called Gestapu
(the 30th September 1965 Movement) "coup". It's also
important to point out that the word COUP poses a
problem to the author. The dictionary defines the word
COUP (in french, coup d'e'tat) as "the sudden,
forceful overthrow of the government"; literally it
means a blow against the state. In fact, the second
communique broadcast by the Gestapu Movement on 1
October 1965 is as follows: "To avoid wrong
interpretations and misreporting, we announce that
President/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno is
in good health and that he continues to HEAD THE
STATE." (Vitacchi, 1967) Therefore, to avoid confusion
among readers, the Gestapu "coup" is used instead of
the Gestapu coup (which is interpreted as a REAL coup
d'e'tat).

Indonesia's official version of the Gestapu "coup"

The statement, more or less a hypothesis, is provided
by the Indonesian Army that:

  1.the PKI was the SOLE mastermind of the Gestapu
"coup",
  2.President Sukarno possessed foreknowledge of the
"coup".

[Sources: Notosusanto and Saleh, 1968; Widjanarko,
1974]

The statement is based on:

  1.the fact that the PKI leader (Dipa Nusantara
Aidit) was at the Halim airbase and the PKI
organizations ("Pemuda Rakyat" and "Gerwani") were
present at the murder and burial scene indicated that
the PKI was involved.
  2.an "evidence" that the PKI Special Bureau "Biro
Khusus" agents Sjam (alias Kamaruzzaman) and Pono
(alias Bono) were in contact with the Gestapu
plotters,
  3.the presence of President Sukarno at Halim air
base (based solely on a document purporting to be a
record of the Army interrogation of a Sukarno-aide
until 1966 - a Colonel Bambang Widjanarko of the
Marine Corps), and Sukarno's refusal to condemn the
PKI or show any real sympathy for the murdered Army
Generals.

The weaknesses of Indonesia's official statement:

  1.The PKI leader (Dipa Nusantara Aidit) was never
brought to a public trial, not even to MAHMILUB
(Extraordinary Military Tribunal) set up by Maj. Gen.
Suharto. The controversy went on until 5 October 1980,
the 15th anniversary of Armed Forces' Day after the
"coup". An account of Aidit's death appeared,
unexplained, in Kompas Minggu, one of Jakarta's major
newspaper (Southwood and Flanagan, 1983). The
following account by Aidit's direct executioner,
Colonel (now General) Yasir Hadibroto, appears
credible because of independent corroborative
evidence.

On 2 October 1965, after hearing news of the "coup",
Yasir, then commander of the IVth Infantry Brigade of
KOSTRAD in North Sumatra, went straight to his
commander at KOSTRAD headquarters in Jakarta. His
commander was (then) Maj. Gen. Suharto, today's
Indonesian President. He was asked by Suharto:

        "Where were you at the time of the PKI Madiun
rebellion in 1948?" "I had just moved to West Java. My
company was ordered to confront three communists
batallions at Wonosobo", answered Yasir. "The people
rebelling today are the offspring of the Madiun PKI.
Go and deal with them all ['bereskan itu semua']. D.N.
Aidit is in Central Java. Take your troops there",
ordered the KOSTRAD commander.

    In Central Java, Aidit (the PKI leader) was
captured, and Yasir took him to the local KOSTRAD
batallion in Boyolali:

     Some officers and men woke up. "What's going on?"
they asked. "I've got the slant-eyed PKI guy", replied
Yasir. Then he asked, "Is there a well any where?"
"Yes, over there", said the men. The fugitive was
taken straight to the place indicated. Aidit was told
to stand there. He was given half an hour before being
dealth with. He made use of his half-hour to deliver a
speech. This passion with which he spoke made all who
heard him very angry and they were unable to control
their emotions, so the rifles went off.

     Later, Yasir made his report to Suharto (his
KOSTRAD commander):

     15:00 o'clock, 24 November 1965. Col Yasir was
received by Pak Harto [Suharto] at the State Palace in
Yogyakarta. He reported everything that had happened
concerning the arrest of the PKI fugitive and the way
he [Aidit] had been dealth with. After making his
report, Col. Yasir took courage to ask:
    "When you said we were to deal with things, is
this what you meant ?"
    The Commander of KOSTRAD [Suharto] only SMILED.
      
  2.Sjam was a cadre of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist
Party) and around the same period he had also been in
touch with Lt. Col.Suharto, today's Indonesian
President, who often came to stay in his house in
Yogyakarta (Wertheim, 1979); besides, Sjam (although
sentenced to death in 1968) and Pono (alias Bono, his
assistant in the Special Bureau) have been treated
extaordinarily well in prison, and May (1978) quoted
as writing:

        "Indonesians who were released after having
been detained following the riots in January 1974 said
they saw the two men in prison. Far from having been
executed, they were allowed OUT from time to time and
wrote reports for the Army on the political
situation."

  3.The Widjanarko testimony (1974) if used to
implicate President Sukarno in the Gestapu "coup" is
doubtful. The Army interrogated Widjanarko to try to
prove Sukarno's involvement in the "coup". But as
Utrecht (1975) revealed, that the original copy of the
testimony was not even signed by Widjanarko himself.
Moreover, he himself, as Utrecht (1975) clarified,
wished to DISSOCIATE himself completely from the
report of his interrogations in 1966-1967.

The Indonesian Army by 1965

According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch
(1978), by 1965 the Indonesian Army General Staff was
split into two camps. At the center were the general
staff officers appointed with, and loyal to, the army
commander General Yani, who in turn was reluctant to
challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity
in alliance with the PKI. The second group, including
the right-wing generals Nasution and Suharto,
comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist
policies. All of these generals were anti-PKI but by
1965 this divisive issue was Sukarno.

The Cornell version (Anderson and McVey, 1971) focused
on the existence of dissatisfaction within certain
sections of the Army and the motivations provided to
launch the "coup". The actual originators of the
"coup", the Cornell version states, were a group of
middle level officers from the Diponegoro Division in
Central Java who were strongly Javanese in their
cultural orientation and resented the metropolitan
decadence of Jakarta, particularly the decadence
prevailing among senior officers of the Diponegoro
Division in the Army, including General Ahmad Yani.
Therefore, the impetus of their discontent was largely
economic, particularly strong was the resentment of
the luxurious life-style of the Jakarta-based
Generals. They also resented the fact that promotions
were hard to come by; they might have wanted to return
to the Spirit of Yogya, to the pure revolutionary
spirit of the Indonesian nation.

The real Gestapu plotters

Col. A. Latief, the commander of the Army's Jakarta
region, is Suharto's friend dated back as far as the
Revolution in which they had fought together. He was
one of the Gestapu plotters and was brought to trial
in summer 1978. Whereas the other plotters, Lt.Col.
Untung and Brig.Gen. Supardjo, had been sentenced to
death and were excuted soon after the events, Latief
had not been tried for all these years, but kept in an
isolation cell in Salemba prison in Jakarta.

What's the problem with him will be revealed very soon
!!

On May 5th, 1978 (during his trial), he submitted to
the court a detailed 'Eksepsi' (demurrer) and is
quoted as writing:

    "Two days before the October 1, 1965, events I
visited with my family Suharto's home in Jalan Haji
Agus Salim. At the time General Suharto was still
commander of KOSTRAD. Besides speaking about family
affairs, I also intended to ask him some questions
regarding information I received concerning the
Generals' Council ("Dewan Djendral") ..... He
[Suharto] himself told me the following: the previous
day he had learned from a former subordinate of his
from Yogyakarta, whose name was Subagyo, that there
was information about the existence of a generals'
council of the Army, which had plans for a coup
d'e'tat against the power of President Sukarno and his
government."

Latief further reported who were present at that
visit; among them was Suharto's youngest son who the
same day got hot soup over his body. Then Latief
continues:

    "In addition, I wish to confirm a report which a
writer, Brackman, has published an interview with
General Suharto ..... General Suharto told him the
following: 'Two days before September 30, our
three-year-old son had an accident at home. He poured
hot soup on himself, and we had to rush him to the
hospital. Many friends visited my son there and on the
night of September 30, I was there, too. ... I
remembered Col. Latief dropped into the hospital that
evening to inquire about my son's health. I was
touched by his thoughtfullness. .... Today I realize
that he didn't go to the hospital to on my son but,
rather, to CHECK ON ME....'

     There also exists (Latief goes on) an interview
of Suharto published in Der Spiegel of June 1970, in
which he was asked how it could happen that he didn't
appear on the list of generals who were to be killed.
Suharto replied: 'About eleven o'clock in the night,
Col. Latief of the putsch conspiracy came to the
hospital with the intention to KILL ME, but evidently
he shrank back from effectuating this plan in a public
place.'

     I believe (Latief continues) that the President
of the Court, .... will ask: 'Why did Latief come at
this extremely important moment ? Did Latief really
want to kill General Suharto that night?'

     Is it imaginable (Latief pursues his argument)
that I should be planning to do harm to a man I highly
esteemed, whom I had known for a long time and who had
been, in the past, my commander ? It is, moreover,
logical that if I would actually have planned to kill
"Bapak" General Suharto, such an act would certainly
have amounted to a BLUNDER that would cause the whole
movement of October 1, 1965, to fall through.

     I was firmly convinced that if anybody could be
considered LOYAL to the leadership of President
SUKARNO, IT WAS HE. I know him already from Yogyakarta
and I truly did know who "Bapak" General Suharto was.
I came to him, in full agreement with
Brig.Gen.Supardjo and Lt.Col. Untung, after we had
gathered that evening about 9 o'clock in my house. The
aim was to be able to appeal at any time to him for
support. This is why I found it important to visit
him. Lt.Col.Untung had also been his subordinate in
Central Java and later he had been transferred to the
Raiders' Corps. He was selected to be parachuted on
West Irian, which earned him high honours. Still,
Untung dared not appear before Suharto, as I did...."

In his "Eksepsi", Col. Latief remarks that Sukarno was
deposed as President because it was assumed that
Sukarno had possessed foreknowledge that something
that night and, thus, had a certain co-responsibility
for the events.

    "We have to observe," writes Laties, "that Gen.
Suharto, TOO, 'possessed foreknowledge', and had
information both about the existence of a generals'
council and about the existence of a movement to
thwart the plan of the generals' council for a coup
d'etat. When he was informed about that or, at least
had learned about it, he did NOT as quickly as
possible report it to his chief the Minister
concurrently Commander of the Army [Gen. Ahmad Yani]
or to the President [Sukarno]."

Troops involved in the Gestapu "coup"

Two batallions,the 454th Diponegoro Division and the
530th Brawidjaja Division, were involed in the "coup"
and comprised the bulk of the 3rd Paratroop Brigade.
The subordination of this two factions in this
supposed civil war to a single close command structure
under Suharto (the KOSTRAD commander) is cited to
explain how Suharto was able to restore order in the
city without gunfire. Meanwhile, out at the Halim air
base, an alleged gun battle between the 454th (Green
Baret) and the RPKAD (Red Baret) paratroops went off
"without the loss of a single man" (Scott, 1985).

Scott (1985) went on explaining his curiosity of the
fact that the 454th and the 530th Batallions had been
among the main Indonesian recipients of US assistance.
It is interesting to note how many Gestapu leaders had
been US-trained !! The Gestapu leader in Central Java,
Col. Saherman, had returned from training at Fort
Leavenworth and Okinawa, shortly before meeting with
Lt.Col.Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th Batallion
in mid-August 1965. Saherman's acceptance for training
at Fort Leavenworth "would mean that he had passed
review by CIA observers."

PKI killings under Army instigation

The total count of those who died in the killings
would satisfy anyone wishing to impose a large order
of magnitude as the defining characteristic of a
MASSACRE.
Amnesty International (1977) quotes estimates that
more than half a million died, but adds that 'many
independent observers' estimate that 'many more than a
million' died in the 1965 - 1966 period.

Hughes (1968) interviewed one of the commissioners,
accountable to President Sukarno for reporting the
Gestapu-aftermath death toll and reported as follows:

     Was he [the commissioner] satisfied, I [Hughes]
asked, with the accuracy of the 78,000 figure the
commission had submitted ? He laughed merily.
    "Oh, my dear, no," he said, "that was nowhere near
the right figure," What then he believe to be the
correct figure ? "My own view," he replied
unblingkingly,"is that about ten times as many people
as that were killed." Taken aback, I asked him to
spell that out again. Was he really saying that
although the commission had reported 78,000 people
killed, he himself believed the figure to be 780,000 ?
"YES, THAT'S RIGHT," he assured me ...
    Shaken, I asked the commisioner why he permitted a
report to go forward to the President [Sukarno]
setting the death toll at about 10% of the figure he
really believed to be accurate. "Ah, well," he
replied,..."you mustn't forget all this was back in
December 1965. You mustn't forget what the political
atmosphere was then. The President was still in
charge. We gave him the figures we thought he wanted
him to hear."

Col. Sarwo Edhie's cold-blooded slaughter of the
alleged PKI members became LEGENDARY as his RPKAD
paracommandos moved from Jakarta to the trouble spot
Central and East Java, then to Bali:

     At the approaches of one village (in Central
Java), women turned their bare bottoms contemptuously
to troops in an armoured car; it has been reported
that they were members of 'Gerwani' (as if this could
somehow justify what happened) but it's difficult to
see how this could have been established with
reasonable certainty while the soldiers rolled
forward. The women persisted with their insult. Sarwo
Edhie, who was directing the operation personally,
ordered a gunner to fire. The women fell. Villagers
rushed up to protest; they were also shot. The troops
went from village to village taking their victims away
by the truckload to be killed. Many were obliged to
dig their own graves (Southwood and Flanagan, 1983,
p.77).

It is also clear from Sundhaussen (1982)'s account
that in most of the first areas of organized massacre
(North Sumatra, Aceh, Cirebon, Central and East Java),
there were loyal army commanders with especially
strong and proven anti-PKI sentiments. Many of these
had for years cooperated with civilians, through
so-called
"civic action" programs sponsored by the United
States, in operations directed against the PKI and
sometimes Sukarno. Thus one can legitimately suspect
conspiracy in the fact that anti-PKI "civilian
responses" began on October 1, when the army began
handing out arms to Muslim students (ANSOR) and
unionists, EVEN BEFORE there was any publicly evidence
linking Gestapu "coup" to the PKI.

Concluding Remarks

The author realizes that this short article is far
from perfect. In addition, the author believes that
the Gestapu "coup" remains an unsolved mystery,
although for the past 28 years Indonesianists around
the world have provided abundant (both confirming and
conflicting) information about the "coup".

None the less, it is clear in our mind that:

  1.almost nobody knows exactly the REAL story of the
Gestapu "coup"; the very person that knows extremely
well is now STILL IN POWER in Indonesia
    and is UNTOUCHABLE by "ordinary human beings",
  2.Indonesia's official version of the Gestapu "coup"
is of course HIGHLY questionable; at least not only
PKI but also President Suharto and his colleagues
could be held accountable for it, with a possibility
that Suharto and his colleagues are the real "Dalang"
(Puppet Master in Javanese Wayang) of the Gestapu
"coup",
  3.so far the number of death toll of the alleged PKI
members has been a 'guessing game' among
Indonesianists overseas, because there is no accurate
figure available; and last but not least NOBODY has
been held RESPONSIBLE (let alone, brought to trial)
for "main hakim sendiri" KILLING the alleged PKI
MEMBERS from October 1 '65 onwards.

Regarding the last point (KILLING PEOPLE), I'd like to
draw the readers' attention to facts in the former
Soviet Union during Gorbachev's era and to quote to
you some headings in the New York Times newspapers:

    (New York Times, 1991, December 1, I, 18:3): "Oles
Yauchuk produces film, called 'Famine 33' chronicling
Josef Stanin's forced collectiveness of agriculture
and famine it caused in 1933 in Ukraine; more than 7
million people died in famine; until recently the
subject was erased from Soviet history"

     (New York Times, 1991, November 7, A, 1:3):
"President Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledges that Soviet
people now understands that Stalin's regime repressed
freedom and HUMAN RIGHTS"

     (New York Times, 1990, April 7, I, 7:1): "Soviet
historians, rewriting history of Stalin years to
replace now DISCREDITED VERSION, hold conference ..."

But before they occured, President Mikhail Gorbachev
spoke on 2 November 1987 about Stalin (Facts on File,
1987):

     "Gorbachev told the delegates that Stalin was
GUILTY OF 'enormous and unforgivable' CRIMES that were
a 'lesson for all generations'. 'To remain on a
position of historical truths,' he said,'we must see
both Stalin's unquestionable contribution to the
struggle for socialism, in defence of its gains, and
his GROSS POLITICAL MISTAKES, the arbritariness
permitted by him and those who were close to him.' "

According to the Indonesian State Ideology Pancasila,
Indonesia is a country based on the One Supreme GOD.
The above examples show us that Soviet COMMUNISTS
supposedly being ATHEISTS can understand Human Rights
and know that TO KILL PEOPLE is a CRIME. What do you
think about the attitude of the Suharto regime who
FALLS BEHIND compared to the Soviet communists ??????

A note from the author (Paul Salim)

It is a scientific article that should be commented on
scientifically. Whoever wants to ask a NON-scientific
question to the author is encouraged to use his
PERSONAL e-mail (salim@acs.ucalgary.ca).
At the end of the article, he has a million-dollar
question to you:

"What do you think about the attitude of the Suharto
regime who FALLS BEHIND compared to the SOVIET
COMMUNISTS ?"

Thank you and hope you enjoy his article.

References

    "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed",
J.of Contemporary Asia, 248-251
    Amnesty International, 1977, "Indonesia: An
Amnesty International Report"
    Anderson, B., and McVey, R., 1971, "A Preliminary
Analysis of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia",
Cornell University
    Crouch, H., 1978, "The Army and Politics in
Indonesia", Cornell University Press, pp. 79-81
    Facts on File, 1987, "Gorbachev criticizes Stalin
in Major Speech but fails to rehabilitate disgraced
Bolsheviks", p. 817
    Holtzappel, C., 1979, "The 30 September Movement:
A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an
Intelligence Operation ?", J. of Contemporary Asia,
    9(2), 216-239
    Hughes, J. 1968, "The End of Sukarno", London,
Angus and Robertson
    May, B., 1978, "The Indonesian Tragedy", London,
Henley and Boston
    Notosusanto, N, and Saleh, I., 1968, "The Coup
Attempt of the 30 September Movement"
    Scott, P.D., 1985, "The United States and the
Overthrow of Sukarno: 1965 - 1967", Pacific Affairs,
239-264
    Southwood, J., and Flanagan, P., 1983, "Indonesia:
Law, Propaganda, and Terror", pp. 155-156, Zed Press,
London
    Sundhaussen, U., 1982, "The Road to Power:
Indonesia Military Politics, 1945 - 1967", Oxford
University Press
    Utrecht, E., 1975, "An attempt to corrupt
Indonesian History", J. of Contemporary Asia, 5(1),
99-102
    Vitacchi, T., 1967, "The Fall of Sukarno", Andre
Deutch
    Wertheim, W.F., 1979, "Whose Plot? -New Light on
1965 Events", J. of Contemporary Asia, 9(2), 197-213
    Widjanarko, B.S., 1974, "The Devious Dalang:
Sukarno and the so-called Untung Putsch"

Ben Anderson (Cornell University), "How Did the
Generals Die?"

1996 note from David Johnson of the Center for Defense
Information

Excerpts from: Dr. Ben Anderson (Cornell University),
"How Did the Generals Die?," Originally published in
the journal "Indonesia," April 1987 issue.

Surprises often come to light when one rummages
through dusty, crowded attics. In the course of
casually rummaging through the hundreds of photocopies
pages
of the stenographic record of Air Force
Lieutenant-Colonel Heru Atmodjo's trial before the
judges of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal
(Mahmilub), I came across the documents translated
below [not reproduced here], which in their original
form were included as appendices to the trial record.
They consist of the reports composed by the team of
five experts in forensic medicine who examined the
bodies of the six generals (Yani, Suprapto, Parman,
Sutojo, Harjono, and Pandjaitan) and lone, young
lieutenant (Tendean) killed on the early morning of
October 1, 1965. Their sober accounts offer the most
exact, objective description of how these seven died
that we will ever have. In view of the longstanding
controversy on the matter, and the widely differing
reports offered to the public in newspapers and
magazines, it seemed to me worth translating them in
full for the scholarly community.
The heading to each visum et repertum (autopsy) shows
that the team was assembled on Monday, October 4, as a
result of written order from the then Major General
Suharto, as KOSTRAD Commander, to the head of the
Central Army Hospital (RSPAD). The team was composed
of two army doctors (including the well-known Brig.
Gen. Dr. Roebiono Kertopati), and three civilian
specialists in forensic medicine at the Medical
Faculty of the University of Indonesia. The most
senior of these civilians. Dr. Sutomo Tjokronegoro,
was then the foremost expert in forensic medicine in
the country. The team worked for 8 hours, i.e., from
4:30 p.m., October 4, to 12:30 a.m., October 5, in the
Dissection Room of the Central Army Hospital. They
clearly had to work fast, since we know from many
press accounts that the bodies were only removed from
the well at Lubang Buaja (into which they had been
thrown by the killers) in the late morning of October
4, over 75 hours after the murders. By then, as was to
be expected in a tropical climate, the corpses were
already in an advanced state of putrefaction. And
after daylight on Tuesday, October 5, the remains were
ceremonially interred in the Garden of Heroes (Taman
Pahlawan) at Kalibata. One final point is worth
noting. Given the fact that the autopsies were ordered
personally by Maj. Gen. Suharto, it is unlikely that
the doctors' reports were not immediately communicated
to him upon their completion.
Each of the seven reports follows the same format:

  1.a statement of Maj. Gen. Suharto's instruction to
the five experts;
  2.identification of the corpse;
  3.description of the body, including any clothing or
body-ornaments;
  4.a detailing of the wounds detected;
  5.a conclusion with regard to time and cause of
death; and
  6.a statement by all five experts, on oath, that the
examination had been fully and properly performed.

For public accounts of the seven deaths, we today,
like Indonesian readers in 1965, must rely largely on
the reporting of two military newspapers, Angkatan
Bersendjata (The Armed Forces) and Berita Yudha (War
News), and the ABRI information service that supplied
them. Although several civilian newspapers continued
to publish, the left-wing press had been suppressed by
the evening of October 1, and the state-run radio and
television were fully in military hands before October
1 was out. It is therefore instructive to compare the
accounts provided by the military newspapers with the
contents of the army-appointed medical experts'
reports, completed, we may infer from the appended
documents, some time on Tuesday, October 5.
Given the fact that the two newspapers were morning
newspapers, and thus their October 5 edition were
probably "put to bed" while the doctors were still
completing their examinations, it is not surprising
that their reporting that day was perhaps hasty,
without the benefit of detailed information. Angkatan
Bersendjata, which featured some blurred photos of the
decomposing bodies, described the deaths as "barbarous
deeds in the form of tortures executed beyond the
bounds of human feeling." Berita Yudha, always more
vivid, noted that the corpses were "covered with
indications of torture. Traces of wounds all over the
bodies, the results of tortures inflicted before they
were shot, still covered our heroes' remains." Maj.
Gen. Suharto himself was quoted as saying that "it was
obvious for those of us who saw [the bodies] with our
own eyes what savage tortures had been inflicted by
the barbarous adventurers calling themselves 'The
September 30th Movement.'"
The newspaper went on to describe the last moments of
General Yani's life, saying that after being gunned
down in his own home, he had been thrown still alive
into a truck, and was tortured from that moment until
the "final torture at Lubang Buaja." Proof of this
torture was provided by wounds on his neck and face,
and the fact that "his members were no longer
complete." What this somewhat obscure phrase meant
became clearer in the following days. On Thursday,
October 7, Angkatan Bersendjata observed that Yani's
"eyes had been gouged out," a finding confirmed two
days later by Berita Yudha, which added that the face
of the corpse had been found wrapped in a piece of
black cloth.
That same October 7 Angkatan Bersendjata went on to
describe how Generals Harjono and Pandjaitan had died
in hails of gunfire in their homes, with the corpses
tossed onto a truck which vanished into the night with
"its engine roaring like a tiger thirsting for blood."
Berita Yudha, however, noted torture scars on
Harjono's hands.
On October 9, Berita Yudha reported that, although
General Suprapto's face and skull had been smashed by
savage terrorists (perterror2 biadah), his features
were still recognizable. Lieutenant Tendean had knife
wounds on his left chest and stomach, his neck had
been mutilated, and both eyes had been gouged out
(ditjungkil). The following day it quoted eyewitnesses
of the October disinterment as saying that some of the
victims had had their eyes torn out, while others had
"had their genitals cut off as well as many other
inhuman horrors." On October 11, Angkatan Bersendjata
elaborated on Tendean's death by saying that he had
undergone severe tortures at Lubang Buaja where he was
handed over to members of Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita
Indonesia--the Communist Party's women's affiliate).
He was made a "vile plaything [permainan djahat]" by
these women, who used him for target practice.
Where the army newspapers led, others quickly
followed. On October 20, for example, Api Pantjasila,
organ of the army- affiliated IPKI party, announced
that the eye-gouges (alat pentjungkil) used on the
generals had been discovered by anticommunist youths
ransacking Communist Party buildings in the village of
Harupanggang, outside Garut, without suggesting,
however, why the Party had thought fit to preserve
them there. On October 25, the same paper carried the
confession of one Djamin, a member of the Communist
Party's youth organization Pemuda Rakjat, who said he
had witnessed General Suprapto being tortured
"obscenely [diluar batas kesusilaan]" by Gerwani
members. Similar confessions followed, culminating in
the remarkable story of Mrs. Djamilah, issued on
November 6 to the whole press by the ABRI information
service. Mrs. Djamilah, described as a three-month
pregnant, fifteen-year-old Gerwani leaders from
Patjitan, revealed that she and her associates at
Lubang Buaja had been issued penknives and razors by
armed members of the September 30th Movement. They
then, all one hundred of them, following orders from
the same men, proceeded to slash and slice the
genitals of the captured generals. Evidently this was
not all. For the Army- controlled Antara of November
30 described how Gerwani women had given themselves
indiscriminately to Air Force personnel involved in
the September 30th Movement; while Angkatan
Bersendjata, on December 13, described them as dancing
"The Dance of the Fragrant Flowers" naked under the
direction of Communist Party leader D. N. Aidit,
before plunging into mass orgies with members of
Pemuda Rakjat.
In these accounts, which filled the newspapers during
October, November, and December, while the massacres
of those associated with the Communist Party were
going on, two features are of particular interest
here. The first is the insistence that the seven men
were subjected to horrifying tortures--notably eye-
gouging and castration; the second is an emphasis on
civilians in organizations of Communist affiliation as
the perpetrators.
What do the forensic experts' reports of October 5
tell us? First, and most important, that none of the
victims' eyes had been gouged out, and that all of
their penises were intact: we are even told that four
of the latter were circumcized, and three
uncircumcized.
Beyond that, it may be useful to divide the victims
into two groups: those whom most of the nonforensic
evidence indicates were killed by being shot dead in
their own homes by the kidnappers, namely Generals
Yani, Pandjaitan, and Harjono; and those who were
killed after being taken to Lubang Buaja, namely
Generals Parman, Soeprapto, and Sutojo, as well as
Lieutenant Tendean.

Group I.
The fullest accounts of their deaths appeared long
after they occurred: in the case of Yani in Berita
Yudha Minggu, December 5; of Pandjaitan, in Kompas,
October 25, Berita Yudha Minggu, November 21, and
Berita Yudha, December 13; and of Harjono in Berita
Yudha Minggu, November 28. All indicate that the
generals were abruptly and immediately killed at home
by heavy gunfire delivered by members of the
Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard Regiment under the
operational command of First Lieutenant Doel Arief.
The forensic reports confirm this picture only in
part. The experts observed that the only wounds on
Yani's body were ten entering and three existing
gunshot wounds. Pandjaitan suffered three gunshot
wounds to the head, as well as a small slit-wound in
the hand. On the other hand, the wounds suffered by
Harjono are puzzling, since no mention is made of
gunshots. The cause of death was apparently a long
deep incision in the abdomen, of a type much more
likely to be caused by a bayonet than a penknife or a
razor. A similar, nonfatal wound appeared on the
victim's back. The only other damage was described as
"on the left hand and wrist, wounds caused by a dull
trauma." There is no obvious way to interpret these
wounds except to say that they seem unlikely to be the
result of torture--torturers rarely pick left wrists
to do their work--and may have been the result of the
dead body being thrown down the 36- foot well at
Lubang Buaja.

Group II.
The fullest accounts of the deaths of these victims
appeared in the following newspaper reports: Parman,
Berita Yudha, October 17, and both Berita Yudha and
Angkatan Bersendjata, December 12; Soeprapto, Berita
Yudha Minggu, December 5; Sutojo, Berita Yudha Minggu,
November 21; and Tendean, Berita Yudha Minggu, October
25. It was these four men that most reports of savage
and sexual torture concerned. What the forensic
reports reveal is as follows:

  1.S. Parman suffered five gunshot wounds, including
two fatal ones to the head; and, in addition,
"lacerations and bone- fractures to the head, the jaw,
and the lower left leg, each the result of a heavy
dull trauma." We have no way of knowing what caused
these dull traumas--rifle butts or the walls and floor
of the well--but they are clearly not "torture"
wounds, nor could they have been inflicted by razors
or penknives.
  2.Soeprapto died of eleven gunshot wounds in various
parts of his body. Other wounds consisted of six
lacerations and fractured bones caused by dull traumas
around the head and face; one caused by a dull trauma
on the right calf; wounds and fractured bones
"resulting from a very severe, dull trauma in the
lumbar region and on the upper right thigh"; and three
cuts, which, to judge from their size and depth, may
have been caused by bayonets. Again "dull trauma"
indicates collision with large, irregularly shaped
hard objects (rifle butts or well stones) rather than
razors or knives.
  3.Sutojo suffered three gunshot wounds (including a
fatal one to the head), while "the right hand and the
cranium were crushed as a result of a heavy dull
trauma." Once again, the odd combination of right
hand, cranium, and heavy dull trauma suggests rifle
butts or well stones.
  4.Tendean died of four gunshot wounds. In addition,
the experts found graze wound on the forehead and left
hand, as well as "three gaping wounds resulting from
dull traumas to the head."

Nowhere in these reports is there any unmistakable
sign of torture, and any trace of razors and penknives
is absent. Not only are almost all the nongunshot
wounds described as the result of heavy, dull traumas,
but their physical distribution--ankles, shins,
wrists, thighs, temples, and so on--seem generally
random. It is particularly striking that the usual
targets of torturers, i.e., the testicles, the anus,
the eyes, the fingernails, the ears, and the tongue,
are not mentioned. It can thus be said with reasonable
certainty that six of the victims died by gunfire (the
case of Harjono, who died in his own home, remains
puzzling), and that if their bodies suffered other
violence, it was the result of clubbing with the butts
of the guns that fired the fatal bullets, or of the
damage likely to occur from a 36-foot--i.e., roughly
three-story--fall down a stone-lined well.
It only remains to be said that in his speech of
December 12, 1965, to the Indonesian News Agency,
Antara, President Sukarno chastised journalists for
their exaggerations, insisting that the doctors who
had inspected the bodies of the victims had stated
there were no ghastly mutilations of eyes and genitals
as had been reported in the press.

"Bayang Bayang PKI"

by Wim F.Wertheim
>From the Tapol newsletter.
E-mailized by: David Johnson; CDI web page

BAYANG-BAYANG PKI (Images of the Indonesian Communist
Party), with a foreword from Goenawan Mohamad,
published by ISAI (Institute for Studies on Free Flow
of Information), Jakarta, December 1995, 180pp.

For the first time since 1990 when the Washington Post
and other US newspapers published revelations by the
journalist Kathy Kadane about the role played by US
diplomats in the 1965/66 massacre of thousands of
Communist cadres in Indonesia, these events have again
become the topic of vigorous public debate in
Indonesia. What appears to have happened is that a new
generation which has grown up in recent decades,
unburdened by the traumatic experiences of their
parents, wants to know what exactly happened in those
critical years. People have started to question the
veracity of the official version which has served to
underpin the New Order ideology.
In the past few years, several books have been
published which are critical of the official version
that the former President Sukarno who was deposed by
Suharto and Nasution was guilty of involvement in the
tragic events. One important book, published in 1994,
was written by former member of Parliament and
diplomat Manai Sophiaan, Kehormatan bagi yang berhak -
Bung Karno tidak terlibat G30S/PKI (Honour to one who
deserves it: Sukarno was not involved in the 30
September/PKI movement). Another was the autobiography
by Oei Tjoe Tat, a former minister and one of
Sukarno's close collaborators, which was published in
1995 and banned a few months later.
But what was missing in Indonesia until recently was a
publication critically dealing with the central
accusation of the Suharto regime, that the 1965 events
happened as the result of an attempt by the Communists
to take power by force. It is this topic that is dealt
with by the book under review.
There are a number of foreign works by experts in
Indonesian history which discuss the 1965/66 events
all of which have been scrupulously studied by the
members of the ISAI team that undertook the research
on which Bayang-Bayang PKI is based. But competent
Indonesian historians living in their own country have
until now shrunk from seriously and critically dealing
with this hot issue. All the more do the youthful
members of the ISAI team deserve our admiration for
having had the courage to publish the results of their
investigations and their evaluation of the different
versions of the sequence of events.

A scientific approach

What is particularly striking is the professionalism
of their methodology. They begin by studying the
accounts by staunch defenders of the official version
and interviewed several of these people. But they also
studied sources that are critical of the role played
by the Indonesian military establishment, as well as
by foreign powers, and interviewed several people
considered as being crucial informants on certain
details. The method of the ISAI team was 'to cover
both sides'. To the New Order regime, such an approach
is totally unacceptable.
After a short Introduction, the first chapter asked
the crucial question of who was the dalang
(puppet-player) behind the 30 September Movement. For
the regime, the reply is clear: the PKI. As recently
as 1994 the Indonesian government again propounded
this position in a White Book: Gerakan 30 September:
Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia. Latar
Belakang, Aksi dan Penumpasannya (The 30 September
Movement: Insurrection of the PKI. Background, Action
and its Eradication). According to every White Book
published by the Suharto regime, the PKI organ
responsible for the insurrection was the Biro Khusus
(Special Bureau) set up to infiltrate the Indonesian
armed forces. According to the latest White Book, the
strategy that culminated in the 1965 insurrection was
adopted at the PKI Congress in 1955.
But as the authors show, in 1955 the PKI adopted the
strategy of a peaceful, parliamentary struggle to
achieve its aims (pp.134/5). It was this strategy that
accounted largely for the PKI's successes at the
national elections of 1955 and regional elections of
1957.
Bayang-bayang PKI looks closely at Sukarno's
assessment of the 1965 events when he was still
president, in January 1967. In a supplement to his
Nawaksara speech of 1966 to the MPRS (Provisional
People's Consultative Assembly), he said he had
arrived at the following conclusion:

  1. The PKI leadership was keblinger (had fallen into
a trap);
  2.'Nekolim' (Neo-colonialism and Imperialism) had
been engaged in subversion.
  3.Some elements had behaved in a malicious way
Evidently, Sukarno was of the opinion that the PKI,
rather than being responsible for the murder of the
generals, had fallen victim to a provocation. It was
this declaration that provided Sukarno's enemies with
the pretext to depose him as president.
The authors look closely as a number of foreign
sources which have tried to demonstrate that the
so-called 'coup' was the result of a provocation by
certain Indonesian army circles. The hypothesis that a
'premature Communist coup' was provoked so as to
enable the army to strike decisively at the left-wing
forces in Indonesia, has been advanced for example by
Geoffrey Robinson, and by Coen Holtzappel of Leiden
University (who is Dutch, not German).
The authors quote at length from my article 'Whose
Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events', published in 1979
in the Journal of Contemporary Asia. In that article I
attributed a crucial role in the whole affair to Sjam
(Kamaruzzaman), to whom Aidit, PKI the chairman, had
entrusted the task of penetrating and subverting the
Indonesian armed forces. But Sjam, appointed by Aidit
to head the secret branch, which since 1965 has been
referred to by the New Order as the Special Bureau,
according to my analysis was a double agent working
for the armed forces to infiltrate the Communist
Party.
As for the military commander from whom Sjam directly
or indirectly received his orders, in my article
reproduced in the book under review, I suggested the
Kostrad commander, Suharto himself, as a plausible
candidate. In this connection the authors, like me,
refer to the highly compromising meeting on the night
of 30 September 1965 between Suharto and one of the
main plotters, Colonel Latief, a few hours before the
seven generals were kidnapped. The book also quotes
Manai Sophiaan who writes that, after his talk with
Latief, Suharto should have reported to his
superiors(p.84). But it is wrongly stated that Suharto
and Latief met again at the Military Hospital on 1
October. Also, on p.27, my recent article 'Indonesia's
hidden history of 1965: When will the archives be
declassified?', published in Kabar Seberang 24/25, is
mistakenly attributed to Van den Heuvel.
Another chapter considers whether the 'coup' could
also be described as a clandestine CIA operation. The
authors carefully studied the writings of Peter Dale
Scott, Geoffrey Robinson and Frederick Bunnell.
Bunnell in particular has disputed the claims made by
H.W.Brands in his article: 'The US didn't topple
Sukarno'.
In Chapter IV, the authors draw the conclusion that a
major factor which led to the 1965 tragedy was the
fact that the Communist Party allowed its chairman
Aidit, in collaboration with his unreliable associate
Sjam, to pursue an adventurist strategy in breach of
the peaceful, parliamentary road re-affirmed in
successive PKI congresses. In 1966, this adventurism
was sharply criticized in Criticism and
Auto-Criticism, clandestinely circulated by Party
leaders who were still at large. One top leader,
Sudisman, who was arrested soon afterwards, repeated
this criticism at his trial in December 1966 (pp.112
ff.). The authors rightly argue that the Party as a
whole cannot be held accountable for the actions of a
tiny group of irresponsible leaders. 'Maybe,' they
write, 'to borrow the words of Bung Karno, the actions
should actually be attributed to the PKI leaders
having fallen into a trap.'
The final chapter analyses the reactions of a random
sample of younger people to a questionnaire asking
them what attitude should be taken towards the 1965
events. Sixty-two per cent of the respondents thought
that people involved in the 1965 events should now be
forgiven; eighty-eight per cent agreed that the 'ET'
mark on the identity cards should be abolished and
eighty-one per cent agreed with the award to Pramoedya
Ananta Toer of the Magsaysay Prize.
In his Foreword, Goenawan Mohamad concludes that the
volume formulates the right questions rather than
attempting to provide answers. In their own
Introduction, the authors draw the following
conclusion from the questionnaire. Evidently, the
youngsters who responded were no longer obsessed by
the Communist scare. 'To the generation which will
soon grow up, maybe the most important problem will
be, how to protect themselves from being crushed by
"globalisasi".'

Wim F.Wertheim
Bayang-Bayang PKI banned On 22 April, the
Attorney-General issued an order banning the sale,
distribution or possession of the ISAI publication.
The reason given is that the book discusses a 'number
of theories about the 1965 events which are based on a
distortion of the facts or which mystify the
historical facts relating to the events, adding
insinuations. Such things can spread false and
deceptive views which can cause unrest and disrupt the
public order'. [Kompas, 17 May]
Thanks David!

THE TRUTH ABOUT GERWANI: THE GENDER ASPECT OF THE
SUHARTO REGIME
"Experience has shown that it is so easy for people to
be branded, accused, detained and tortured, until they
are forced to confess to what they never even did."
                                             Syed
Husin Ali

by: Wim F. Wertheim

On 23 September 1990, at the invitation of Indonesians
staying in the Netherlands, I read a lecture in
Amsterdam with the title: Sejarah tahun 65 yang
tersembunyi. 1) In that lecture I called on those
present seriously to study the 1965 events, as well as
to reconstruct the history of the PKI preceding those
events, in order to prove that the PKI had been a
social force worthy of being remembered with pride
(PKI merupakan kekuatan yang patut dibanggakan). It
was a period when, owing to the revelations of the
American journalist Kathy Kadane, in Indonesia
interest in the true history of 1965 had been awakened
anew. To my great surprise, in 1994 I received from
M.R. Siregar, who had been present at my lecture, a
copy of the first edition of his highly important book
on the postwar history of PKI, which has, in revised
form, now been published both in Europe and in
Indonesia under the title Tragedi Manusia dan
Kemanusiaan: Kasus Indonesia - Sebuah Holokaus Yang
Diterima Sesudah Perang Dunia Kedua (2nd ed. Tapol,
1995; 3rd ed. Progres, 1996) 2).

However, in the same lecture I equally had urged the
necessity of a thorough rehabilitation of Gerwani,
that had been slandered by the New Order in a most
scandalous manner. I argued:

"Ada sebuah kewajiban lagi yang penting, yaitu
meneliti kembali duduk perkara Gerwani di dalam
peristiwa 1 Oktober 1965. Dan semula penguasa menuduh
gadis-gadis Gerwani di Lubang Buava berbuat paling
keji dan tak tahu malu. Melalui media pers
bertahun-tahun disiarkan, seolah-olah mereka
dihadirkan di sana oleh PKI untuk melakukan upacara
'harum bunga', sambil menari-nari lenso untuk
mengantar nyawa jenderal-jenderal itu, melakukan
perbuatan tak senonoh, dibagi-bagikan pisau silet, dan
lantas ikut ambil bagian dalam perbuatan jahat serta
menyiksa jenderal-jenderal itu sebelum mereka tewas.
Sebagai akibat dan cerita-cerita demikian terbentuklah
bavangan. seakan-akan Gerwani adalah perkumpulan
perempuan lacur, jahat, bengis yang harus dihinakan
dan bahkan dibinasakan" 3).

Further on in my lecture, I stressed the importance of
a complete purification of Gerwani from all such
unjust accusations, since Gerwani before 1965 had been
most active in defending women's rights and struggling
for their implementation.

And again my appeal proved not to have been in vain;
but this time the response came not from one of those
Indonesians who had attended my lecture, but from a
Dutch sociologist, who was already since years engaged
in a study of the Indonesian women's movement and
probably had not been aware of my appeal. To my great
surprise on 6 October 1995, at the University of
Amsterdam, Saskia Wieringa defended her doctoral
thesis on Gerwani, one week after the presentation in
Amsterdam of the second edition of Siregar's study.
The title of her dissertation is: The Politicization
of Gender Relations in Indonesia: The Indonesian
Women's Movement and Gerwani Until the New Order
State. It is really a pity that thus far the study is
only available as a doctoral dissertation, in a very
restricted number of copies. A translation into
Indonesian has been completed, but not yet published.
Nevertheless, its content is so important that a
review should not be delayed any longer.

Basically, the study consists, after a theoretical
introduction, of two parts: first an analysis of the
pre-war and post-independence history of the
Indonesian Women's Movement, and of the position of
Gerwani within that framework, in totality covering
eight chapters; and second one final chapter, dealing
with the 1965 events and their aftermath. But one
might sustain that the two parts are of equal
significance. The two parts form together a rewritten
account of the social and political post-war
developments in Indonesia, analysed from a novel
angle: the gender viewpoint.

>From the three chapters, devoted to the left-wing
branch of the Indonesian post-war feminist movement,
represented first by Gerwis and later on by Gerwani,
one cannot but conclude that generally speaking
Gerwani has fulfilled an important and positive role
within Indonesian post-war society. However, Wieringa
certainly is not idealizing the political role played
by Gerwani from 1954 onwards, and in her analysis she
criticizes several aspects of Gerwani's strategy. In
particular she censures the tendency of Gerwani, in
conformity with the strategy of PKI, to abstain from
any criticism of President Sukarno's behaviour in
matrimonial affairs.

"Indonesia was no exception to the general pattern in
which after national liberation was won women's
movements are disappointed, although it has its own
peculiar edge. In this case the personal life of the
nation's first President, who had managed with such
success to rally the collective force of the women's
movement behind the nationalist struggle as the
'second wheel of the chariot', helped defeat the
marriage reforms for which the movement had fought so
consistently" (p.136).
Wieringa elaborates this point as follows: 1'President
Sukarno's marriage to Hartini in 1954 meant a
staggering blow to the movement. The same President
who had 'in so inspired a manner' addressed several
women's congresses, and who, in Sarinah, had promised
women independence in the 'just and prosperous
society'
Indonesia would become after independence, now ignored
the central interest for which most women's
organizations fought" (p.144).

Whereas Gerwis, in 1952, had strongly supported the
demand for marriage reforms, and had opposed a draft
law granting widows of civil servants, in case of
polygamy, a pension twice the amount a single widow
would receive (p.179), in 1954 after Gerwis had been
transformed into Gerwani, the latter organization
abstained from criticizing Sukarno's marriage with
Hartini. This was, no doubt, related with PKI's wish
for political reasons not to antagonize Sukarno. But
as a consequence, Gerwani's leading position in the
struggle for women's rights was weakened, also in
comparison with the strategy of other wings of the
women's movement. According to Wieringa, through its
strategy vis-a-vis Sukarno's marriage with Hartini,
Gerwani also isolated itself to some extent from other
feminist organizations. Marriage reform remained on
Gerwani's programme, but in the course of the 1950's
received less attention.

In the period of 'Guided Democracy' (from 1957
onwards) Gerwani increasingly supported Sukarno's
policy in connection with the feminist movement: the
time had come for Indonesian women "to struggle side
by side with their men, not against them". What
Sukarno meant with the struggle which the women had to
share with
the men, was the struggle against imperialism (p.230).
In this respect Gerwani aspired to a vanguard position
within the women's movement, but herewith it met with
antagonism on the part of the other organizations,
particularly through its attitude towards Sukarno.

However, generally speaking one can observe that in
the course of the 'Old Order' the feminist accents
within the women's movement gradually tended to
evaporate. Within Gerwani there existed a PKI-oriented
communist wing side by side with a feminist wing
(though Gerwani itself did not want to define itself
as being 'feminist'). But particularly during 'Guided
Democracy' the former wing started to dominate. The
theoretical position of Gerwani approached President
Sukarno's view, that female equality with men could
only be realized after a truly socialist society would
have been created, through a common struggle by women
and men (p.231). Gerwani, therefore, started to stress
activities in the realm of nationalist policies, such
as support of the struggle for incorporating
West-Irian within Indonesia.

But in actual practice, in the local sphere, Gerwani
remained active in typically feminist campaigns, such
as establishing creches, in the realm of education and
health, in struggling against hard child labour in the
fields, against prostitution and forced marriages
(pp.251/2). Gerwani was even active in organizing
anti-price rise demonstrations, which amounted to
opposition vis- a-vis the government (pp.235 ff.).
Wieringa summarizes the way Gerwani characterized
itself vis-a'-vis other women's organizations:
"Gerwani distinguished itself in its concern for the
rights of female labourers and peasants. Thus
Gerwani's constituency was different; it fought for a
'more complete' range of interests, and its proposed
solutions, drawn primarily from the socialist world,
were also different" (p.275). The other organizations,
such as Perwari, were characterized by Sukarno as only
a 'ladies movement' (p.231).

Gerwani did not identify itself with the PKI, and
accepted also non- communist members. "From 1945
through 1965, Gerwani defined itself as an
organization which was non-party political but which
did contain political views't (p.213). PKI chairman
Aidit was, according to Wieringa, not much interested
in female interests, and even never attended Gerwani
congresses (p.210, note 63). On the local level,
Gerwani often could carry out actions on behalf of
women's rights and interests, in cooperation with
local groups from other women's organizations (p.195).
Moreover, in the early 1960s some of the other women's
organizations also increasingly became influenced by
Sukarno's 'hegemonic' political line; they "felt
compelled to couch their activities in a language
punctuated with Nasakom, Manipol/Usdek, Nefos and
other current terms" (p.156). However, in 1964
relations between Gerwani and the other wings of the
women's movement suffered from increased tensions.

An important factor was the government's instruction
in that year, that all mass organizations had to link
themselves to a political party. "As Gerwani felt
closest to the PKI the decision was taken that at the
next congress, in December 1965, the organization
would officially affiliate itself to the Party".
Marxism would become the leading ideology, and
"Gerwani would change from a non-political
organization based on education and struggle to a
mass- organization of Communist and non-Communist
women" (pp.201/2). Gerwani had meanwhile grown into an
organization which claimed to possess 1,7 million
members!

It was in particular the 'spontaneous' activities of
PKI, BTI and Gerwani in the realm of land reform 4),
which seriously antagonized Islamic and certain
right-wing PNI-oriented groups. According to Wieringa,
"the role of Gerwani in the one-sided actions has not
been described in any depth in the histono graphy of
the period.
Yet about half of the peasants imprisoned were women,
and it was Gerwani leaders who made frequent visits to
the prisons and helped the BTI cadres to free the
prisoners" (p.223). But in addition, it was the
militancy of Gerwani members that irritated Javanese
cherishing traditional conceptions about the female
duties.
"Gerwani's definition of women's kodrat (code of
conduct) did not include the idea that members should
appear to be shy and meek in public life. Gerwani's
pride in the militancy of its volunteers for the
Malaysia campaign in the 1960s had been preceded by a
concerted effort to stimulate women's revolutionary
activism in the 1950s, and the roots of Gerwani's
readiness for combat were found in the personal
histories of many of the original Gerwis members, who
had fought in the war for national indepen dence"
(p.255). "The resistance Gerwani experienced at the
militancy it propagated indicates the strength of the
traditional women's kodrat which prescribes servility
and meekness for women" (p.281).

As for the moral ideals and practices of Gerwani:
"Gerwani was very adamant in its marriage policy:
monogamy was the norm" (p.261). "The accusations
directed at Gerwani after 'the events' are not
supported by Gerwani's ideology or practice. The
organization opposed prostitution, defended rape
victims and fought against the 'moral corruption'
associated with 'mad dancing' and ngik ngak ngok
music. Its sexual policy was actually rather
puritanical, with a certain emphasis on egalitarian
values (...) In the seriousness with which Gerwani
kept to its role as 'moral guardian' of their
(Manipol) families and society as a whole they
conformed to the prevailing kodrat" (pp.282/3).

The strikingly accurate way the author has analysed
the pre-coup history of the Indonesian women's
movement and the special role within that movement of
Gerwani, challenges the reader to study most seriously
the last, highly important chapter, titled 'Two
Coups', in which 'The curtain falls', and Gerwani is
definitely swept away.

In that final chapter Saskia Wieringa presents a
concise survey of the events in the night from 30
September till the evening of October 1, followed by a
profound analysis of the crucial period of the final
months of 1965. There exist many studies of that
highly tragic period in Indonesian history, but the
author attempts to add a perspective that is largely
missing in the current literature: the enormous
significance of the gender aspect.

There are quite some historians, among them myself,
who have attempted to explain the fierceness of the
massacre of hundreds of thousands communists and other
left-wing Indonesians, especially in the countryside,
as a reaction upon the aksi sepihak (one-sided
actions) waged by poor peasants from 1964 onwards
against rich landlords or farmers, many of them
belonging to the pious Moslem community. But according
to Wieringa the whole eradication campaign, waged
against PKI and related organizations, was explicitly
based on a slander design, from the beginning directed
against Gerwani and the militant ideology associated
with the women's movement. Through the sexual
symbolism utilized in this campaign, PKI and communism
could be thoroughly discredited. The following
quotations elucidate Wieringa's main thesis:

"It is important to discuss what happened during this
crucial period, the last months of 1965, for two
reasons. In the first place the campaign had major
consequences for the women's movement, because Gerwani
was totally destroyed and the space within which the
other women's organizations could manoeuvre was
severely restricted. Prior to 1965, women's
organizations were able to define their own interests,
although this capacity had become increasingly limited
by national and party politics. This is no longer
possible in the New Order state, which defines the
interests women's organizations should take up. This
is the case not only for the women's organizations set
up by the state, such as the PKK and the Dharma
Wanita, but for all women's organizations.

In the second place the campaign hit the underbelly of
Indonesian society, linking Communism (...) with
fitnah, the Islamic concept of sexual disorder (...)
The PKI became associated with disorder symbolized by
women's sexually perverse behaviour. From this state
of chaos, society could only be saved by a systematic
cleansing of Communism and the resubordination of
women. As the symbol of virility, the army - and
president Suharto in particular - took care to emerge
as the only force capable of restoring and maintaining
orderly society. Their continued power is justified by
consistently recreating the myth of the perverted
Communist beast ... Gerwani, meanwhile, has become
associated with loose, amoral behaviour" (pp.287/8).

Wieringa's analysis is based on field research she
undertook in the mid 1980's. She succeeded in
interviewing some of the main surviving Gerwani
leaders, who all of them had suffered decennia-long
prison terms and terrible maltreatment. She also
interviewed some ordinary members who had been
associated with the events around 'Lobang Buaya', the
'Crocodile Hole' near Halim Airfield where in the
early hours of 1 October 1965 the surviving generals,
victims of the kidnapping operation, had been killed
and together with the corpses of those who had been
killed earlier were thrown into a deep well. She also
thoroughly studied newspaper reports dated between 1
October 1965 and the first months of 1966, from which
it became possible "to trace how the campaign of
slander about the involvement of Gerwani members at
Lobang Buaya was built up". Initially there was among
the military a certain hesitation to incriminate the
women who had been present at the atrocities in Lobang
Buaya. However, from 11 October onwards the newspapers
directed by the army followed a consistent line:

"Gradually, new elements were being introduced which
all pointed to the central conclusion the Indonesian
public had to reach: Communism is so immoral and
anti-religious that it leads 'our' women to neglect
their womanly duties. Instead of being loyal wives and
good mothers, obedient to the state ideology Pancasila
and religion, they become politically active and
morally loose unleashing their frightful sexual powers
in indecent ways and committing unspeakable
atrocities. Therefore, the public was made to
understand, it was perfectly justified to wipe out
Communism and especially Gerwani and thus cleanse the
society and restore order. This message was directed
towards a society which was already badly shaken by
both the economic and the political crisis and the
rural unrest" (pp.306/7).

Already on 11 October Berita Yudha, an army newspaper,
started with the story that the bodies of the generals
had been mutilated: 'eyes had been gouged out, and the
genitals had been cut off some of the generals" .
Other papers took up the campaign as well (p.309). On
12 October another newspaper claimed "that Gerwani
danced in front of their victims nakedly, which act
reminds us of cannibalist ceremonies executed by
primitive tribes centuries ago. Let us leave it to the
women to judge the womanly morality of Gerwani, which
is of an immorality worse than animals" (p.310). This
set the tone for the whole campaign, which soon
resulted in slogans such as 'Crush the PKI' and
'Gerwani Whores'! The newspapers also started to
'substantiate' their incriminations through forged
'confessions' of alleged 'horrible sins', that were
extracted by military people, police and prison guards
from girls who came back from interrogations beaten
and bruised. Some of Wieringa's informants "also
witnessed the undressing of the girls to take the
pictures which would later be shown as having been
taken on Lobang Buaya" (pp.304,314). The strongest
argument of Wieringa to dismiss all the incriminations
as completely false is the fact "that after these
'confessions' none of the women who had been present
at Lobang Buaya and who had been detained, were ever
brought to court" (p.318).

President Sukarno on 12 December 1965 tried to stem
the tide of violence. He decided to announce in a
special declaration the results of the autopsy by
prominent physicians on the bodies of the generals,
which revealed that the reports of sexual mutilation
and eyes gouging were false. "He called on the
journalists to keep themselves to the facts and to
refrain from publishing lies. Only one paper published
this announcement" (namely Sinar Harapan, the
Protestant newspaper). But it was of no avail, since
the same paper a few days later published again a
forged 'confession' about sexual debaucheries
(pp.317/8).

The whole campaign served, according to Wieringa, two
major purposes: first, the complete elimination and
annihilation, through the orchestrated massacre during
the last months of 1965, of PKI and all the allied
organizations, among them Gerwani; and in the second
place, the toppling of Sukarno as President and the
establishment of the so-called 'New Order'; the latter
target is defined by Wieringa as the actual, second,
'creeping' coup. The author defines, at the end of her
book, its basic conclusion as follows: "My reading of
the 1965-66 campaign of sexual slander not only
reveals the lies but also tells something about the
backdrop of sexual oppositions through which political
conceptions, in this case the birth of the 'New
Order', may take place" (p.338).

Yet, the true character of the slander campaign and
its contribution to the establishment of the 'New
Order' has also been pointed out by other historians.
Wieringa herself, on p.295, refers to Julie Southwood
and Pat Flanagan, and to Jacques Leclerc 5); she might
also have mentioned Michael van Langenberg, who in his
excellent contribution titled 'Gestapu and State Power
in Indonesia' for Robert Cribb's volume The Indonesian
Killings 1965-1966 6), on p.47 not only shows how the
military commanders within days after 30 September
"embarked on a deliberate campaign to promote a
climate of fear and retribution", but also urged the
populace "to have little mercy on the perpetrators of
the Gestapu affair who were principally identified as
being the PKI. They were publicly vilified as
'traitors' (pengkhianat), 'devils' (setan),
child-murderers an sexually dissolute women". The
author sees a direct link with the mass killings which
thereupon occurred.
Further on Van Langenberg argues: "The legitimacy of
the New Order has been built on its role as the
restorer of order. The scale of the killings has
served to consolidate in the public mind the image of
the Old Order as a period of chaos and disorder. The
New Order has used the historical memory of the
killings in the establishment of its own legitimacy
(...). Events that legitimize also constitute an
enabling process by which power is acquired and
exercised" (pp.58/9). Also Siregar in his earlier
mentioned book Tragedi Manusia dan Kemanusiaan, which
contains an endeavour at rehabilitating PKI on
historical grounds, specifically discusses the
campaign against Gerwani (pp.215 ff.) 7), and also
refers to Van Langenberg's analysis - but his study
was not yet available when Wieringa wrote her
dissertation.

However, the original aspect of Wieringa's analysis
remains, of course, that she is the first to stress
gender attitudes as the decisive factor for a more
profound understanding of the relation between
specifically the campaign against Gerwani and
Suharto's ascent to absolute power. Very important
too, she was able to interview a number of Indonesian
women, who could provide her with many facets of the
personal experiences of those who became victims of
Suharto's 'gender war'. She was also the first
systematically to study the 'sexist' content of the
newspapers from early October 1965 onwards.

As for Wieringa's attempt to exchange the accent, laid
by other authors (among them Mortimer, Utrecht and
myself) upon the class conflict in the countryside as
the basic cause of the mass killings, for the stress
put by her on the gender factor - it seems to me that
both views could be combined into a consistent whole
through positing a mutual interaction. I maintain that
the mass killings in the countryside of Java and Bali
would not have occurred with a strong cooperation of
part of the peasantry, if in 1964 the aksi sepihak
(one- sided actions) would not have been stimulated by
BTI and PKI. A strong argument for this standpoint is,
that the mass murders mostly occurred exactly in those
areas of Java, where aksi sepihak had taken place on a
massive scale 8); for example, from West-Java mass
killings are not reported. In an article, published in
1969, I have argued that through starting a kind of
class war on a large scale in the countryside of Java,
PKI made a big mistake: it was completely inconsistent
with an attempt to retain a Nasakom cooperation with
Sukarno, NU and PNI at the top level 9); a similar
analysis can be found in Wieringa, p.125.

What Wieringa's gender analysis explains, is not the
deeper cause of the mass murders in the countryside,
but the method through which people were intentionally
motivated to develop an intense hate against anything
connected with communism.

A small point where a correction is needed: on p.90
Sutan Sjahrir is mentioned, together with Amir
Sjarifuddin, as having avowed to have belonged to a
communist group. This is certainly incorrect.
Sjarifuddin admitted it after the return of Musso in
1948 to Indonesia. At that time Sjahrir had already
broken with Sjarifuddin's radical Partai Sosialis, and
called into life a new party, PSI. As a student in
Holland, Sjahrir had never joined communist groups,
although personally he had been in touch with radical
socialists 10).

A minor point, where I to some extent disagree with
Wieringa's treatment of the earlier history of the
Indonesian women's movement, refers to a remark she
makes about Raden Ajeng Kartini, the pioneer of
women's emancipation in Indonesia. On p.67 the author
expresses some surprise that in previous publications
on Kartini her 'polygynous marriage and the pain it
caused her' were ignored (note 25). In my view there
is a simple explanation. In her letters, published in
the early years of this century, there is only
sporadic mention of her objection against polygamy;
only since the publication of her letters to
Mme.Abendanon in 1987 do we know how central this
issue was in her whole life.

Whereas Saskia Wieringa's dissertation is intended as
a theoretical analysis of an historical process
covering several decennia, Carmel Budiardjo's
autobiographical book titled Surviving Indonesia's
Gulag, published in 1996, forms a personal testimony
of the terrible treatment in the early years of
Suharto's 'New Order', suffered by the victims of the
1965/66 counter- revolution 11). After the Second
World War the author had, as a young woman, been
active in left-wing international circles, and by 1947
in Prague she got a job at the Secretariat of the
International Union of Students (IUS). It was there
that she met the Indonesian student Budiardjo, whom
she married in 1950; not long afterwards they moved
with their daughter Tan to Indonesia, where Carmel at
the time of President Sukarno's 'Old Order' had
completely assimilated to her Indonesian environment.
But as leftists, with connections in PKI-circles, they
got in serious difficulties after the 1965 events.
Carmel writes: "Overnight we became social outcasts as
Jakarta was transformed into a city under armed
occupation. It seemed that everyone I knew was being
arrested (...) At work, no one wanted to speak to me,
and mobs of youths roamed the streets attacking the
homes of communist suspects" (p.VIII). Her husband Bud
was also twice arrested, but Carmel finally managed to
get him free.

The story as told by Carmel starts in 1968, when she
was suddenly arrested in her home, and taken to an
interrogation center; Bud had, out of chivalry,
offered to accompany her, and was of course also
arrested. For Carmel a period of detention began that
lasted about three years, whereas Bud remained for ten
years in prison.

Carmel underwent a frightful time in detention centres
and in prison; but she is convinced that what she
suffered could not stand comparison with the kind of
physical tortures many female Indonesian 'political
prisoners' had to endure 12). There were periods in
which she got a special treatment as teacher of
English language for military officers; once she was
even allowed to spend some time outside the detention
centre, and to earn some income as a language teacher
for private individuals.
Intervention on the part of Christian Church people
had succeeded in achieving that her and Bud's children
were allowed to travel to London in order there to
join Carmel's relatives. And other Human Rights
organizations could provide her with some necessities
not available from the prison authorities, which she
of course shared with her companions in misfortune.

But in particular her detention, without any previous
trial, during some 15 months in Bukit Dun prison
(August 1970 till November 1971) was to become a
situation in which Carmel not only had to share the
same treatment as her Indonesian companions. That
period also created for her the possibility to
acquaint herself optimally with the sufferings both
former Gerwani or PKI leaders, and young girls which
had been accused of having been present in Lobang
Buaya, had undergone before their confinement in Bukit
Dun.

Through Carmel's description of her experiences in the
Indonesian 'Gulag' throughout three years her book has
become a most valuable illustration and supplement to
Saskia Wieringa's study of the fate of the Indonesian
Women's Movement after Suharto's ascent to power.

The first detention centre, where Carmel was taken,
taught her at once the type of treatment she would
henceforth have to endure: she was taken to 'the room
for women detainees': "there was not a single piece of
furniture in the room: no beds, no chairs, no
cupboards, just a few straw mats" (p.6). One of the
two women, present in the room, appeared to know who
Carmel was, she had once met her at the SOBSI
(left-wing trade-union) headquarters, and said: "They
know everything about you, Zus Carmel. It will be
better for you to tell them everything frankly". But
another woman, with a new-born baby on her lap, gave
Carmel a sign, in order to warn her. The woman who had
spoken, was writing and suddenly Carmel realized that
she was drawing a diagram with squares connected by
lines, the sketch of an organizational structure -
evidently SOBSI!

There was an empty mat, with a handbag. "Where is
she?", Carmel asked. The baby's mother replied:
"Upstairs being interrogated. They arrested her only
this morning and she's been up there most of the time
since then. Poor woman. They're probably giving her a
rough time". This was Carmel's first experience as
inmate of a detention centre: "A mother who had been
dragged away from her children, a trade union activist
who had turned collaborator, a woman upstairs being
tortured, armed men outside. How could I ever adjust
to all this?" When the absent woman finally was
escorted to the room, and sat down in great distress,
the baby's mother came to comfort her a bit. "Did they
beat you?" "They stripped me naked. I told them I
could remember nothing. The brutes".

The same day Carmel was interrogated - but in her case
no torture was applied. A former PKI member was
present, who evidently now, after having been
arrested, had become a willing collaborator of the
prosecutors. Later on Carmel came across several such
cases. But after the interrogation she got the
impression that they had hardly any significant
evidence against her. Before October 1965 she had been
an economic expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and she had never become a member of PKI. And after
the coup neither she nor Bud had ever been involved in
underground activities. But her expectation, that she
would now soon be released, was false. "I still had a
lot to learn" (p.25).

About the woman, whom she had seen drawing a diagram
of SOBSI as an organization, Carmel later learned the
following: she had evidently, as was the case with
many new inmates in the detention centres in 1968/69,
been active in the South Blitar resistance movement
which had been detected and dismantled by the army.
"After being arrested somewhere in East Java, she was
savagely tortured, stripped naked, beaten and forced
to stand with the legs of a chair on her feet while a
soldier jumped up and down on the chair. This form of
torture is commonly used by the army. After having to
endure such ordeals, she succumbed and was now feeding
information to her persecutors" (p.30).

It was not only the detainees themselves who suffered:
"The hardship and sufferings of the wives and children
of detainees are a story in themselves. The vast
majority of these women had no means of support or
regular income and were cold-shouldered even by close
relatives, who were afraid of being tainted by contact
with prisoners and their families. Some women managed
to survive by setting up food stalls and selling
home-made cakes (...) but few were able to earn enough
to keep hunger from the door. Some, in desperation,
handed their children over to relatives or neighbours.
In many cases, the children were hounded from their
schools (...) and were unable to get places in other
schools" (p.57).

Carmel was held at that detention centre Satgas-Pusat
for two weeks before being transferred to another
detention camp. "My stay there was a period of
perpetual fear and anxiety, of hearing about the
arrival of new detainees at alle times of the day and
night, of hearing them being tortured and seeing them
immediately after their sessions with the torturers,
covered in blood or with ther signs of physical abuse.

Like all detention centres used for newly arrested
people, Satgas-Pusat was designed to keep the inmates
in a constant state of terror in order to cruśh their
morale. The terror was not confined to the
interrogation sessions: officers and rank-and-file
soldiers on guard duty were constantly on the lookout
for pretexts to punish detainees for the most trivial
'offences' against the regulations. The purpose was to
remind us again and again that we were prisoners and
should never forget this. The powers under which we
had been detained were extra-judicial and the army
were answerable to no one but themselves. We had no
rights at all. There was no such thing as legal
representation, either now or at later stages of
detention" (p.40).

Bonar, the boss of Satgas-Pusat, was the worst type of
sadist one could imagine. Once he came at one of the
windows leering at the inmates in Carmel's room. He
asked: "Well, well. How are you feeling this evening?
Quite well, and happy, I hope?" One of the women said:
"We'll be only happy when you release us and let us go
home to our children". His reply was: "There's no
going home for any of you lot, you dirty communists.
This isn't like any other place. Once here, you'll
never get out alive". Then he looked at Carmel: "Ever
heard of Eichmann?", he asked. "Yes, he was the man
who planned the annihilation of the Jews in the German
concentration camps", Carmel replied. "Eichmann,
that's me, commander of this camp. I've read all about
him. A great fellow. He's my model" (p.60).

One of the worst aspects of the situation for
prisoners under the 'New Order' regime was indeed,
that nobody could be sure that one would ever regain
freedom.
Around 1969 it was decided, that the political
prisoners ('tapol') would be classified into three
categories: A, B and C. C category prisoners were
regarded as followers of PKI or other banned mass
organizations, but did not need to be held
indefinitely, and could therefore be released. 'A'
category tapols were those against whom there was
enough evidence to bring them to trial. But after
having undergone a sentence there was for them a
possibility to be released. But what about 'B'
category, against whom there was no proof of having
committed any 'crime'? In 1969/70 a great number of
male B prisoners were shipped to 'Devil's Island' Buru
in the Moluccas, with the intention that they would
have to stay there forever! But also for those
B-prisoners who would be sent either to Salemba prison
(for males) or to Bukit Dun (for women) there was no
outlook for release. One of the detention camps, where
the decision about one's 'category' would be taken,
was Likdam, in the centre of Jakarta, the place where
both Carmel and Bud were transferred after their
ghastly fortnight's stay in Satgas-Pusat.

As such Likdam, where Carmel would stay for the next
fifteen months, was in spite of a terrible
overcrowding not so bad, at least for prisoners who
had relatives in Jakarta. Although they were not
allowed to phone or write them, there were other
possibilities to get in touch. Relatives were allowed
to visit three times a week, and so Carmel's and Bud's
children could meet them regularly, and provide them
with foodstuffs and other necessities. However, many
inmates of Likdam came from the so-called Kalong
Torture Centre, and so Carmel was able to get more
information about the way 'interrogations' were being
conducted, and also about the way some victims became
traitors, but others, such as Sri Ambar, a leading
SOBSI activist, and her dau~~ters as well as her
mother had demonstrated a courage that defies belief.

Finally Carmel was taken to Bukit Dun, whereas Bud had
to spend many more years in Salemba. In both prisons a
similar system was applied. Tapols were not enabled to
keep in touch with their relatives. One was not even
allowed to possess a scrap of paper! Regularly there
were 'hari bezoek' (in Dutch the word 'bezoek' means
visit). But what was allowed, was not true visits by
relatives, but only the possibility for relatives or
friends to deliver food parcels. That was different
from the situation in the part of the prison for true
criminals, for these were actually allowed to receive
'bezoek! The women could make their stay more or less
tolerable by doing all kinds of needlework, and
selling their products through the prison
administration.

During the night, the inmates had to stay in their
cells (intended for three persons, but occupied by
five), but in daytime they were allowed to mix, except
for those women who were kept in 'Isolation Block C'.
But Carmel succeeded in getting clandestinely access
to Block C, and for some time she even became an
inmate of one of the cells in that Block. These cells
were intended fot one person each, but were actually
occupied by three women.

It was particularly through Carmel's contact with the
inmates of Block C, that Carmel managed to get
interesting information from important Gerwani leaders
or other female 'dissidents'. In Block C Carmel shared
a cell with Salawati Daud, a prominent personality in
the Sukarno era. As early as in december 1949 she was
elected Mayor of Makassar, "the first woman ever to
hold such a position in Indonesia". After being
elected to Parliament in 1955 she moved to Jakarta and
became active in Gerwani. Carmel admires Salawati
highly, and she shares this admiration with many women
who have known her as a detainee. The following story
Carmel tells, occurred a few months before her arrival
in Bukit Dun: the food situation in Bukit Dun was
terrible, and for several days running rotten cabbage
had been served. So when the commander came to inspect
the blocks, he was greeted by the sound of bleeting
(...) "A few days later, we were summoned to a special
roll-call. He ranted on, scolding us and saying it
wasn't his fault that we had been given rotten food.
He said things would soon get even worse as the
Jakarta military command was about to stop allocating
money for anything other than rice. Soon, he warned,
we would only be receiving rice twice a day and
nothing more". "So what do you have to say to that",
he said, as he strutted up and down in front of us.
"You made enough noise the other day. Now, let me hear
you speak".

There was complete silence for a few moments. Then Ibu
Salawati stepped forward: "Let me make one thing clear
before saying what I have to say. I am speaking only
for myself and I alone take full responsibility. I am
not speaking on anyone's behalf. I was imprisoned many
times under the Dutch, many times they maltreated me
and held me unjustly for my beliefs. Yet never, in all
my experience, did the Dutch, bad as they were, supply
the prisoners with nothing more than rice. Never! Now,
go back to your bosses and tell them that. I have
nothing more to say". "With that she stepped back into
line again. The commander looked very uncomfortable.
He said nothing and ordered us back to our cells. From
then on, the food improved a bit" (pp.155/6).

Among the women held in the Isolation Block was also a
medical doctor Sumiarsih Caropeboka. Shortly after
October 1, 1965, Carmel had read a newspaper headline:
"Communist woman doctor's house destroyed. She's the
Lubang Buaya doctor!" Carmel, who had known her as a
capable doctor, had wondered what had happened to her.
'tNow we were together in prison with plenty time to
exchange experiences. Sumiarsih coped with prison life
in a very positive way. Whatever the difficulties, she
would always be ready with a solution (...) Resistance
for her was making the best of what we had and never
allowing our captors to wear us down." Her attitude in
prison reminded Carmel of the way she had known
Sumiarsih in her surgery, "always packed with mothers
and children from the most disadvantaged groups".

"Despite the sensational claims about her and the
years she spent in isolation as a 'heavy' case,
Dr.Sumiarsih was never charged or tried". In Bukit
Dun, Dr.Sumiarsih was never officially permitted to
function as a doctor, but was held in the isolation
block as long as Carmel was at the prison (pp.169
ff.).

Finally, in the 'Isolation Block' Carmel also could
hear the stories of 'the Children' (Ch.20), young
girls accused of having attended and participated in
Lubang Buaya atrocities and debaucheries. Carmel got
to know many of these young women and listened also to
what other women had to say about them. She deposited
accounts about them with Amnesty in London after her
release, but she decided in this story not to identify
them by name. Probably they have tried, since their
release, to conceal their prison experience. Many of
these women had been subjected to extremely violent
torture during interrogations in the early days of
their arrest. One of the young women had just got
married to a man not much older than herself who was a
member of Pemuda Rakyat. "The troops who came for her
took her straight to the local military command where
she was beaten repeatedly but denied that she had ever
been to Lubang Buaya. Her interrogators said that her
husband had told them that she was there. She could
not believe this and agreed to a confrontation with
him. She was stupefied when he repeated this
allegation in her presence, and couldn't find words to
contradict him. Six years later, when she told me how
it had happened, she still could not contain her
emotions. After being transferred to Bukit Dun, she
was again interrogated and tortured with cigarette
burns, but still refused to confess a lie".

Two girls had been in Lobang Buaya on 1 October. They
suffered terribly at the hands of their tormentors
during interrogation. They both confessed about sex
orgies and admitted that they had seen the kidnapped
generals being roughly treated by soldiers of the
Tjakrabirawa palace guard. Two years later, in 1967,
these girls were interrogated under less distressing
circumstances and retracted much of what they had said
ealier, only admitting that they had attended the
training course at the air base.

"There were twenty or so young women in Bukit Duri
whom we always knew as 'the children'. They all spent
up to fourteen years in detention, six in Bukit Duri
and the rest in the Plantungan labour camp. Despite
the serious charges levelled aginst them about what
they were alleged to have done in Lubang Buaya, not
one was ever to trial".

Plantungan was a camp in Central Java, comparable with
what Buru was for males, where many of the women of
the B-category whom Carmel had known in Bukit Dun
were, shortly after her release, transferred. If her
relatives in London with the assistance of several
human rights organizations and the British Embassy in
Jakarta, would not have succeeded in getting Carmel
released on the basis of her retained British
nationality, most probably she would also have been
transferred to Plantungan.

Carmel, who since the early 1950s had fully identified
herself with the Indonesian society, felt rather
uncomfortable about seeing whether being foreign-born
was going to extricate her. But her fellow-prisoners
had little time for such qualms: "Get out of here as
fast as you can", they would say, "and start working
for our release" (p.192). They would often tell her
they were relying on her to tell the world what she
knew about the criminal system of imprisonment and all
the atrocities associated with it.

We all know how seriously Carmel Budiardjo has taken
this moral obligation. In 1995 she received the Right
Livelihood Award for 'holding the Indonesian
Government accountable for its actions and upholding
the universality of fundamental human rights'.

1) Published in Arah, suplemen No.1, th.1990; also in
Aksi Setiakawan, 1990.
2) The first edition was published in 1993, in a very
restricted number of copies; the second, thoroughly
revised edition was published by Tapol, London, in
October 1995; the third edition by Progres is from
1996, and contains as an Annex the texts of the
speeches held on 30 September 1995 at the occasion of
the presentation in Amsterdam of the second edition.
3) English translation: "There is another important
obligation, namely to undertake again research
concerning the Gerwani affair in connection with the
events of 1 October 1965. From the beginning those in
power have accused Gerwani girls present in Lubang
Buaya of having committed horrors and sexually
perverse acts.
Through the press and other media year after year
information has been spread, as though these girls had
been taken there by PKI in order to perform
'pornographic dancing' and the naked 'dance of the
fragrant flowers' as an accompaniment for the dying
generals; that they committed other indecencies, that
gilette knives had been distributed among them, and
that they thereupon took part in cruel actions and
maltreated those generals before they died. As a
consequence of such stories an image was created as
though Gerwani was a collection of dissolute, vicious,
cruel women which should be held in contempt and even
finished off".
The same appeal to restore the reputation of Gerwani
had previously been published in my Foreword for a
collection of poems, titled Sansana anak naga dan
tahun-tahun pembunuhan, by Magusig 0 Bungai, 1990,
p.21 (published by ISDM, Culemborg).
4) An important study on the Aksi Sepihak in Central
Java has been defended in 1986 by Kusni Sulang as a
doctoral dissertation in Paris; unfortunately, the
text of this study, titled Le mouvement des actions
unilaterales pour les reformes agraires des paysans de
Klaten, Java-centre. Indonesie - 1963-1965: Son

MARSHALL GREEN: "WHEN WE WERE IN INDONESIA WE WERE
VERY CAREFUL NOT TO BE SAYING THIS KIND OF THING"
Kathy Kadane's research

WASHINGTON -- U.S. officials who said in interviews
that they knew of and approved a decision to pass the
names of Indonesian Communist party members to the
Indonesian army in 1965 are now denying they did so,
according to an article published in the New York
Times.

States News Service in May reported the United States
played a significant role in one of the worst
massacres of the century by supplying lists of
thousands of Communist party members to the Indonesian
army in 1965, which hunted down and killed many of the
leftists.

The Times article said there is no question that a
list of names of alleged communists was provided to
the Indonesians by the U.S. embassy.

But it said, "The dispute has focused on whether the
decision to turn over the names was that of an
individual American embassy officer, or was
coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency and
approved by senior embassy officers."

The Times article asserted that transcripts of several
key interviews are "ambiguous" about what top embassy
officials knew.

But taped interviews, conducted after years of
in-depth research and numerous interviews with Bob
Martens and other mid-level officials, some of whom
were not quoted in the article, show that top embassy
officials knew of and approved the release of the
names, that CIA employees contributed to the lists of
names, and that CIA officials in Washington, along
with embassy officials in Jakarta, during the
massacre, gathered and "checked off" the names of the
victims.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence is
conducting a preliminary inquiry into the allegations
to determine whether to open a formal investigation
into the American actions in Indonesia in 1965.

Jack Lydman, the former deputy chief of mission -- the
embassy's second ranking official -- confirmed in an
interview with States News on May 14, 1990, that the
decision to release the names was made by top
officials at the embassy, including himself; that CIA
personnel contributed to the lists; and that the
embassy subsequently collected information about who
had been caught and killed in an effort to determine
whether the organization was being destroyed.

In an interview with reporter Kathy Kadane, Lydman
responded "Absolutely" to the question of whether top
embassy officials, he among them, approved the
decision to turn over the names.

The Times, which interviewed Lydman after the States
article appeared, quoted Lydman as saying this
response was "absolutely not what I intended," and
that "I certainly wasn't focusing on the impact" of
what the reporter had asked him.

A portion of a transcript of the May 14, 1990,
interview with Lydman shows the response came after an
extended discussion of the lists.

Interviews with Edward Masters, chief of the embassy's
political section, Martens' direct superior, also show
that he and other top officials were aware of and
approved the release of the names; that CIA personnel
contributed to the lists, and that the lists were used
as a basis for "checking off" what happened to the PKI
leaders during the massacre.

In three interviews in December, 1989, excerpted
below, Masters said the decision to release the names
was made by an inner group of top officials at the
embassy of which he was a member, and that top embassy
officials knew the names were going to the army. He
said he "fully recognized that (a) person might be
taken into
custody as a result of being on our lists."

When asked what was in his mind when he agreed to the
released of the names, Masters said "In my own
feeling, the Indonesians were out to take care of the
communist party (PKI), and it was in our interest to
help them."

The Times article asserted that interview transcripts
show that former Ambassador Marshall Green "had no
recollection that Mr. Martens had compiled lists of
Communist Party members." A transcript of the Dec. 18,
1989, interview with Green clearly shows that he knew
about Martens' work in the political section, though
he said he was not familiar with the details of
Martens' files.

"I knew he was sort of our guru with regard to the
PKI," Green said.

When questioned about the Martens' PKI study, Green
said that as political counselor (chief of the
embassy's political section) in Sweden in the 1950s,
he had supervised a similar project to gather names of
Swedish communist party activists. By coincidence, he
said, William Colby, later chief of the Far East
Division of the CIA in 1965, served on his staff at
the time, though Colby was actually an employee of the
CIA.

"If you had asked our ambassador in Sweden about this
file [on the communists], he wouldn't have known a
thing -- but I did, because it was my section," Green
said.

The transcripts show that later, when the army attack
began, Green had more information about the PKI files.

In the Times article, the phrase, "if he said that
were so, I would agree with it" was omitted.

The New York Times article erred in quoting portions
of the Green transcript, confusing two key passages
concerning Green's knowledge of the release of the
names.

In the States article, Joseph Lazarsky, deputy CIA
station chief in Jakarta at the time, said CIA
employees contributed to Martens' lists, a point
confirmed by Masters and Lydman, and by two CIA
employees -- not identified in the article -- who said
they worked on the PKI roster in the political
section.

The Times said Bernardo Hugh Tovar, the station chief,
denied his office gave "any classified information on
Indonesian communist officials to Mr. Martens."

The States article did not say that the CIA
information contributed to the PKI lists was
classified.

Tovar did not return phone calls placed to his home
during the preparation of the States News Service
article.

The Times article asserted that "the two senior CIA
officials in Jakarta at the time of the coup denied
any involvement in Mr. Martens' action."

The States article did not assert that they had any
hand in disseminating PKI names. The States account
did include an account by Joseph Lazarsky, the deputy
CIA station chief, about his dealings with Ali
Murtopo, the Indonesian intelligence chief. Murtopo
relayed back to the embassy information about who had
been caught and who had been killed, Lazarsky said.

The Times story described John Hughes, a former editor
of the Christian Science Monitor, who won a Pulitzer
Prize for his reporting on Indonesia in the mid-1960s,
as an "observer removed from the controversy."

Hughes told the Times that he thought the idea that
the United States helped the army locate Communist was
"pretty far out."

"I don't think the Indonesian Army needed any help in
going after Communists in Indonesia at that time," he
said. "It sort of boggles the mind that our embassy
would need to be giving out lists. There wasn't any
problem about killing people. There was an abundance
of names and targets. Everybody knew who was a PKI
cadre."

The Times article did not say that Hughes later served
as a State Department spokesman (August 1982 to
January 1985.) Michael Wines, the reporter who wrote
the Times story, told States News Service he had
decided to use Hughes as an expert in the story
despite Hughes' apparent "conflict of interest" in his
later employment by the State Department.

In August 1989, Kadane interviewed Hughes about his
experiences in Jakarta after the abortive coup in late
September, 1965. At the time, Hughes was a reporter in
the Far East Bureau for the Christian Science Monitor.

In the weeks following the Sept. 30 abortive coup that
set off the army backlash against the communists,
embassy officials have said it was a hard task to
gather intelligence about what was going on.

Hughes told Kadane that during this period, he and
other western correspondents helped out, often
functioning as the "eyes and ears of the embassy." As
an example of the aid he gave embassy officials, he
said, "I can remember going off to rallies and coming
back (to the embassy) and playing a tape," he said.

Times reporter Michael Wines declined to answer
questions about why he omitted key portions of the
Lydman, Masters and Green interviews. He gave this
statement.

David Johnson
Research Director
Center for Defense Information
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20005
phone: 202-862-0700
fax: 202-862-0708
email: djohnson@cdi.org
CDI web page

The Gestapu "coup"

In the late evening of 30 September 1965, on the
orders of a commander of President Sukarno's Palace
Guard, Lt. Col. Untung, and a commander of the Army's
Jakarta region, Col. Latief, six top generals of the
Army were seized in their houses and taken to Halim
air base near Jakarta. The generals were:

  1.Gen. Ahmad Yani, Army Commander and Minister;
  2.Maj.Gen. Suprapto, Second Deputy Commander of the
Army, specially charged with administration;
  3.Maj.Gen. Harjono, Third Deputy Commander, in
charge of financial management and public relations;
  4.Maj.Gen. S.Parman, First Assistant of the Army
Commander, in charge of intelligence work;
  5.Brig.Gen.D.I. Pandjaitan, Forth Assistant of the
Army Commander, in charge of logistics;
  6.Brig.Gen. Sutojo Siswomihardjo, Prosecutor General
of the Army.

A seventh general, who was also haunted by the
kidnappers, managed to escape. This was the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution.

In order to carry out the aims of the kidnapping,
three task forces were established some time between
14 August and 30 September 1965 (Holtzappel, 1979):

  1.Pasopati Task Force (headquarter: SENKO I;
commander: Lt. Dul Arief [Tjakrabirawa Regiment], a
subordinate of Lt.Col.Untung) consisted of: soldiers
of Untung's batallion in the Tjakrabirawa,
complemented by two platoons of the First Infantry
Brigade of the Military District Jakarta and a unit of
the Paratroop Brigade of that territory,
  2.Pringgodani Task Force (headquarter: SENKO II;
commander: Maj.Sujono [responsible for guarding the
Halim air base]) had two influential members Sjam
(alias Kamaruzaman) and Pono (alias Bono) "allegedly"
from the "Biro Chusus" of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI),
  3.Bimasakti Task Force (headquarter: SENKO I;
commander: Col.Latief) consisted of two parts; the
first part consisted of the 454th Diponegoro Division
and the 530th Brawijaya Division, plus other smaller
units; the second part consisted of a radio
broadcasting team headed by Captain Suradi of the
Intelligence Service of Col. Latief's Brigade.

Later it became known that all six generals were found
dead in the LUBANG BUAYA (Crocodile Hole) near Halim
air base. From that time on, the Indonesian people
observe the Pancasila Sacredness on every October 1,
as a reaction to the so-called Gestapu (the 30th
September 1965 Movement) "coup".

It's also important to point out that the word COUP
poses a problem to Paul H. Salim. Dictionaries define
the word COUP (in french, coup d'e'tat) as "the
sudden, forceful overthrow of the government";
literally it means a blow against the state. In fact,
the second communique broadcast by the Gestapu
Movement on 1 October 1965 is as follows:

     "To avoid wrong interpretations and misreporting,
we announce that President/Great Leader of the
Revolution Bung Karno is in good health and that he
CONTINUES to head the State."

(Vitacchi, 1967)

Therefore, to avoid confusion among readers and also
myself, the Gestapu "coup" is used instead of the
Gestapu coup (which is interpreted as a REAL coup
d'e'tat).

The First "Semiofficial" Version of the "Coup" (& the
aftermath)

After the generals' bodies were discovered in the
Crocodile Hole (a hole 36 feet deep and one meter
wide) near Halim Air base on 4th October 1965 , one of
the members of the Gerwani (women's branch of the PKI)
reportedly gave to "Djakarta Daily Mail" an evidence
of what was going on during the early morning of
October 1st 1965 at the Halim Air base. She was Mrs.
Dja- milah, three-month-old pregnant and a
fifteen-year-old wife of a PKI member, and reportedly
said as follows (Vittachi, 1967):

     "Small knives ('pisau ketjil') and razor ('pisau
silet') were dis- tributed. I only got a razor blade.
>From afar we saw a thickset man wearing sleeping
clothes, hands bound with red cloth and eyes also
covered with read cloth. The platoon leader commanded
us to beat up that person, then to cut his private
parts ('kemaluan').
    The first to start the beating and cutting we saw
to be S. and Mrs. Sastro, leaders of the Tandjung
Priok branch of Gerwani. Then followed other
comrades... Finally I myself joined in the torture.
All the 100 women did likewise and were witnesses...
the victim was shot three times, then fell down, but
was not yet dead. A green-unifomed person wearing
crooked white bars on the shoulder ordered the
actions, stabbing at the victim's private parts
('kemaluan') and cutting these parts and the body
until he died." Within a week, particularly after the
discovery of mutilated bodies of the army generals and
an allegation by the Army that the 'Pemuda Rakjat'
(youth branch of the PKI) and the Gerwani assisted the
Gestapu rebels mutilating the generals' bodies, the
slogans began raving against the PKI, such as AIDIT
GANTUNG (hang Aidit) - BUBARKAN PKI (dissolve the PKI)
- GANJANG PKI, AIDIT PAHLAWAN GESTAPU (crush the PKI,
Aidit is the champion of the Gestapu) - AIDIT SALIP
(crucify Aidit).
  Also there were slogans raving against the women's
wing of the PKI: GERWANI TJABOL (the Gerwani are
whores) - GANTUNG GERWANI (hang the Gerwani) - GANJANG
GERWANI (crush the Gerwani). At this stage of the
slogan war, the Muslim parties with their militant
youth wing ANSOR joined in and called: PKI ANTI-TUHAN
(the PKI is anti-God) - AIDIT SETAN (Aidit is Satan).
Also the first charge of complicity was made against
the Chinese residents in Indonesia: GANJANG BAPERKI
(crush the party of the Chinese residents). For a
record, please see a brief report in Facts on File
(1965) as follows:

         "More than 500 demonstrators set fire to the
Chinese-sponsored Res Publica University in Jakarta on
Oct. 14 after assaulting 100 students guarding the
closed building. 40 students were later arrested. Res
Publica University was one of 14 universities ordered
shut by the government on Oct. 12 for 'involvement' in
the Gestapu 'coup'"

    The total count of those who died in the killings
of the alleged PKI members and sympathizers in 1965-6
would satisfy anyone wishing to impose a large order
of magnitude as the defining characteristic of a
MASSACRE. Amnesty International (1977) quoted
estimates that more than half a million died, but
added that 'many independent observers' estimated that
'many more than a million' died in the 1965 - 1966
period.

     Hughes (1968) interviewed one of the
commissioners, accountable to President Sukarno for
reporting the Gestapu-aftermath death toll, and
reported as follows:

         Was he [the commissioner] satisfied, I
[Hughes] asked, with the accuracy of the 78,000 figure
the commission had submitted ?
        He laughed merily. "Oh, my dear, no," he said,
"that was nowhere near the right figure,"
        What then he believe to be the correct figure
?
        "My own view," he replied unblingkingly,"is
that about ten times as many people as that were
killed."
        Taken aback, I asked him to spell that out
again. Was he really saying that although the
commission had reported 78,000 people killed, he
himself believed the figure to be 780,000 ? "YES,
THAT'S RIGHT," he assured me ...
        Shaken, I asked the commisioner why he
permitted a report to go forward to the President
[Sukarno] setting the death toll at about 10% of the
figure he really believed to be accurate. "Ah, well,"
he replied,..."you mustn't forget all this was back in
December 1965. You mustn't forget what the political
atmosphere was then. The President was still in
charge. We gave him the figures we thought he wanted
him to hear."

    Col. Sarwo Edhie's cold-blooded slaughter of the
alleged PKI members became LEGENDARY as his RPKAD
paracommandos moved from Jakarta to the trouble spot
Central and East Java, then to Bali:

         At he approached one village (in Central
Java), women turned their bare bottoms contemptuously
to troops in an armoured car; it has been reported
that they were members of 'Gerwani' (as if this could
somehow justify what happened) but it's difficult to
see how this could have been established with
reasonable certainty while the soldiers rolled
forward. The women persisted with their insult. Sarwo
Edhie, who was directing the operation personally,
ordered a gunner to fire. The women fell. Villagers
rushed up to protest; they were also shot. The troops
went from village to village taking their victims away
by the truckload to be killed. Many were obliged to
dig their own graves (Southwood and Flanagan, 1983,
p.77).

    It is also clear from Sundhaussen (1982)'s account
that in most of the first areas of organized massacre
(North Sumatra, Aceh, Cirebon, Central and East Java),
there were loyal army commanders with especially
strong and proven anti-PKI sentiments. Many of these
had for years cooperated with civilians, through
so-called "civic action" programs sponsored by the
United States, in operations directed against the PKI
and sometimes Sukarno.
    Thus one can legitimately suspect conspiracy in
the fact that anti-PKI "civilian responses" began on
October 1, when the army began handing out arms to
Muslim students (ANSOR) and unionists, EVEN BEFORE
there was any publicly evidence linking Gestapu "coup"
to the PKI.

Some Weaknesses of the First "Semiofficial" Version

Is it true that the PKI branches especially the
Gerwani took part in tor- turing/killing the Army
generals in the early morning of October 1st, 1965?
This question is very important because, in view of
the statement, Indonesian people got angered and
attacked the PKI and its related branches as well as
its alleged members and sympathizers.

The above question had remained a mystery until 1987,
when Prof. Ben Anderson did a remarkable job in
unveiling it. In April 1987, Prof. Ben Anderson
published full account of "Visum et Repertum"s of all
six army generals, plus Lt. P. Tendean who was also
found dead in the Crocodile Hole on 4th Oct. 1965. The
following please find a summary of the "Visum et
Repertum"s which have been translated into English by
Anderson (1987) :

  1."Visum at Repertum" (VR) No. H.103, for Lt.Gen.
TNI ACHMAD YANI: a. the corpse was that of an
Indonesian male, about 40 years old; skin-color
undeterminable as putrefaction far advanched; epi-
dermis no longer is existence. Nutritional condition
hard to establish. Penis circumcized. Height of the
corpse was 175 cm high, weight 45 kilogram.
    b. on the corpse were discovered eight entering
gunshot wounds on the front, and two to the rear.
    c. on the abdomen were discovered two exiting
gunshot wounds, and one on the back.
      
  2.VR No. H. 104, for Major-Gen. TNI R. SOEPRAPTO:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 40 years old; skin-color undeterminable.
Nutritional condition undeterminable. Penis
uncircumcized. Rigor mortis not apparent. Subcutaneous
discolorization undeterminable. Height of the corpse
was 172 cm, weight 37 1/2 kilogram. b. on the corpse
were discovered:
          
      1.three entering gunshot wounds on the front,
      2.eight entering gunshot wounds to the rear,
      3.three exiting gunshot wounds on the front,
      4.two exiting gunshot wounds to the rear,
      5.three cuts ('luka tusuk'),
      6.wounds and fractured bones caused by dull
trauma, around the head and face,
      7.one wound caused by dull trauma on the right
calf,
      8.wounds and fractured bones resulting from a
very severe, dull trauma in the lumbar region and on
the right thigh.
  3.VR No. H. 105, for Maj-Gen M.T. HARJONO:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 40 years old; skin-color and nutritional
condition undeterminable. Penis circumcized. Height of
the corpse was 159 cm, weight 44 1/2 kilogram.
    b. on the abdomen, a cut ('luka tusuk') caused by
a sharp object penetrating to the abdominal cavity.
    c. on the back, a cut ('luka tusuk') caused by a
sharp object,not penetrating to the sternal cavity.
    d. on the left hand and wrist wounds caused by
dull trauma.
      
  4.VR No. H. 106, for Maj-Gen TNI S. PARMAN:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 40 years old; skin-color and nuritional
condition undeterminable. Penis circumcized. Rigor
mortis no longer present. Subcutaneous discolorization
undeterminable. the body was 162 cm high, weight 33
kilogram.
    b. on the corpse were discovered:
          
      1.three entering gunshot wounds to the front of
the head.
      2.one entering gunshot wound at the front of the
thigh.
      3.one entering gunshot wound at the left
buttock.
      4.two existing gunshot wounds to the head.
      5.one existing gunshot wound at the back of the
right thigh.
      6.lacerations and bone-fractures to the head,
the jaw, and the lower left leg, each the result of
heavy, dull trauma.
  5.VR No. H. 107, for Brig-Gen. TNI D. I. PANDJAITAN:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 40 years old; skin-color impossible to
determine. Nuritional condition also undeterminable.
Penis uncircumcized. Rigor mortis no longer present.
Subcutaneous discolorization undeterminable. Height of
the corpse was 168 cm high, weight 41 kilogram.
    b. on the front of the head two entering gunshot
wounds.
    c. on the back of the head, one entering gunshot
wound.
    d. on the left rear of the head two exiting
gunshot wounds.
    e. on the back of the left hand a slit-wound.
      
  6.VR No. H. 108, for Brig-Gen TNI SOETOJO
SISWOMIHARDJO:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 40 years old; skin-color undeterminable. Penis
circumcized. Rigor mortis not apparent. Subcutaneous
discolorization undeterminable. Height of the corpse
was 172 cm high, weight 41 kilogram.
    b. on the corpse were found:
          
      1.two entering gunshot wounds to the front of
the lower right leg.
      2.an entering gunshot wound to the right side of
the head, pointing forward.
      3.an exiting gunshot wound on the inner side of
the right calf.
      4.an exiting gunshot wound to the front of the
head.
      5.the right hand and the cranium crushed as a
result of heavy, dull trauma.
  7.VR No. H. 109, for Lieut. P. TENDEAN:

     a. the corpse was that of an Indonesian male,
about 30 years old; probably of partial European
descent. Skin-color and nuritional condition also
undeterminable. Penis uncircumcized. Rigor mortis no
longer present. Subcutaneous bruishing undeterminable.
Height of the corpse was 176 cm, weight 65 kilogram.
    b. on the corpse were found:
          
      1.four entering gunshot wounds to the rear.
      2.two exiting gunshot wounds to the front.
      3.graze wounds on the forehead and left hand.
      4.three gaping wounds resulting from dull
traumas to the head.

Each "Visum et Repertum" is preceded by the following
statements (Anderson, 1987):

     On the orders of the KOSTRAD COMMANDER as
COMMANDER OF THE OPERATION FOR THE RESTORATION OF
SECURITY AND ORDERS to the HEAD OF THE CEN- TRAL ARMY
HOSPITAL in Jakarta, by written instruction per
October 4, 1965 number PRIN-03/10/65, signed by
Major-General TNI SOEHARTO, transmitted by the HEAD OF
THE CENTRAL ARMY HOSPITAL to us the undersigned:

      1.ROEBIONO KERTOPATI, doctor, Brigadier-General
TNI, senior offi- cer seconded to the Central Army
Hospital.
      2.FRANS PATTIASINA, doctor, Colonel, Army
Medical Corps Nrp.14253, Health Officer of the Central
Army Hospital.
      3.SUTOMO TJOKRONEGORO, doctor, Professor at the
Medical Faculty of the University of Indonesia, expert
in Pathology and Forensic Medicine.
      4.LIAUW YAN SIANG, doctor, Lecturer in Forensic
Medicine, Univer- sity of Indonesia.
      5.LIM JOE THAY, doctor, Lecturer in Forensic
Medicine, University of Indonesia.

    We from 4:30 pm, October 4, 1965, to 12:30 am
October 5, 1965, in the Dissection Room of the Central
Army Hospital, Jakarta, have carried out an external
examination of a corpse which, according to the
above-mentioned written order, is the corpse
of........

At the end of every "Visum of Repertum", there are
signatures of the five doctors, plus a signature of
HAMZIL RUSLI Bc. Hk. (Captain CHK - Nrp.303840) and
a signature of SOEDARJO Bc. Hk. (Air Force First
Lieutenant/473726, as the Secretary to Air-Force
Lt.Col. HERU ATMODJO).

Given the fact that the autopsies were ordered
personally by Maj-Gen Suharto, it is unlikely that the
doctors' reports were not immediately communicated to
him upon their completion. But, it is very strange
that an issue which the Gerwani mutilated the
generals' bodies and which was partly used to im-
plicate the PKI in the Gestapu "coup" escalated after
the internment of the generals at the Garden of Heroes
('Taman Pahlawan') at Kalibata, Jakarta. Therefore,
based on the above autopsy reports, a slogan such as
"Gerwani Tjabol" (the Gerwani are whores) is without
basis at all, because on 5th October 1965 (Anderson,
1987):

  1.all of the generals' penises were still intact (we
are even told that four of the generals were
circumcized, and three uncircumcized),
  2.none of the victims' eyes had been gouged out
('ditjungkil') as also being rumoured at that time,
  3.there was no trace of razors ('pisau silet') and
small knives ('pisau ketjil') on the victim's bodies
(please compare it with Mrs. Djamilah's testimony that
100 Gerwani members tortured a general),
  4.all the non-gunshot wounds described resulted from
heavy, dull traumas and were most likely caused by:
    a. clubbing with the butts of the guns that fired
the fatal bullets, or
    b. the damage likely to occur from a 36-feet,i.e.
roughly three-story, fall down a stoned-lined well.

The Second Semiofficial Version of the "Coup"

On the basis of interrogations and evidence taken up
to mid-1967, a semi- official account of the "coup"
was published in Jakarta by Notosusanto and Saleh
(1968). The key points of the account may be
summarized as follows:

  1.The September 30 Movement was a creature of the
PKI, brought into being by the machinations of a "Biro
Chusus", or Special Bureau, of the party headed by two
men known as "Sjam" and "Pono", who worked directly
under the instructions of Dipa Nusantara Aidit (the
PKI leader). The secret "Biro Chusus" had been
established in November 1964 to direct members of the
armed forces who had been recruited by the PKI or had
shown pronounced sympathy for the party. All major
participants in the "coup" attempt were clients of the
"Biro" and had acted in accordance with its
directives.
  2.When Aidit returned from abroad early in August
1965 he convened a series of Politburo meetings at
which he outlined the critical problems facing the PKI
as a result of the deteriorating health of President
Sukarno. He informed the Politburo that he had re-
liable information about the existence of a generals'
council (DEWAN DJENDRAL) and its plan to launch a
"coup" to overthrow Sukarno and to crush the PKI. At
the same time he reported that a group of "progressive
officers" within the army was ready to forestall the
council of generals. Aidit spoke in favour of
pre-emptive action against the army and won the
Politburo's approval of his taking charge of measures
to secure this end. It was agreed that "they would
have to secure President Sukarno's support for the
'movement'."
  3.The PKI's aim was not to seize power for itself
but "to prevent the army from eliminating the Party
after Sukarno's death." It was in effect seeking "time
to develop its power in a peaceful manner according to
Aidit's strategy" in a situation where "both began
calculating their chances in the post-Sukarno era."
  4.The generals' council was in fact a PKI fiction,
and the progressive officers were direct agents of the
PKI's secret apparatus. Upon instructions from Aidit,
the "Biro Chusus" called meetings of the key "coup"
officers in the capital during August and September
and worked out plans for the strike. It also took
steps, through its branches in the provinces, to
prepare supporting actions in favourable regions.
Several leading party functionaries, including Njono,
Sudisman, and Peris Pardede (the first two members of
the Politburo, the third a candidate member), were
also given task of alerting selected party cadres,
particularly in the capital, to mobilize party
activists once the "coup" had been successfully
carried out.
  5.On the eve of the "coup", the conspirators
obtained the blessing and cooperation of Air Force
Commander Omar Dhani to use the facilities of Halim
air force base for their headquaters. In addition, a
few days before the "coup", it was decided to recall
PKI volunteers who had received weapons training at
Halim under the aegis of the air force and to use them
to fill the gaps in the "coup" forces.

After the publication of the account by Notosusanto
and Saleh (1968), "Sjam" was brought to trial and
added details implicating Aidit more deeply. According
to Sjam's evidence, Aidit was responsible for the
entire direction of the "coup" operation, even down to
write the decrees concerning the Revolution Council
and its composition that was broadcast over Jakarta
radio (Mortimer, 1974).

Some Weaknesses of the Second Semiofficial Account

  1.Who is Sjam ?

     Statement no. 1 about the existence of "Biro
Chusus" was merely based on the evidence of Sjam. Who
is Sjam, anyway ? Sjam alias Kamaruzaman bin Ahmed
Mubaidah was a cadre of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist
Party). On May 1st,1951, the PSI daily, "Suara
Sosialis", listed him (under the name of Kamaruzaman)
as one of twenty-nine selected members undergoing
intensive party training in Jakarta. He appears to
have remained a well regarded member of the PSI until
at least the end of 1955 (Mortimer, 1974). Please note
that the PSI was very much different from the PKI, and
that another prominent member of the PSI, Professor
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, has been a leading economist
up to the present time and was appointed twice by
President Suharto as Minister of Trade in 1968-73 and
as Minister of State for Research in 1973-8.

     Around the 1950s Sjam had also been in touch with
Lt. Col.Suharto, today's Indonesian President, who
often came to stay in his house in Yogyakarta
(Wertheim,1979). After the Gestapu "coup", more light
was shed on Sjam's career by the army officer who
arrested him in March 1967, who stated in "Sinar
Harapan" on 13th March 1967 that Sjam had acted as an
informant for the Section I (Intelligence) of the
Greater Jakarta Regiment from 1955 onwards.
    The officer further claimed in the newspaper that
Sjam had managed to elude capture for eighteen months
after the October 1 affair because he had been
protected by his former army superiors. Who are his
former army superiors ? This is an interesting
question which will be addressed later in this
article.

     Besides, Sjam (although sentenced to death in
1968) and Pono (alias Bono, his assistant in the
Special Bureau, who was also sentenced to death) have
been treated extaordinarily well in prison. It was
quoted from May (1978) that :

         "Indonesians who were released after having
been detained following the riots in January 1974 said
they saw the two men in prison. Far from having been
executed, they were allowed out of prison from time to
time and wrote reports for the Army on the political
situation."

    Therefore, Sjam (alias Kamaruzaman bin Ahmed
Mubaidah) along with his aide Pono (alias Bono) is
most likely a Secret Agent working for the Indonesian
Army. Who are their army bosses will be found later in
this article.

      
  2.Why was D.N. Aidit never brought to trial ? The
above question "why was D.N. Aidit never brought to
trial ?" arises because the only person that could
challenge Sjam's account (written as State- no. 1) was
D.N. Aidit himself and nobody else. But, what happened
to Aidit right after the Gestapu "coup" ?

     The controversy went on until 5 October 1980, the
15th anniversary of Armed Forces' Day after the
"coup". An account of Aidit's death appeared,
unexplained, in "Kompas Minggu", one of Jakarta's
major newspaper (Southwood and Flanagan, 1983). The
following account by Aidit's direct executioner,
Colonel (now General) Yasir Hadibroto, appears
credible because of independent corroborative evidence
:

         On 2 October 1965, after hearing news of the
"coup", Yasir, then commander of the IVth Infantry
Brigade of KOSTRAD in North Sumatra, went straight to
his commander at KOSTRAD headquarters in Jakarta. His
commander was (then) Maj. Gen. Suharto, today's
Indonesian President. He was asked by Suharto: "Where
were you at the time of the PKI Madiun rebellion in
1948?" "I had just moved to West Java. My company was
ordered to confront three communists batallions at
Wonosobo", answered Yasir. "The people rebelling today
are the offspring of the Madiun PKI. Go and deal with
them all ['bereskan itu semua']. D.N. Aidit is in
Central Java. Take your troops there", ordered the
KOSTRAD commander.

         In Central Java, Aidit (the PKI leader) was
captured, and Yasir took him to the local KOSTRAD
batallion in Boyolali. Some officers and men woke up.
"What's going on?" they asked. "I've got the slanteyed
PKI guy", replied Yasir. Then he asked, "Is there a
well any where?" "Yes, over there", said the men. The
fugitive was taken straight to the place indicated.
Aidit was told to stand there. He was given half an
hour before being dealth with. He made use of his
half-hour to deliver a speech. This passion with which
he spoke made all who heard him very angry and they
were unable to control their emotions, so the rifles
went off.

         Later, Yasir made his report to Suharto (his
KOSTRAD commander):

         15:00 o'clock, 24 November 1965. Col Yasir
was received by Pak Harto [Suharto] at the State
Palace in Yogyakarta. He reported everything that had
happened concerning the arrest of the PKI fugitive and
the way he [Aidit] had been dealth with. After making
his report, Col. Yasir took courage to ask: "When you
said we were to deal with things, is this what you
meant ?"
The Commander of KOSTRAD [Suharto] only SMILED !!

    Therefore, this is the second indication that PKI
has been framed in the Gestapu "coup" . And, the
person who framed the PKI (or who at least tried to
prevent the truth from coming out) is Maj. Gen.
Suharto. The extra-judicial killing of D.N. Aidit will
probably remind us of the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald
(the "alleged" killer of US President John Fitzgerald
Kennedy). As a result, both the Gestapu "coup" and the
assasination of JFK would probably remain mysterious,
unless more evidences are sought.
      
  3.Was Generals' Council "Dewan Djendral" a fact or a
fake ?

     According to the fourth point of the second
semiofficial account, "Dewan Djendral" was a PKI
fiction. Is it true ? First let's examine the verbatim
testimony of Col. Bambang Setyono Widjanarko, an
adjutant of President Sukarno until 1966. In his
testimony on 3rd October 1970, he was asked by the
interrogators, Lieut.Col.CPM. S. Soegiarjo and
Ass.Chief Comm.of Police Azwir Nawie as follows
(Widjanarko, 1974):

         "Please give us a statement on:
        a. when and where did you become aware of the
problems connected with the Council of Generals ?
        b. what was the significance of the Council of
Generals about which you had heard ?
        c. what did Bung Karno (President Sukarno -
phs) say about the Council of Generals ?"

         Col. Widjanarko replied as follows:

         "a. I first heard about the existence of the
Council of Generals in the first quarter of 1965. I do
not know for sure from whom I first heard about it. I
heard about it at the Palace, where many officials
either called or were employed.
        b. 1) When I first heard about the existence
of this Council of Generals, I did not pay so much
attention to it, because in my opinion, it was quite
an ordinary matter, in other words, that a Committee
in the Forces whose task it was to regulate promotions
or to keep up the officers' honour, was necessary.
        2) Quite a time afterwards (about the middle
of June 1965) I heard that the existence of this
Council of Generals in the Army was being reported as
having a purpose opposed to the Government, or to Bung
Karno
        c. As far as I know, and have witnessed, Bung
Karno was very much influenced by and believed there
existed this Council of Generals that was opposed to
Bung Karno. From several incidents, it could be seen
that Bung Karno was displeased with certain Army
Generals and, in turn, often received visits from
certain other who were trusted by Bung Karno.

    It was then revealed by Utrech (1975) that the
original copy of the testimony was not even signed by
Widjanarko himself. Moreover, Col. Bambang Widjanarko,
as Utrecht (1975) clarified, wished to dissociate
himself completely from the report of his
interrogations. However, we can probably use part of
his testimony especially about "Dewan Djendral",
because his statement was in good agreement with Gen.
Yani's speech in "Antara News Bulletin, 28-5-65B,
147B" which was extracted by Mody (1987). Gen. Ahmad
Yani, when asked about the existence of Army officers
maintaining contacts with the British and Americans,
acknowledged that there was a Council of Generals, but
denied that it was evaluating Sukarno's activities,
but functioned merely as a body responsible for
officers' promotions (Mody, 1987).

     Other important information we need to look at
came from Sir Andrew Gilchrist, who was the British
Ambassador to Indonesia in 1965. His name is
well-known because in fall 1963 he was caught
producing the so-called Gilchrist Document, in which
the name of 'our local Army friends' that was implied
as 'Dewan Djendral' was mentioned. On 28th March 1977,
Sir Andrew Gilchrist corresponded with Mr. Nawaz B.
Mody (a then PhD student in the Department of Civics
and Politics of the Bombay University). His letter
reads as follows (Mody, 1987):

         "In order to give you a full reply to your
letter of March 11, I would have to write a book...
which no one would publish. It is remarkable how
little interest there is in Britain in the history of
the period you are concerned with. As to the
'Gilchrist docu- ment', I believe the story is this.
        There were two papers which were confusingly
referred to under this name, one genuine, one forged.
The genuine letter was one found by the Indonesians in
the wreckage of the British Embassy; it was signed by
me and contained uncomplimentary remarks about
Soekarno. This document, though it irritated Soekarno
beyond measure, was never published and I have no
copy. The other document was a forgery, prepared by
Subandrio and his agents for use at an international
meeting at Cairo (New Emerging Forces or Non-Aligned
or some such trade mark); it purported to be a plan
originated by me, in concert with the Americans for an
invasion of Indonesia. This document was used by the
Indonesian government by way of leaks and private
circulation; they refrained from publishing it
officially or from claiming its authenticity (which
would have involved demanding my recall as Ambassador)
because when a part of it was reproduced
photographically in an Egyptian newspaper, it was
noticed that the notepaper was headed 'British
Embassy, Jakarta'; whereas genuine British Embassy
notepaper in those days used the spelling 'Djakarta'
(I hope it still reads like that !). And indeed there
were other obvious indications of forgery; so that the
plan misfired and I remained as Ambassador for a
normal tour of duty, with the pleasure before my
departure of seeing the overthrow of Soekarno and the
imprisonment of Subandrio.

         I am sorry not to be able to help you
further. I hope that if your researches end in a book
you will send me a copy.

        I have had many Indian friends during my
career and regret that it does not seem likely that I
should have a further opportunity to renew my
acquintance with your country, especially in its new
and hopeful political situation."

    From the letter of Sir Andrew Gilchrist, it can be
concluded that:
          
      1.the Gilchrist document did exist,
      2.the Document was printed on notepaper stolen
from the British Embassy during the anti-British riots
of September 1963,
      3.Sir Andrew Gilchrist makes no attempt to hide
the pleasure he felt at Sukarno's overthrow.

Going back to the main point, we can make two
conclusions that "Dewan Djendral" is not a fiction
(either of PKI or of whoever else it was) and that the
Gilchrist document did exist, although its genuine
content was hard to verify.

The First Conclusions

  1.torture of the six army generals by the Gerwani
members, let alone the 'Pemuda Rakyat', at Halim air
base in the early morning of October 1, 1965, is false
and without basis at all,
  2.Sjam who has implicated the PKI in the Gestapu
"coup" was most likely a Secret Agent working for
Indonesian Army,
  3.Dipa Nusantara Aidit (the PKI leader) who could
challenge Sjam's statement about involvement of the
PKI in the Gestapu "coup" was never brought to trial
('tidak pernah di-Mahmilub-kan'), but was summarily
executed by Col. Yasir Hadibroto upon request by
Maj-Gen. Suharto, today's Indonesian President,
  4.both the Council of Generals ('Dewan Djendral')
and the Gilchrist Document did exist and were not
fictions.

Who were the Gestapu plotters ?

We know from the beginning of this article that there
are three principal Gestapu "coup" leaders, Lieut-Col.
Untung and Col. A. Latief along with Brig-Gen.
Supardjo. In the second semiofficial account, it was
mentioned that all major participants of the "coup"
including the three persons were puppets of the PKI.
Is this statement true ? Lets read the following brief
resume of the three persons (Mortimer, 1974):

  1.Lieutenant-Colonel Untung:
    a. served in Batallion 454 of the Diponegoro
Division from about 1954 to 1965,
    b. in 1963, was dropped into West Irian on
commando warfare and returned as a hero after the
campaign was over,
    c. interviewed in May 1963 (reported in
"Kedaulatan Rakjat", May 7-10, 1963) he said that he
hoped the families of all those killed in the west
Irian campaign would place their trust in the
Almighty, keep the Faith, and remain faithful to the
One God,
    d. when he was married in 1964, General Suharto
(today's Indone- sian President) appeared to have
thought highly enough of him to travel to Central Java
to be present at the wedding (extracted from
"Kedaulatan Rakjat", April 29, 1964)
    e. was promoted and transferred to his batallion
command in the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (since this was a
highly sensitive post, both the army and the palace
would have had good reason to check its incumbent
thoroughly)
  2.Colonel A. Latief: was commander of Brigade I of
the Djakarta garrison (when the "coup" broke out);
Brigade I was formerly attached to the Diponegoro
Division, stationed at Srondol in Central Java; but in
November 1963, he was transferred to Djakarta to
strengthen the capital's defence and security (it is
most unlikely that Latief would have been appointed to
such a critical position if there had been serious
grounds for suspecting him of close PKI affinities).
  3.Brigadier-General Supardjo:
    a. had a long and distinguished record record of
service in the Siliwangi Division in West Java, and in
crushing the Darul Islam rebellion, and Malaysian
forces along the Kalimantan border,
    b. in 1963, underwent training at Fort Bragg in
the USA, as assignment that would have entailed
careful vetting by the Indonesian and American army
security agencies (meaning that could hardly be a
communist sympathyzer),
    c. returning to Indonesia in mid-1963, was given
charge of all training and indoctrination of Siliwangi
troops, a highly responsible and trusted position in
the army's premier division,
    d. in 1965, was appointed commander of a brigade
in West Kalimantan and promoted to Brigadier-General.

Besides knowledge of the three "coup" leaders, it is
important to see the Army's situation prior to and
during the Gestapu "coup".
According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch
(1978), by 1965 the Indonesian Army General Staff was
split into two camps. At the center were the general
staff officers appointed with, and loyal to, the army
commander General Yani, who in turn was reluctant to
challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity
in alliance with the PKI. The second group, including
the right-wing generals Nasution and Suharto,
comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist
policies. All of these generals were anti-PKI but by
1965 this divisive issue was Sukarno.

The Cornell version (Anderson and McVey, 1971) focused
on the existence of dissatisfaction within certain
sections of the Army and the motivations provided to
launch the "coup". The actual originators of the
"coup", the Cornell version states, were a group of
middle level officers from the Diponegoro Division in
Central Java who were strongly Javanese in their
cultural orientation and resented the metropolitan
decadence of Jakarta, particularly the decadence
prevailing among senior officers of the Diponegoro
Division in the Army, including General Ahmad Yani.
Therefore, the impetus of their discontent was largely
economic, particularly strong was the resentment of
the luxurious life-style of the Jakarta-based
Generals. They also resented the fact that promotions
were hard to come by; they might have wanted to return
to the Spirit of Yogya, to the pure revolutionary
spirit of the Indonesian nation.

Two batallions,the 454th Diponegoro Division and the
530th Brawidjaja Division, were involed in the "coup"
and comprised the bulk of the 3rd Paratroop Brigade.
The subordination of this two factions in this
supposed civil war to a single close command structure
under Suharto (the KOSTRAD commander) is cited to
explain how Suharto was able to restore order in the
city without gunfire. Meanwhile, out at the Halim air
base, an alleged gun battle between the 454th (Green
Baret) and the RPKAD (Red Baret) paratroops went off
"without the loss of a single man" (Scott, 1985).

Scott (1985) went on explaining his curiosity of the
fact that the 454th and the 530th Batallions had been
among the main Indonesian recipients of US assistance.
It is interesting to note how many Gestapu leaders had
been US-trained !! The Gestapu leader in Central Java,
Col. Saherman, had returned from training at Fort
Leavenworth and Okinawa, shortly before meeting with
Lt.Col.Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th Batallion
in mid-August 1965. Saherman's acceptance for training
at Fort Leavenworth "would mean that he had passed
review by CIA observers."

The conclusion of this section is that it is very much
unlikely that the three Gestapu "coup" leaders as well
as Batallions 454th and 530th have been puppets of the
PKI. Also interesting to note that there was split
within the Indonesia Army which might motivate the
Gestapu "coup".

Who was the Puppet Master/"Dalang" of the Gestapu
"coup" ?

So far, we have not seen any evidence leading up to
the "Dalang" of the Gestapu "coup". However, in few
moment, we'll see a very important testimony from Col.
A. Latief, one of the three "coup" leaders mentioned
above. Col. A. Latief, the commander of the Army's
Jakarta region, is Suharto's friend dated back as far
as the Revolution in which they had fought together.
He was one of the Gestapu plotters and was brought to
trial in summer 1978. Whereas the other plotters,
Lt.Col. Untung and Brig.Gen. Supardjo, had been
sentenced to death and were excuted soon after the
events, Latief had not been tried for all these years,
but kept in an isolation cell in Salemba prison in
Jakarta.

Why he had not been brought to trial for so long will
be revealed very soon !!

On May 5th, 1978 (during his trial), he submitted to
the court a detailed 'Eksepsi' (demurrer) and is
quoted as writing:

     "Two days before the 1 October 1965 events, I
visited with my family Suharto's home in Jalan Haji
Agus Salim. At the time General Suharto was still
commander of KOSTRAD. Besides speaking about family
affairs, I also intended to ask him some questions
regarding information I received concerning the
Generals' Council ("Dewan Djendral") ..... He
[Suharto] himself told me the following: the previous
day he had learned from a former subordinate of his
from Yogyakarta, whose name was Subagyo, that there
was information about the existence of a generals'
council of the Army, which had plans for a coup
d'e'tat against the power of President Sukarno and his
government."

Latief further reported who were present at that
visit; among them was Suharto's youngest son who the
same day got hot soup over his body. Then Latief
continues:

     "In addition, I wish to confirm a report which a
writer, Brackman, has published an interview with
General Suharto ..... General Suharto told him the
following: 'Two days before September 30, our
three-year-old son had an accident at home. He poured
hot soup on himself, and we had to rush him to the
hospital. Many friends visited my son there and on the
night of September 30, I was there, too. ... I
remembered Col. Latief dropped into the hospital that
evening to inquire about my son's health. I was
touched by his thoughtfullness. .... Today I realize
that he didn't go to the hospital to check on my son
but, rather, to CHECK ON ME....'

     There also exists (Latief goes on) an interview
of Suharto published in Der Spiegel of June 1970, in
which he was asked how it could happen that he didn't
appear on the list of generals who were to be killed.
Suharto replied: 'About eleven o'clock in the night,
Col. Latief of the putsch conspiracy came to the
hospital with the intention to KILL ME, but evidently
he shrank back from effectuating this plan in a public
place.'

     I believe (Latief continues) that the President
of the Court, .... will ask: 'Why did Latief come at
this extremely important moment ? Did Latief really
want to kill General Suharto that night?'

     Is it imaginable (Latief pursues his argument)
that I should be planning to do harm to a man I highly
esteemed, whom I had known for a long time and who had
been, in the past, my commander ? It is, moreover,
logical that if I would actually have planned to kill
"Bapak" General Suharto, such an act would certainly
have amounted to a BLUNDER that would cause the whole
movement of October 1, 1965, to fall through.

     I was firmly convinced that if anybody could be
considered LOYAL to the leadership of President
SUKARNO, IT WAS HE. I know him already from Yogyakarta
and I truly did know who "Bapak" General Suharto was.
I came to him, in full agreement with
Brig.Gen.Supardjo and Lt.Col. Untung, after we had
gathered that evening about 9 o'clock in my house. The
aim was to be able to appeal at any time to him for
support. This is why I found it important to visit
him. Lt.Col.Untung had also been his subordinate in
Central Java and later he had been transferred to the
Raiders' Corps. He was selected to be parachuted on
West Irian, which earned him high honours. Still,
Untung dared not appear before Suharto, as I did...."

In his "Eksepsi", Col. Latief remarks that Sukarno was
deposed as President because it was assumed that
Sukarno had possessed foreknowledge that something
that night and, thus, had a certain co-responsibility
for the events.

     "We have to observe," writes Laties, "that Gen.
Suharto, TOO, 'possessed foreknowledge', and had
information both about the existence of a generals'
council and about the existence of a movement to
thwart the plan of the generals' council for a coup
d'etat. When he was informed about that or, at least
had learned about it, he did NOT as quickly as
possible report it to his chief the Minister
concurrently Commander of the Army [Gen. Ahmad Yani]
or to the President [Sukarno]."

The Final Conclusions

Beyond reasonable doubt, we have to suspect President
Suharto as a "Dalang"/Puppet Master of the Gestapu
"coup" and its aftermath (including the killing of
about 800,000 alleged PKI members and sympathyzers in
the period of 1965-6). Also, we have seen that the PKI
most likely had nothing to do at all with the "coup",
so that the PKI deserves its name to be rehabilitated
!

Last but not least, it has been seen that on 1st
October 1965 the sacredness of Pancasila (Indonesia's
Ideology) was NEVER tested. What we have seen in this
article is that 1st October 1965 ONLY marked Suharto's
rise to power ... and this is what we are going to
observe tomorrow !!

References

    "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed",
J.of Contemporary Asia, 248-251
    "Facts on File", vol xxv, no. 1303, Oct. 14-20
(1965), p. 377
    Amnesty International, 1977, "Indonesia: An
Amnesty International Report"
    Anderson, B., 1987, "How did the Generals Die ?",
Indonesia no. 43 (April, 1987)
    Anderson, B., and McVey, R., 1971, "A Preliminary
Analysis of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia",
Cornell University
    Crouch, H., 1978, "The Army and Politics in
Indonesia", Cornell University Press, pp. 79-81
    Holtzappel, C., 1979, "The 30 September Movement:
A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an
Intelligence Operation ?", J. of Contemporary Asia,
    9(2), 216-239
    Hughes, J. 1968, "The End of Sukarno", London,
Angus and Robertson
    May, B., 1978, "The Indonesian Tragedy", London,
Henley and Boston
    Mody, N. B., 1987, "Indonesia under Suharto", Apt
Books Inc., New York
    Mortimer, R., 1974, "Indonesian Communism under
Sukarno", Cornell University Press, p. 420
    Notosusanto, N, and Saleh, I., 1968, "The Coup
Attempt of the 30 September Movement"
    Polomka, P., 1969, "The Indonesian Army and
Confrontation", unpublished MA Thesis, Melbourne
University, p. 239
    Scott, P.D., 1985, "The United States and the
Overthrow of Sukarno: 1965 - 1967", Pacific Affairs,
239-264
    Southwood, J., and Flanagan, P., 1983, "Indonesia:
Law, Propaganda, and Terror", pp. 155-156, Zed Press,
London
    Sundhaussen, U., 1982, "The Road to Power:
Indonesia Military Politics, 1945 - 1967", Oxford
University Press
    Utrech, E., 1975, "An attempt to corrupt
Indonesian History", J. of Contemporary Asia, 5(1),
99-102
    Vitacchi, T., 1967, "The Fall of Sukarno", Andre
Deutch
    Wertheim, W.F., 1979, "Whose Plot? -New Light on
1965 Events", J. of Contemporary Asia, 9(2), 197-213
    Widjanarko, B.S., 1974, "The Devious Dalang:
Sukarno and the so-called Untung Putsch"

From: pws@cuug.ab.ca (Paul Salim)
Subject: USA vs PKI - Part 1/2
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 1995 15:26:19 -0600 (MDT)

THE 30th ANIVERSARY OF THE GESTAPU "COUP": USA vs PKI

by Paul H. Salim

DEDICATED TO MILLIONS OF INDONESIANS who were either
massacred after the Gestapu "coup" on 30th September
1965, or have their civil rights denied by the
Soeharto Regime on allegation that they or their
parents or one of their families were involved in the
event; also dedicated to HUNDREDS OF MIL- LIONS OF
INDONESIANS who are going to observe the 30th An
niversary of the Gestapu "coup" without any knowledge
of what really happened on that day

    Abstract
    Introduction
    The West New Guinea settlement in 1962
    References

With my best wishes from Calgary, Canada Paul H. Salim

Abstract
US involvement to combat the growth of the Communist
forces in Indonesia up to 1966 is examined through
some most recent information from the US government
and a CIA station chief working in Indonesia.

This article shows that the return of the West New
Guinea to Indonesia in 1963 was (1) because the USA
was afraid of losing Indonesia to the Communist Bloc,
(2) because the USA believed that the West New Guinea
dispute, if not quickly resolved, could hamper the
efforts of the Indonesian army to reduce PKI strength
and influence. Based on this US foreign policy, it is
understood why the USA needed to "install" its
diplomat, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, to mediate between the
Dutch and Indonesia governments during the
negotiations of the dispute in 1962.

This article will also summarize the most recent paper
published in 1994 by the CIA station chief in Jakarta,
Bernardo Hugh Tovar. His paper will be critically
reviewed in this article.

Introduction

On 30th October 1995 we, the Indonesian people, will
commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the so-called
Gestapu "coup". A review on this important subject has
been given in detail elsewhere (see ref. [1], [2], and
[3]).

Unlike three articles mentioned previously, this one
will base its analysis on United States official
documents of foreign affairs. The documents are
published in series called "Foreign Relation of the
United States" (FRUS) which are drawn from the
following sources:

  1.the Department of State and Defence,
  2.the White House,
  3.the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
  4.papers from key participants.

Right now, the most recent series of FRUS have been
published for a period between 1964 and 1968 for
Vietnam (vol. I) and Western Europe (vol. XIII).
Unfortunately, vols. II till XII of 1964-68 FRUS which
most likely contain abundant information on US
involvement in the Gestapu "coup" are still
unavailable.
Yesterday afternoon I had a telephone conversation
with Mr. Edward C. Keefer at the following address:

Mr. Edward C. Keefer,
Chief of the Asia and American Division
The Office of Historian
Ph: (202) 663-1131

and basically Mr. Keefer told me that the most
possible time for the publication of the 1964-68
series for Indonesia will be in 2 (two) years' time.
Actually, it is amazing that apparently the US
government is afraid to declassify the most important
CIA files on the Gestapu "coup" and has to wait until
approximately 1997 or possibly 1998 when the political
change in Indonesia would likely occur.

Due to the above circumstances, this article is
divided in two parts:

  1.The first part is based on "FRUS 1961-1963"
published early this year and will focus on the West
New Guinea dispute. This part is very important to
    Indonesians who are probably unaware:
    a. why did West New Guinea have to be returned to
the Republic of Indonesia in 1963, not in 1970 or per-
haps even at later time ?
    b. whether was there any connection between the
West New Guinea settlement and PKI (the Indonesian
Com- munist Party) ?
    c. what was the US interest for the return of West
New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia ?
    This first part is available in "USA vs PKI - Part
1/2."
      
  2.The second part will discuss the most recent
article regarding the view of Bernardo Hugh Tovar (the
US station chief in Indonesia in the 1960s) on the
Indonesian crisis in 1965-6, usually referred to as
the Gestapu "coup". This part will be available in
"USA vs PKI - Part 2/2."

The West New Guinea settlement in 1962

Frankly, there is very little information about West
New Guinea even from official version, except that
West New Guinea was a part of the Netherlands East
Indies and was retained by the Dutch after the
transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia
on 27th December 1949. After the constant agitation by
the Republic of Indonesia to acquire West New Guinea,
the Netherlands was forced to turning it over to the
control of the United Nations on 15 August 1962. On
1st May 1963, the United Nations turned it over to the
Republic of Indonesia, which created it the province
of West Irian.

Although the official version of West New Guinea is
somewhat "with nothing to say", the US/CIA documents
tell a lot. Before we have further discussion, please
remember two things:

  1.on 5 March 1960 President Sukarno dissolved
Parliament ('DPR') which was the result of an election
on 29th September 1955 and created a new parliament
('DPRGR'). More importantly, Masyumi, a non-communist
party which held 21% seats in 'DPR', was banned
because of its involvement during the PRRI/Permesta
Rebelion; and PKI gained more political strength in
Indonesian politics.
  2.President Sukarno launched a military campaign
against the Dutch over West New Guinea on 18th
December 1961
Now, let's look at what was the US reaction after
President Sukarno launched the military campaign. On
the same day, Mr. Robert H. Johnson (the National
Security Council Staff) wrote a letter to Mr. Bundy
(President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs) and his letter reads as follows (see ref.
[4]):

Attachment (Secret)

Washington,December 18,1961

Some Fundamentals With Respect to West New Guinea

      
  1."The U.S. Interest." The U.S. has a general
interest in eliminating this irritant in international
relations involving two free world countries. But its
more basic interest are two:
    (a). to eliminate this issue from Indonesian
politics where it has diverted the country from
constructive tasks, has been used by Sukarno as a
means of frustrating opposition to himself, and has
been exploited by the large local Communist Party (PKI
- phs) and by the USSR,
    (b). to avoid a military clash ... (deleted by
phs).. because such a clash would probably strengthen
Communist forces within Indonesia. The loss of
Indonesia could be as significant as the loss of
mainland Southeast Asia and would make defence of the
latter considerably more difficult.

     ... (deleted by phs)... If the above analysis is
correct, we must conclude that it is in our interests
that a solution be devised which will lead to accesion
of West New Guinea to Indonesia. ... (deleted by
phs)... As the State paper says somewhat more
cautiously - "basically, we recognize that for
historical, geographical and political reasons West
New Guinea probably will tend to closer, if not
complete, association with Indonesia and our role in
seeking a settlement will be to facilitate this
evolution."
      
  2."The Validity of the Self-Determination Principle
for West New Guinea" .... (deleted by phs)....
  3."The Current Situation".... (deleted by phs)...
  4."The Value of Negotiations" Negotiations will
serve very little purpose if we approach them in the
same spirit that has motivated some of our current
diplomatic activity on the subject;... (deleted by
phs)... Our role must be grounded in the conclusion
that the only solution that will be lasting and that
will serve U.S. interests will be one that gives
Indonesia a clear prospect of acquiring early control
over the territory..... (deleted by phs)........
In order to accomplish this objective we must make
very clear to the Dutch that we are not taken in by
the idea that self- determination principle has any
reality when applied to West New Guinea. We must also
talk very frankly with them (and with the Australians)
about the danger of the loss of Indonesia to Communism
by the West New Guinea issue and the damage that much
loss would cause to the free world position in
Southeast Asia.... (deleted by phs)....

     2 (two) weeks before negotiations between the
Dutch and Indonesian government started on 20th March
1962 for the West New Guinea settlement, another
secret US document prepared by CIA, the Departments of
State, Defence, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the
Joint Staff, and NSA, reads as follows (see ref. [5]):

            NIE 55-62
Washington, March 7,1962

                               The Prospects for
Indonesia

                                      The Problem
To analyze the major trends in Indonesia and to
estimate probable developments over the next year or
so with special reference to Indonesia's international
orientation and to the
            West New Guinea dispute.

                                      Conclusions
            1. Until a settlement satisfactory to
Sukarno is reached with the Netherlands, the West New
Guinea dispute will continue to overshadow and
strongly influence all other foreign and domestic
issues in Indonesia. Sukarno will probably even
closer to the (communist) Bloc position on major
international issues as Indonesia continues to rely
heavily on Soviet military aid and political support
for the prosecution of the West New Guinea campaign.
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) will continue to
exploit the issue and to obstruct a negotiated
settlement. The diversion of army energies into the
West New Guinea campaign will continue to hamper its
efforts to reduce PKI strength and influence....
(deleted by phs)...
            2. ... (deleted by phs)... In the event of
a settlement, the army would probably give greater
attention to countering PKI influence in the
country.... (deleted by phs)....

    As it can be seen above, the West New Guinea
settlement had been made in advance by the USA as
early as 1961 and even before the negotiations between
the Dutch and Indonesian governments began on 20th
March 1963. The US settlement was that West New Guinea
should be a part of the Republic of Indonesia because:

          
      1.the PKI could not gain strength in Indonesia
by exploiting West New Guinea dispute anymore,
      2.the Indonesian army would concentrate its
energy more on reducing the PKI's strength (note: it
was better than the previous situation where the
Indonesian army had to divide its attention between
PKI and West New Guinea).
    It is also not surprising that the US
representatives were very active in the West New
Guinea settlement and sponsored the negotiations
between the Dutch and Indonesian representatives
carried out in Middleburg, Virginia, on 20th March
1962. The talks were formally under the auspices of
the United Nations Secretary General (U Thant), but
required the third party as a mediator. It is also not
surprising with the previously mentioned US foreign
policy, that the mediator was chosen to be Mr.
Ellsworth Bunker, a then-retired American diplomat
(see ref. [6]).
    It can be noticed a telegram from the Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk, to the US Embassy in Indonesia on
March 6, 1962. The telegram reads as follows (see ref.
[7]):

                                        Washington,
March 6, 1962, 8:57pm

            .... Secretary (of State, Dean Rusk) has
asked Dutch consider following individuals for third
party role: Ellsworth Bunker, Frederic Boland, Ernest
Gross, Eugene Black, Walt Rostow, John McCloy,
Hamilton Fish Armstrong. In our view Bunker would be
particularly outstanding candidate.

            Request you see Sukarno or Subandrio
soonest and pass on substance this message including
list of names suggested to Dutch. You should stress
Secretary's view that Bunker would be absolutely first
class. Believe with favorable Indo reaction this
message we should be able firm up arrangements for
secret talks get under way.

    Now, we know that from the beginning USA had
insisted Ellsworth Bunker to be the mediator. And, we
know that the main task of Ellsworth Bunker during the
West New Guinea negotiations was that he had to hand
over West New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia as
soon as possible, regardless of Holland's position or
even West New Guinea's position.

References

  1.Salim, P.H., 1993a, "The Gestapu 'Coup': Unsolved
Mystery !!", soc.culture.indonesia Newsgroup, 30th
September 1993
  2.Salim, P.H., 1993b, "Two Chinese Indonesians
'Disappeared' af- ter Gestapu", soc.culture.indonesia
Newsgroup, 2nd October 1993
  3.Salim, P.H., 1994, "The Gestapu 'Coup': Mystery
Almost Solved!!",
IDS-Net/Paroki-Net/Indoz-Net/Apakabar-Net, 30
September 1994
  4."Foreign Relations of the United States
1961-1963", vol. XXIII (Southeast Asia),
pp.491,492,493, US Government Printing Office
  5."Foreign Relations of the United States
1961-1963", vol. XXIII (Southeast Asia), pp.555-6, US
Government Printing Office
  6.Henderson, W., 1973, "West New Guinea: The Dispute
and Its Settlement," p. 179, Seton Hall University
Press "Foreign Relations of the United States
1961-1963", vol. XXIII (Southeast Asia), pp.554-5, US
Government Printing Office

"BUNG KARNO: 6 JUNE - 21 JUNE"

I wish that the following brief account of Sukarno's
political biography [1,2] would refresh your memory
about him, and I also wish that you'd share my
curiosity about the Gestapu "coup" which is still an
unsolved mistery (see Appendix I) :
  

6 June 1901: Sukarno was born in Surabaya (father,
Raden Sukemi Sosrodihardjo [a Javanese], and mother,
Idayu Njoman Rai [a Balinese]) 1911 - 1913 : Sukarno
attended his father's primary school at Mojokerto 1914
- 1915 : attended ELS (Europeesche Lagere School), a
Dutch-language elementary school, at Mojokerto 1916 -
1921 : attended HBS (Hogere Burger School), an elite
Dutch high school, in Surabaya 1921 - 1926 : attended
THS (Technische Hoogeschool te Bandung) in Bandung,
earned "Ingenieur" with a dissertation on Harbour
Design; he also developed his own version of Marxism,
called MARHAENISM; he claimed to have met a sundanese
farmer nicknamed Marhaen while cycling through the
countryside near Bandung; the following is a
conversation between Sukarno and Marhaen:
'Who owns this field ?' asked Sukarno
'I do,' replied Marhaen
'And the hoe, who owns that ?'
'I do.'
'Those tools, who owns them ?'
'I do.'
'The crop on which you're working, for whom is it ?'
'For me.'
'Is it sufficient for your needs ?'
'There's barely enough to keep us alive.'
'Do you ever sell your labour ?'
'No.I must work hard, but my labours are all for
myself.'
'But brother, you live in poverty.'
'That's right, I live poorly.'
'I thought to myself,' said Sukarno,'this man clearly
and certainly is not a member of the proletariat, he
is a pauper, he is poor, he suffers much, has not
enough to live on, but he is not a member of the
proletariat, for he does not sell his labour-power to
another without participating in ownership of the
means of production.
 [ He then asked the farmer his name and was told
MARHAEN. Sukarno then decided to use that name to
describe the DESTITUTE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA ]
4 Jul. 1927 : Ir. Sukarno, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, and
Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo established 'Perserikatan
National Indonesia' (PNI); Party's position was
political independence of Indonesia and
non-cooperation with the Netherland Indies Gov't.
May 1928 : PNI became 'Partai Nasional Indonesia'
29 Dec. 1929: Sukarno and his colleagues at PNI were
arrested by the Dutch police
18 Aug - 22 Dec 1930: Sukarno was tried at the Bandung
District Court under the presidency of Mr. R.
Siegenbeek van Heukelom on charges (under Article 153
of HAATZAAI Article) of a crime to contribute by
speaking or writing, directly or by implication, to
the disturbance of public order; Sukarno then made an
eloquent speech titled 'Indonesia Menggugat' in his
own defence; he was then found guilty and sentenced 4
years in the jail of Sukamiskin near Bandung.
25 Apr 1931 : PNI was dissolved and replaced by
'Partai Indonesia' (Pertindo)
31 Dec 1931 : Sukarno got clemency and was released
from jail, and then joined Partindo
1 Oct 1933 - 9 Jul 1942 : Sukarno was arrested for the
second time and exiled to Endeh (Flores), then
tranferred to Bengkulu in 1938 after he sufferred a
severe bout of malaria
9 Mar 1942 : The Netherland Indies Gov't surrendered
to Japan without offering much resistance on land;
Sukarno was subsequently released from jail
9 Mar 1943 : Putera ('Pusat Tenaga Rakyat') was set
up with Sukarno as Chairman; however, his reputation
was tarnished by his role in recruiting Romusha, a
conscription of Indonesian laborers to serve the
Japanese army, not only in Indonesia, but also in
other parts of Southeast Asia (estimated that 270,000
romusha were sent Outer Islands and Japanese-held
territories in Southeast Asia, but only 52,000 were
repatriated to Java);
Sukarno's collaboration with the Japanese gov't (who
was hostile to the Allies) also brought into being a
familiar refrain in his oratory 'Amerika kita setrika,
Inggris kita linggis !'.
March 1944 : Djawa Hokokai replaced Putera which was
dissolved by the end of 1943; the new party was under
the chairmanship of Sukarno.
1 Mar 1945 : BPUPKI ('Badan Penyelidik Usaha
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was founded under the
chairmanship of Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat.
1 June 1945 : Sukarno introduced his Pancasila during
BPUPKI meeting. His Pancasila contained five
principles:
1. nationalism
2. internationalism (humanism)
3. democracy (representative government or consent)
4. social prosperity for all
5. belief in God
He said,'The first two principles, nationalism and
internationalism, can be pressed to one, which I used
to call socionationalism.' Similarly with democracy
'which is not the democracy of the West' together with
social justice for all can be pressed down to one, and
called socio democracy. Finally - belief in God. 'And
so what originally was five has become three: socio
nationalism, socio democracy, and belief in God.' 'If
I press down five to get three, and three to get one,
then I have a genuine Indonesian term - GOTONG ROYONG
[mutual co-operation]. The state of Indonesia which we
are to establish should be a state of mutual
co-operation.
How fine that is ! A Gotong Royong state !'
8 Aug 1945 : Sukarno, Hatta, and Radjiman
Wediodiningrat were summoned by Marshal Terauchi,
Commander-in-Chief of Japan's Southern Expeditionary
Forces in Saigon.
14 Aug 1945 : they return from Saigon
15 Aug 1945 : Sukarno, Hatta, and Mr. Ali Subardjo
visited Admiral Maeda.
In the evening, Sukarno received Wikana and his
colleagues and was later kidnapped by Jakarta youth
leaders
16 Aug 1945 : Sukarno and Hatta were held kidnapped at
Rengasdengklok.
They then returned to Jakarta in the evening in order
to see the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto, the meeting
with Nishimura and the drafting of the proclamation.
17 Aug 1945 : The proclamation by Sukarno and Hatta on
behalf of all Indonesian people
15 Aug 1950 : Sukarno unilaterally declared the
unitary Republic of Indonesia and abandoned the Round
Table Conference signed by Indonesia and its former
ruler, the Netherlands, on 27 Dec. 1949; Indonesia
followed a Parliamentary Democracy till 1959.
April 1955 : Sukarno hosted the Afro-Asian Conference
in Bandung; 29 Non-Bloc countries attended the
conference
10 Nov 1956 : The newly elected Constituent Assembly
started to draft a new Indonesian constitution
18 May 1958 : During PRRI revolt in Sulawesi, an
American B-25 pilot, Allan Pope, was shot down over
Ambon. After this incident, Sukarno had good reason to
believe that America would like to see him toppled,
and he started developing closer relations with the
Soviet Union and, especially, the People's Republic of
China
5 July 1959 : Sukarno with influence from the Army
dissolved the Constituent Assembly and adopted by
decree the Constitution of
1945 (UUD 45); later this year, Sukarno introduced his
NASAKOM ('Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme') which
was to serve as the basis for a revolutionary 'just
and prosperous society.'
Under Nasakom, to oppose PKI ('Partai Komunis
Indonesia') was to be anti-Pancasila/anti-Sukarno.
1960 : Sukarno introduced his most important
formulas, Manipol/USDEK; USDEK was an acronym of UUD
45, 'Sosialisme ala Indonesia',
'Demokrasi Terpimpin','Ekonomi Terpimpin',and
'Kepribadian Indonesia'; at the same time, the PKI
power in Java's villages grew strongly
23 Sep 1963 : Sukarno who had proclaimed himself
President-for-Life declared 'Ganyang Malaysia' Policy
Late 1963 : following Sukarno's call for
implementation of land reform measures that had been
made into law in 1960, the PKI announced 'aksi
sepihak' and began dispossessing landlords and
distributing the land to poor Javanese, northern
Sumatrans, and Balinese peasants. Reforms were not
accomplished without violance. Old rivalries between
nominal Moslems, the abangan (many of whom were PKI
supporters), and orthodox Moslems ('santri') were
exacerbated. The PKI membership rolls then totalled 2
million.
Dec. 1964 : After the UN General Assembly elected
Malaysia as a nonpermanent member of the Security
Council, Sukarno took Indonesia out of the world body
and promised to establish CONEFO (Conference of New
Emerging Forces); 1964 was called by Sukarno as TAVIP
('Tahun Vivere Pericoloso' = The Year of Living
Dingereously )
29 May 1965 : Sukarno announced that he had
documentary evidence (called Gilchrist Letter) of a
plot against the lives of himself, Subandrio, and
Ahmad Yani, to be carried out by 'henchmen' of the
imperialists( which in the Gilchrist Letter were
called 'our local army friends' and which could be
held to imply the existence of close connections
between the British Embassy and members of the
Indonesian Army). These statements were made in the
context of Gilchrist letter, produced by Subandrio and
purporting to be a telegram of the preceeding March
from the British Ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist to
the British Foreign Office.
17 Aug 1965 : D.N. Aidit, the PKI chairman, called for
the arming of 5 million workers and 10 million
peasants to carry on 'Ganyang Malaysia'; this new
armed force were then called 'the Fifth Force'
30 Sep - 1 Oct 1965 : A coup d'etat was launched by
Lt.Col. Untung, commander of the Tjakrabirawa
Presidential Guard, but smashed by Lt.Gen. Suharto
from KOSTRAD; this event however remains a mistery to
Indonesian people up to this present moment
(especially about who has masterminded the coup
d'etat)==> please see explanation below in <a
href=appen.html>Appendix I</a> 11 Mar. 1967: Sukarno
was FORCED to sign the executive order of March 11
('Supersemar) in front of three generals, Basuki
Rachmat, Mohammad Yusuf, and Amir Machmud, and Sukarno
was obliged to transfer supreme authority to Suharto (
Please note that the above three generals were sent by
Suharto [Minister and Commander of the Army], so this
11 March event should be viewed as COUP d'ETAT by
Suharto against Sukarno)
12 Mar. 1967: MPRS stripped Sukarno of all political
power and installed Suharto as Acting President.
21 June 1970: After a sudden deterioration in his
condition on 16 June 1970, Sukarno was taken to the
Jakarta Military Hospital and died there on the
morning of 21 June. Sukarno's wish to be buried in the
garden of his Batu Tulis home near Jakarta was not
granted by Suharto (then President of Indonesia); and
he was instead buried next to his mother at Blitar
(East Java).
Years before his death, Sukarno had written,"And when
I die, don't write on my tombstone, President Sukarno,
doctor, engineer,leader of the Revolution ... No !
Just write on my tombstone, "Here lies Sukarno,
'Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia' "

References:

  1.J.D. Legge, "Sukarno: A Political Biography", The
Penguin Press (1972)
  2.W.H. Frederick and R.L. Worden, "Indonesia: a
country study", Department of the Army (1993)

Salam dari Calgary, Canada
Paul H. Salim Encl. Appendix I

                   POLITISASI HUBUNGAN KELAMIN DI
INDONESIA;
  SEJARAH GERAKAN WANITA INDONESIA DAN GERWANI SAMPAI
ORDE BARU

Saskia Eleonora Wieringa (I)
Thesis di Institute of Social Studies
The Hague
1995

Pengantar

    Jalan sejarah kita dibangun oleh para 'sejarawan'
yang mengabdi kekuasaan militer ... Kita yang sudah
disiksa dan kalah jangan sekali-kali menjadi putus
asa.
    Kita harus berjuang untuk hidup. Generasi muda
harus belajar dan tahu, apa yang sebenarnya telah
terjadi pada masa lalu. Sejarah harus ditulis di atas
kejujuran, sehingga generasi-generasi mendatang tidak
akan salah mengerti. (Dok IX 1992:22)

(1) 'Sejarah' yang dimaksud dalam kutipan tersebut di
atas meliputi jangka waktu setengah abad, yaitu sejak
Sukarno dan Hatta memproklamasikan kemerdekaan
Indonesia sampai sekarang; dan khususnya sekitar
tahun-tahun 1965, ketika Orde Lama Sukarno digantikan
dengan Orde Baru Suharto. Mereka yang 'telah disiksa
dan dikalahkan' itu adalah orang-orang dari Partai
Komunis Indonesia dahulu, atau dari organisasi ini dan
itu yang termasuk dalam 'Keluarga Komunis', seperti
misalnya organisasi perempuan Gerwani
(2) (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia). Suharto tampil ke atas
singgasana kekuasaannya dengan menciptakan kampanye
kekerasan yang tak ada tolok bandingannya di masa
lalu, dan dikuatkannya pula dengan tuduhan pesta-pora
seksual yang konon dilakukan oleh para anggota
Gerwani. Orde Baru tidak hanya dibangun di atas
timbunan mayat-mayat, yang diperkirakan sebanyak satu
juta, dari orang-orang tak berdosa yang dibantai
selama bulan-bulan terakhir tahun 1965 dan bulan-bulan
pertama tahun 1966. Tetapi Orde Baru juga dibangun di
atas pembasmian kekuatan kaum perempuan, yang telah
berhasil diperolehnya selama dasawarsa-dasawarsa
sebelumnya, kekuatan yang oleh musuh-musuh mereka
dilukiskan melalui metafora-metafora seksual.

(3) Tidak banyak perhatian diberikan pada masa genting
dalam sejarah modern Indonesia ini, baik oleh peneliti
dari luar maupun dari dalam negeri sendiri. Seperti
John Legge mengakui, 'barangkali karena yang dibunuh
adalah orang-orang Komunis, maka sedikit banyak hati
nurani dunia luar seakan-akan tidak terusik oleh apa
yang harus digolongkan, apa pun penilaiannya, sebagai
salah satu pembantaian paling keji dalam sejarah
modern' (Legge 1972:399). Jelas jika Amerika Serikat
menjadi merasa lega, bila selagi berada di tengah
kemelut Perang Vietnam, Sukarno, yang mereka pandang
sebagai pengacau dunia yang hendak menyerahkan
Indonesia ke tangan kaum Komunis yang berbahaya itu,
telah berhasil disingkirkan oleh seorang jendral kanan
yang dengan segala daya membawa Indonesia ke jalan
kapitalis.
(4) Seorang pengamat kekuasaan Suharto, Vatikiotis
(1993:34), menulis: 'Indonesia, citra buruk bagi para
pengamat politik luar negeri Amerika Serikat itu,
dalam tahun 1960-an tiba-tiba memberi bukti paling
terang, bahwa tidak semua kekuasaan yang dibangun di
atas laras senjata adalah buruk'.

Dalam kajian ini saya akan membuktikan, bahwa alasan
lain mengapa Dunia Barat tutup-mulut itu ialah, karena
ketidak-mampuannya memahami tali-temali dan
intrik-intrik yang ada di balik kampanye
ketidak-amanan dan pembunuhan-pembunuhan massal, yang
dilakukan sesudah kup 'pertama' tanggal 1 Oktober
1965.
Kampanye beserta akibat-akibatnya itu saya pandang
sebagai kup yang 'kedua', yang dengan diam-diam telah
mengantar Suharto ke tahta kekuasaannya. Para pengamat
umumnya mengabaikan adanya kup yang kedua ini, atau
sekedar mengatakannya sebagai suatu periode genting
dalam sejarah Indonesia yang 'tidak bisa dimengerti'
(Tšrnquist 1984:54). Beberapa penulis mengakui, bahwa
keberhasilan Suharto naik ke tangga kekuasaan terjadi
dalam dua tahap (Southwood dan Flanagan 1983; Pohan
1988; Vatikiotis 1993). Walaupun begitu orang
mengabaikan mekanisme di balik tali-temali kup yang
kedua itu:

    Suharto tampil di atas tahta kekuasaan di tengah
kemelut kejadian-kejadian sesudah kup yang gagal, dan
yang sampai sekarang sama sekali belum jelas ...
    Suharto dan sekelompok kecil pendukungnya
mengambil kesempatan itu, seolah-olah tampil tanpa
rencana sebelumnya yang terlalu jauh. (Vatikiotis
1993: 2&22)

Dalam kejadian-kejadian tersebut, kup tanggal 1
Oktober 1965 merupakan kejadian terpenting yang perlu
dijelaskan. Karena, entah bagaimana pun juga, memang
kejadian inilah yang akhirnya telah membukakan jalan
bagi Suharto naik ke jenjang kekuasaan. Sebagai
akibatnya, maka diabaikanlah kecerdikan Suharto dalam
memanipulasi pendapat umum - segala dalih dan
kebohongan telah digubahnya untuk menciptakan kondisi
kekacauan masyarakat, serupa seperti adegan gara-gara
dalam pergelaran wayang.
(5) Vatikiotis berpendapat, misalnya, bahwa mungkin
orang-orang di sekitar Suharto itulah, khususnya para
perwira muda dan mahasiswa radikal (dengan dukungan
satuan-satuan kesatuan khusus di bawah komando Kolonel
Sarwo Edhie Wibowo), 'yang telah mendorong Suharto
merebut kekuasaan' (Vatikiotis 1993:240). Kampanye
ideologi dan pembunuhan-pembunuhan massal yang
melandasi Orde Baru memang dilihat dengan kesedihan,
namun begitu telah dianggap sebagai kejadian-kejadian
yang tersendiri:

     yang mengawali penyusunan orde baru dan
pembangunan kembali ekonomi Indonesia, merupakan
periode lanjutan kekacauan yang pendek tetapi
berdarah.
    Orde Baru telah mengeksploitasi keadaan masyarakat
warisan jaman Sukarno yang sangat terpolarisasi, untuk
menumpas lawan- lawannya dan memberikan jalan keluar
untuk terjadinya pertumpahan darah katarsis itu.
(Vatikiotis 1993:33)

(6) Sementara Dunia Barat demi alasan-alasannya
sendiri berdiri di kejauhan, di Indonesia oposisi
dipukul atau dengan cerdiknya dibikin tutup mulut oleh
pemerintah melalui tindakan represi yang kejam. Tidak
hanya dengan pembunuhan terhadap ratusan ribu
orang-orang yang berdosa, tetapi juga dengan menahan
puluhan ribu lainnya, bahkan ada di antara mereka yang
sampai lebih dari dua puluh tahun. Hanya sedikit saja
dari para tahanan itu yang dibawa ke depan mahkamah
pengadilan, notabene pengadilan kanguru sekali pun.
Mereka yang selamat pun masih terus menderita. Bahkan
sampai sekarang kartu penduduk para bekas tapol dan
napol masih harus bercap 'ET' (eks-tapol).
Cap ini menjadi kendala yang efektif bagi mereka untuk
bisa memperoleh kesempatan bekerja.
(7) Pembatasan-pembatasan seperti itu juga
diberlakukan terhadap anak-anak, cucu-cucu, dan
saudara-saudara dekat mereka, jika mereka hendak
mencari kesempatan kerja dan belajar. Untuk bisa di
terima bekerja atau masuk balai pendidikan, dengan
surat keterangan resmi mereka harus bisa membuktikan
bahwa mereka 'bersih lingkungan'. Artinya, bahwa tidak
ada seorang ET pun di tengah-tengah keluarga mereka.
Banyak eks-tapol yang sampai sekarang masih harus
lapor diri secara teratur kepada penguasa militer.
Namun demikian dampak represi rezim Orde Baru tidak
puas berhenti sampai dengan para korban atau keluarga
mereka saja. Kampanye sesudah kup 1 Oktober 1965 yang
dilakukan Suharto memang tidak hanya dimaksud untuk
menumpas Komunisme di Indonesia sampai seakar-akarnya,
dan untuk membangkitkan kebencian massa terhadap
politik Sukarno, sehingga ia akan melepaskan jabatan
kepresidenannya. Kampanye itu juga bertujuan untuk
menciptakan suasana mental, pembenaran ideologis bagi
Orde Baru Suharto. Karena itu saya sama sekali tidak
setuju terhadap pendapat yang mengatakan, misalnya,
bahwa 'endapan perasaan tentang periode ini belum
memberi corak tertentu pada persepsi umum terhadap
kekuasaan Suharto' (Vatikiotis 1993:34). Menurut
pendapat saya, justru 'endapan perasaan' semacam
itulah yang telah menjadi dasar rezim Suharto, yang
tidak saja ditunjang dengan teror fisik yang dilakukan
angkatan darat, tetapi khususnya oleh keberhasilannya
yang meyakinkan, bahwa apa pun yang berkaitan dengan
kritik sosial ialah subversif, Komunis, dan akhirnya
dikaitkanlah pula dengan perbuatan seksual kaum
perempuan 'kita' yang tidak senonoh. Saya berpendapat,
bahwa hendaknya ketakacuhan politik bangsa Indonesia
tidak terlalu dilihat hanya sebagai akibat dari
'stabilitas politik dan kemakmuran ekonomi'
(Vatikiotis 1993) yang telah diciptakan Orde Baru
saja. Tetapi, ketak-acuhan itu, juga timbul dari
bayangan tentang kekacauan masyarakat berikut
warna-warna seksualnya, pembunuhan massal yang terjadi
karenanya, dan disusul represi yang tiada
putus-putusnya itu. Untuk menjamin agar citra resmi
itu tidak rusak, penguasa tetap sangat membatasi
kebebasan pers. Dalam bulan Juni 1994 yang lalu saja
ada tiga majalah dibredel: Tempo, DeTik, dan Editor.
(8) Dengan demikian periode traumatis 1965-1966 dalam
sejarah Indonesia itulah, yang menandai pergantian
dari Orde Lama Presiden Sukarno ke Orde Baru Presiden
Suharto. Kekuasaan Orde Baru dibangun di atas model
disiplin dan represi kejantanan militer, di mana
setiap referensi mengenai ketimpangan social dituding
sebagai dijiwai atau berkaitan dengan 'subversi
Komunis'.
(9) Mitos tentang lahirnya Orde Baru diciptakan oleh
Presiden Suharto dengan sadar, dan terus-menerus
diulang-ulangnya di dalam setiap kampanye
indoktrinasi. Dalam hal ini termasuk, antara lain,
pemutaran sebuah versi film tentang apa yang
disebutnya sebagai 'pengkhianatan' PKI. Kampanye ini
dibangun di atas metafora-metafora seksual, khususnya
ketakutan laki-laki terhadap kastrasi yang, dengan
dalih-dalih sangat menjijikkan, menggambarkan
organisasi perempuan Gerwani (yang dikaitkannya dengan
PKI), yang diduga berperanan di dalam kup tersebut.
Sampai sekarang analisis-analisis mengenai kekuasaan
Orde Baru selalu mengabaikan unsur-unsur kiasan
seksual yang melandasi konfigurasi politik Indonesia
dewasa ini.
(10) Kampanye tersebut di atas membawa
implikasi-implikasi yang luas, dan memerlukan proses
indoktrinasi yang terus-menerus. Indoktrinasi ini tak
lain ialah
brainwashing bagi seluruh bangsa agar mempercayai
pandangan penguasa tentang masa lampau kolektif
mereka, dan agar tidak mempersoalkan politik
pemerintah Orde Baru. Bicara tentang masalah
emansipasi perempuan, yang mengandung pandangan
tentang keadilan sosial yang lebih luas, dapat
menimbulkan kecurigaan.
(11) Bukan hanya akan dikaitkan dengan 'Komunisme',
tetapi juga dengan 'cara berpikir Orde Lama' pada
umumnya. Seperti salah seorang pemimpin Perwari
mengatakan: 'Jika saya bicara tentang pandangan saya
mengenai gerakan kaum perempuan Indonesia, dan harus
menyebut cita-cita yang hendak saya capai atau
membahas soal-soal emansipasi perempuan, seketika saya
akan dituduh sebagai 'orang Orde Lama'. Pemerintah
sekarang ini benar-benar mengajar rakyatnya agar
menjadi bodoh. Padahal, tidakkah orang hanya akan bisa
merdeka jika dia bisa berpikir, bukan? Kemerdekaan itu
benar-benar tidak ada di sini. Di sini tidak ada
jalan, bagaimana caranya supaya kita bisa berbicara
atau berpikir menurut apa yang kita mau' (interviu 73,
31 Januari 1984).

Karena itu kajian ini tidak hanya merupakan kebutuhan
sejarah. Analisis dari sudut gender tentang
kejadian-kejadian tahun 1965-1966 yang dikemukakan di
sini, ada hubungannya secara langsung dengan pemahaman
terhadap persekongkolan kekuasaan Orde Baru pada
umumnya, dan dengan cara pelecehan martabat perempuan
pada khususnya, yang telah digunakan sebagai
pembenaran kelangsungan basis kekuasaan totaliter
Presiden Suharto yang berwatak patriarkal militer,
yang telah dibangunnya itu.

(12) Sesungguhnya itulah alasannya, mengapa saya
menjadi tertarik pada topik kajian sekarang ini. Dalam
akhir tahun 1970-an, saya terkesima melihat kadar
ketaatan dan dominasi laki-laki pada
organisasi-organisasi terpenting kaum perempuan di
Indonesia saat sekarang. Khususnya pada
organisasi-organisasi istri para pejabat sipil (Dharma
Wanita) dan pejabat militer (Dharma Pertiwi), demikian
juga pada organisasi Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga
(PKK) yang disponsori negara dan meluas di seluruh
negeri itu. Belakangan saya tahu,
organisasi-organisasi ini dibangun di atas reruntuk
sejarah organisasi-organisasi kaum perempuan yang
mandiri dan giat. Seperti pada tahun 1985 pernah saya
kemukakan, organisasi-organisasi baru ini didirikan
oleh militer, sengaja untuk menomor-duakan kembali
kedudukan kaum perempuan Indonesia:

Sekarang setiap suara yang mempersoalkan tentang
sulitnya keadaan sosial dan ekonomi mendapat cap
sebagai berbau politik. Maka soal-soal yang
berimplikasi sayap-kiri dan 'kaum kiri', yang
dikaitkan dengan 'kaum perempuan' semacam itu, membuka
seluruh kotak asosiasi-asosiasi Pandora dengan
pembunuhan-pembunuhan ritual dan pesta-pora
seksual.(Wieringa 1985:38)
(13) Semula berkat cambukan Sukarno sendiri, sehingga
kaum perempuan Indonesia giat berpartisipasi dalam
perang kemerdekaan nasional. Namun sesudah kemerdekaan
tercapai, berlangsunglah proses pemulihan kembali
kekuasaan kaum laki-laki. Selama tahun-tahun pertama
pemerintahan Sukarno, kaum perempuan selalu menjadi
subjek yang vokal di tengah percaturan politik
Indonesia, dengan menyerang benteng dominasi laki-laki
dari dua penjuru. Pertama-tama, mereka menyerang hak
prerogatif laki-laki berpoligini. Perjuangan mereka
kalah, karena tak lain dari Presiden Sukarno sendiri
yang menuntut hak beristri lebih dari satu orang.
Kedua, sebagian dari gerakan ini, itulah Gerwani,
menuntut tempat di tengah gelanggang politik bagi kaum
perempuan. Langkah ini membawa sejumlah konsekuensi.
Pertama-tama, mereka memancing amarah
organisasi-organisasi perempuan lainnya, yang
berpendirian bahwa kedudukan perempuan di masyarakat
tidak di bidang politik tetapi di bidang sosial.
Selanjutnya Gerwani, yang menjadi semakin rapat
mendekatkan diri pada PKI (yang tak banyak
perhatiannya pada 'soal perempuan' itu) kehilangan
banyak pendirian feminismenya yang semula. Ketiga,
saya ingin mengemukakan, bahwa langkah Gerwani
memasuki bidang yang sampai sekarang dipandang daerah
kawasan laki-laki, telah memicu ketakutan di kalangan
kelompok-kelompok tradisional di Indonesia, khususnya
kalangan Muslim yang salih. Kalangan inilah yang pada
waktunya merupakan lahan subur bagi kampanye Suharto
tentang fitnahan seksual dalam akhir tahun 1965.

(14)Untuk mengerti bagaimana organisasi-organisasi
kaum perempuan dewasa ini berfungsi, baik sebagai
tiang penyangga rezim Orde Baru maupun sebagai alat
untuk menomor-duakan kembali kedudukan perempuan, saya
merasa perlu meneliti periode Orde Lama dan lahirnya
kekuasaan Orde Baru. Sementara meneliti sejarah dalam
periode ini, saya melihat sehingga mana kiasan seksual
dan penghinaan terhadap perempuan mengelilingi
asal-muasal rezim Suharto. Namun dengan ini tidak
bermaksud mengatakan, bahwa metafora-metafora seksual
merupakan faktor satu-satunya yang turut menyebabkan
terjadinya pembantaian massal, dan tampilnya Suharto
di atas singgasana kekuasaan. Faktor-faktor lain,
selain dari kekacauan perekonomian, yang mengakibatkan
rasa sangat khawatir baik di kalangan Angkatan Darat
maupun kaum Komunis, termasuk juga percobaan-percobaan
pembunuhan terhadap Sukarno (Mei 1978), sakitnya
Sukarno, dan seruan Sukarno untuk pembentukan Angkatan
Ke-5.
Walaupun Angkatan Ke-5 ini sedikit banyak sekedar
merupakan retorika medio 1960-an belaka, namun
Angkatan Darat merasa sangat cemas melihat kemungkinan
akan dipersenjatainya sekitar 21 juta kaum tani dan
kaum buruh, yang sama sekali terlepas dari kendali
pimpinan Angkatan Darat.
(15) Walaupun begitu, sugesti-sugesti tentang
perbuatan seksual yang tak senonoh itulah, yang telah
menjadi penyebab kotak mesiu meledak.
Saya berpendapat, bahwa untuk mengerti tentang
dalamnya krisis yang telah menenggelamkan Indonesia
pada tahun 1965 itu, tidak cukup dengan memberikan
analisis politik saja, tetapi juga analisis dari sudut
gender perlu dikemukakan. Analisis gender yang
dikemukakan di sini akan menyoroti aspek-aspek
tertentu dalam sejarah politik modern Indonesia, yang
sedemikian jauh masih tetap merupakan misteri bagi
banyak para peneliti, dengan mengajukan
pertanyaan-pertanyaan mengenai pokok-pokok masalah
yang umumnya diabaikan itu.

Halaman-halaman selanjutnya akan menguraikan sejarah
yang terselubung itu dalam tiga tahap. Tahap pertama
menguraikan sejarah feminisme Indonesia, yang mengenal
saat-saat radikal dan berani lebih banyak lagi dari
yang diakui para penulis sekarang. Tahap kedua
memaparkan sejarah yang terlarang, yaitu sejarah
Gerwani. Tentang anggota-anggotanya yang dibunuh, yang
dipenjara dan yang hilang, serta dokumen-dokumen
tentangnya yang di Indonesia dimusnahkan. Untungnya
perpustakaan-perpustakaan di Negeri Belanda dan
Amerika Serikat masih menyimpan bahan-bahan, yang atas
dasar itulah kisah masa lampau Gerwani dapat disusun
kembali. Ketiga, dengan mengamati kejadian-kejadian
tahun 1965 dan 1966 atas dasar analisis gender dari
periode itu, akan menyingkap aspek-aspek tertentu
mengenai lahirnya Orde Baru, yang sampai sekarang
digelapkan (oleh militer Indonesia) atau diingkari
(oleh para peneliti sejarah modern Indonesia).

Fokus karangan ini terletak di Jawa. Antara lain
karena Jawa merupakan pulau di Indonesia yang
berpenduduk paling padat, tetapi lebih dari itu karena
Jawa merupakan pusat kegiatan politik untuk negeri
ini. Dengan giat Sukarno menggalakkan Jawanisasi
terhadap budaya politik Indonesia, suatu langkah
politik yang diikuti PKI. Kebijakan ini tetap
dilanjutkan di bawah rezim Suharto.

Butir utama argumen saya berkisar di seputar periode
antara 1950 dan 1965; yaitu periode Orde Lama, dan
meluas sampai 1976, yaitu ketika Sukarno memberi
kekuasaan de facto atas Indonesia kepada Suharto. Oleh
karena perkembangan-perkembangan yang terjadi selama
Orde Lama diantar oleh kebangkitan nasional masyarakat
Indonesia, yang berlangsung selama dasawarsa-dasawarsa
terakhir kekuasaan kolonial dan masa pendudukan
Jepang, maka periode ini pun tidak saya luputkan dari
perhatian.

Struktur karangan ini sebagai berikut. Proses
penelitian diuraikan dalam bab pertama. Bab berikut
menjelaskan tentang kerangka teoretis, yang saya
bangun di atas konsep gender sebagai alat analisis
untuk memahami gerakan-gerakan dan
organisasi-organisasi kaum perempuan, serta manipulasi
politik memperhinakan perempuan. Bab-bab mengenai
sejarah yang menyusul masing-masing membahas sejarah
organisasi-organisasi kaum perempuan Indonesia sampai
saat kemerdekaan, perkembangan politik pemerintahan
Orde Lama dan gerakan perempuan dalam periode ini.
Tiga bab pertama tentang Gerwani membahas sejarah
organisasi ini secara umum, dan beberapa masalah
keorganisasiannya. Dua bab berikutnya masing-masing
menitik-beratkan pada politik dan ideologi Gerwani.
Masalah pokok yang diajukan dalam dua bab ini yaitu,
apakah alasan pembenaran untuk tuduhan yang
dilemparkan kepada Gerwani, sesudah 1 Oktober 1965
itu, dapat ditemukan di dalam ideologi dan praktik
organisasi. Kesimpulan saya ialah, jika ditinjau dari
sudut seksualitas, Gerwani dapat dikatakan suatu
organisasi yang agak konservatif. Bab terakhir
membahas 'kup pertama', 1 Oktober, dan mengemukakan
cerita dari hari ke hari bagaimana tahap pertama dari
kup kedua yang secara diam-diam, dan bagaimana
kampanye menentang Gerwani dan PKI disusun.

Untuk mengantar tema-tema tersebut di atas, dan
memberi contoh tentang dedikasi dan aspirasi
anggota-anggota Gerwani, Kata Pengantar ini ditutup
dengan sebuah wawancara dengan seorang kader Jawa.
(16) Hampir dua puluh tahun sesudah 'kejadian' 1965
masih juga sangat berbahaya bagi bekas anggota Gerwani
untuk ditemui orang asing. Tetapi wawancara ini dapat
dilakukan dengan mudah, karena ketika itu saya
mendapat sakit pinggang yang luar biasa dan dirawat
oleh Ibu Marto, sebutlah ia begitu, seorang tukang
pijit dan tusuk jarum yang terkenal.
Kepandaian-kepandaian memijit dan tusuk jarum itu
mulai dipelajarinya ketika di dalam penjara. Kami
berjanji bertemu di rumah seorang kenalan kami.
Biasanya saya dipijit sepanjang pagi. Dalam kesempatan
itulah, sambil memijit dan mengurut punggung saya, ia
menceritakan kisahnya yang terpotong-potong. Setiap
kali ia menyentuh bagian tubuh saya yang terasa sakit,
kami berhenti bercakap-cakap. Pada saat-saat kami sama
sekali saling membisu, kesunyian itu menjadi penuh
diliputi bayang-bayang kisahnya yang menyihir seluruh
isi bilik kecil kami. Dan saya biarkan jari-jemarinya
yang kuat dan berpengalaman itu merajalela
bermain-main di sekujur tubuh, dari ujung rambut
sampai ujung jari-jari kaki. Andaikata seseorang di
luar liwat, atau masuk rumah, yang terdengar dan
terlihat olehnya hanyalah suara percakapan seorang
tukang pijit dan pasiennya, yang bicara tentang
pinggang yang nyeri.

Keluarga saya tidak berlatar belakang kiri. Saya
sajalah satu-satunya di dalam keluarga kami yang masuk
dalam organisasi progresif. Saudara misan saya anggota
PKI. Dan ketika saya berumur 17 tahun, dialah yang
mendorong agar saya masuk Pemuda Rakyat.

Saya sangat senang di Pemuda Rakyat. Kami melakukan
segala macam kegiatan bersama-sama. Terkadang menari,
menyanyi dan juga bermain drama, dengan cerita-cerita
yang berisi politik. Juga diberikan kursus soal-soal
kerumahtanggaan, seperti masak-memasak dan menjahit.
Tentu saja setiap saat kami selalu berdiskusi
soal-soal politik.

Beberapa tahun sesudah itu saya masuk Gerwani tingkat
ranting. Pimpinan menaruh perhatian pada saya, karena
saya selalu mendengarkan dengan baik, mengajukan
pertanyaan-pertanyaan, dan membantu mengurusi
kegiatan. Saya mengikuti kursus kader, dan mulai giat
di tingkat cabang. Saya sangat bersemangat dan bekerja
keras, sehingga karenanya dipilih untuk tingkat
daerah, dan akhirnya sampai tingkat pusat.

Seluruhnya sudah tiga kali saya mengikuti kursus. Yang
paling lama di Jakarta. Di sini kami digembleng selama
satu bulan, bekerja di berbagai daerah ke mana kelak
kami masing-masing akan dikirim. Mata-pelajaran
termasuk pendidikan politik, mempelajari teks-teks
pidato Bung Karno dan Bung Aidit, diskusi tentang
soal-soal keorganisasian dan kerumahtanggaan. Juga
kami mendapat pendidikan latihan kepemimpinan. Sore
hari kami belajar teks-teks karya Marx, Lenin, Stalin,
Engels, dan tentu saja beberapa bagian dalam Sarinah,
buku karangan Bung Karno itu. Pimpinan pusat
menggunakan semua teks itu sebagai bahan bacaan.
Biasanya kami juga mendiskusikan sejarah organisasi.
Saya menjadi anggota organisasi dalam pertengahan
1950-an, ketika namanya sudah berubah menjadi Gerwani.
Gerwis, begitu dulu biasanya disebut, kamu tahu,
sedikit sektaris. Sedikit sekali perempuan dari
lapisan bawah yang menjadi anggota. Organisasi ini
dianggap terlalu merah, terlalu PKI, terlalu ekstrem.
Sebenarnya kami rasa penilaian itu tidak benar. Orang
yang pernah mengenal Gerwis di saat-saat awal, jauh
lebih menyukai daripada ketika Gerwis telah berkembang
menjadi besar. Tetapi begitu itulah orang menilai.
Maka dalam kongres tahun 1954 jadilah kami Gerwani.
Dengan sikap yang lebih luwes, khususnya dalam
soal-soal keperempuanan, lebih lembut, lebih halus.
Pengutamaan pada soal-soal perempuan berkurang,
sementara itu soal-soal ekonomi, sosial, politik dan
kebudayaan mendapat perhatian lebih besar.

Yang sangat saya senangi dari semua kegiatan selama
tahun-tahun itu, ialah usaha kami untuk menjalin
hubungan dengan perempuan tani. Jika saya pergi ke
suatu desa dan di sana bertemu seorang perempuan, yang
mungkin kenalan atau saudara salah seorang kenalan
saya entah di mana, lalu memperkenalkan diri sebagai
anggota Gerwani, kamu tahu apa yang terjadi? Biasanya
mereka tidak kenal, apa itu Gerwani. Lalu saya perlu
menjelaskan kepadanya, soal-soal apa yang kita
perjuangkan. Umumnya mereka tertarik pada organisasi
kami karena pendirian kami terhadap poligami. Soal
kedua yang menarik perhatian perempuan tani ialah soal
upah rendah. Umumnya mereka menyetujui gagasan
kemerdekaan perempuan, karena kejengkelan bahwa upah
mereka lebih rendah dari upah laki-laki. Jika
seseorang telah masuk menjadi anggota, kepadanya
diminta agar menarik seorang teman, dan teman ini pun
menarik seorang teman lagi, begitu seterusnya,
sehingga terbentuklah sebuah kelompok kecil.
Kelompok-kelompok inilah basis organisasi kami.
Melalui rapat-rapat kelompok, mereka akan mulai
mengerti tentang hak-hak mereka dan tentang system
feodal. Karena sistem feodal inilah yang menjadi
sebab-musabab penderitaan kaum perempuan Indonesia.
Tentang soal-soal seperti itu kami akan membacanya
dalam koran Harian Rakjat dan berkala Berita Gerwani,
lalu kami akan membahas bersama-sama karangan-karangan
yang kami kehendaki. Kami hampir tidak pernah membaca
Api Kartini, yang tidak berpihak, bebas, dan tidak
jelas warnanya. Majalah ini tidak menarik untuk
perempuan di desa-desa, atau perempuan-perempuan
kampung di kota.

Kami bangga pada organisasi kami. Karena Gerwani telah
berjuang untuk perbaikan nasib perempuan, menentang
kenaikan harga, dan memperjuangkan kenaikan upah.
Sungguh menyenangkan bisa berdiri di barisan depan,
dan melihat bahwa sesungguhnya kami bisa berbuat
sesuatu.

Di kota kita juga sangat giat, khususnya di kalangan
kaum buruh. Buruh perempuan biasanya anggota SOBSI,
tetapi di kampung kediaman mereka, mereka anggota
Gerwani. Banyak di antara mereka itu merangkap
keanggotaan. Itu mudah saja. Karena banyak soal-soal
tentang nasib buruh perempuan, sehingga memungkinkan
kami untuk bekerjasama. Misalnya SOBSI dan Gerwani
bekerja sama memperjuangkan hak cuti haid. Jika
terjadi buruh perempuan dipecat, karena menuntut hak
sah mereka untuk cuti haid, baik Gerwani maupun SOBSI
akan tampil bersama membela buruh itu.

Gerwani juga sangat giat dalam usaha pemberantasan
buta-huruf. Banyak sekali kursus-kursus PBH yang kami
selenggarakan. Kami juga memperjuangkan hak-hak
politik kaum perempuan, agar lebih banyak lagi
perempuan yang menjadi anggota parlemen pusat dan
daerah, atau agar mereka bisa dipilih menjadi lurah
desa atau menteri, sama mudahnya seperti kaum
laki-laki. Tentang hak-hak politik ini, terutama di
desa-desa, banyak mengalami tentangan. Banyak golongan
Islam yang memandang hal itu sangat menimbulkan
perselisihan. Mereka tidak mau memberi hak apa pun
bagi perempuan. Juga tak sedikit tuan tanah yang
sangat konservatif. Dalam aksi-aksi sepihak tahun
1960-an kaum perempuan ikut mengambil peranan aktif.
Mereka tidak sekedar bersorak-sorai di garis pinggir.
Di Kediri dan Jengkol, perempuanlah yang mengadang
traktor-traktor tuan tanah, yang berusaha mengusir
mereka dari tanah kediaman mereka. Dan perempuan itu
jugalah yang mati ditembaki tentara.

Memang benar, aksi-aksi ini banyak tidak disukai di
desa-desa. Bahwa begitu banyaknya perempuan yang
dibunuh, mungkin inilah sebabnya: orang-orang Gerwani
terlalu mandiri. Mereka membenci Gerwani. Mereka
menghendaki agar perempuan hanya bergerak di bidang
kemasyarakatan. Kadang-kadang mereka mengadakan
arisan, bolehlah, seperti halnya semua organisasi
perempuan lainnya. Tetapi di dalam Gerwani, perempuan
juga giat berpolitik. Ya, itulah hal yang sangat
dibenci.

Saya sering merasa heran, bagaimana semuanya bisa
menjadi serba salah begitu. Satu hal memang jelas.
Yaitu bahwa Sukarno tidak konsekuen dalam menangani
sisa-sisa feodalisme yang masih ada di dalam
masyarakat kami. Itulah sumber malapetaka yang menimpa
kami. Kami bekerja bersama dengannya di dalam Front
Nasional yang anti-imperialis. Tetapi ia tidak pandai
memegang janjinya, misalnya dalam pelaksanaan
undang-undang land reform. PKI yang konsekuen, dan
dalam hal ini kami bekerja bersama-sama dengannya.
Peranan Gerwani dalam aksi-aksi sepihak sangat besar.
Tetapi sekarang hampir dilupakan sama sekali. Juga
koran-koran ketika itu, tidak banyak yang meliput
aksi-aksi kami itu. Kaum laki-laki selalu ingin
dilihat sebagai lebih militan dari kaum perempuan.
Kami di pihak Sukarno dalam konfrontasi menentang
Malaysia. Tetapi sesungguhnya buat kami tidak terlalu
menarik. Itu hanya untuk mengalihkan perhatian dari
persoalan nasional saja. Karena itu sikap kami
mula-mula agak maju-mundur. Tetapi akhirnya dengan
bersemangat kami mendukungnya, dan bahkan mengirim
sukarelawan. Juga kaum perempuan di dalam PNI, Wanita
Marhaen dan Wanita Demokrat, (17) berbuat sama; begitu
pula halnya beberapa organisasi perempuan lainnya.

Pada waktu itu saya sendiri tidak di Jawa. Pada tahun
1962 saya, seorang diri, ditugasi di pulau lain.
Sering saya merasa sangat kesepian. Karena saya tidak
mengerti baik bahasa, masyarakat, maupun kebudayaan
setempat. Saya harus berusaha merasa kerasan di
tengah-tengah lingkungan yang asing itu. Saya tinggal
bersama kader-kader lain, dari PKI dan Pemuda Rakyat,
di sebuah rumah yang besar. Seorang pemuda dari Pemuda
Rakyat sering membantu saya. Kadang-kadang saya merasa
begitu sedih, sehingga ingin menangis. Lalu, di
saat-saat begitu, ia datang menghibur saya,
menjelaskan hal-ihwalnya kepada saya, dan jika perlu
juga membantu saya. Beberapa bulan pertama sering saya
merasa sangat sedih, sehingga ingin segera pulang saja
ke Jawa. Yang juga membuat terasa berat karena saya,
sebagai anak gadis, tidak biasa hidup sendirian di
tengah orang-orang laki-laki asing. Orang sangat suka
bergunjing. Maka saya selalu harus mempertahankan
diri.

Daerah tempat penugasan saya pun daerah sulit.
Mempunyai kebanggaan yang besar terhadap sejarah
perlawanannya menentang Belanda, dan juga tidak
terlalu senang terhadap Jakarta. Islam sangat kuat,
laki-lakinya berwatak congkak. Saya perempuan Jawa,
orang asing, tidak boleh sekali-kali
menonjol-nonjolkan diri. Jangan sekali-kali saya
berusaha menampilkan diri sebagai guru yang serba
tahu. Jadi saya harus menunggu saja, sampai mereka
sendiri datang kepada saya dan mengemukakan persoalan
mereka.
Kader-kader yang bekerja di daerah ini tidak banyak
mendapat pendidikan, dan juga sangat sedikit
pengetahuan mereka tentang apa sebenarnya yang dibela
Gerwani, dan apa yang dicita-citakannya. Melalui
rapat-rapat saya menjadi tahu, siapa-siapa di antara
mereka yang paling cerdas. Lalu perempuan itu saya
dekati, dan perlahan-lahan saya mencoba menerangkan
serba sedikit tentang organisasi,
kegiatan-kegiatannya, dan seterusnya dan seterusnya.
Tetapi saya sama sekali tidak boleh menampak sebagai
pemimpin.
Untuk pemimpin haruslah seseorang dari daerah ini
sendiri.

Sungguh sangat berat buat saya untuk bisa menyesuaikan
diri. Oleh karena saya tidak biasa hidup di tengah
daerah yang sangat kuat Islamnya, di mana perempuan
tidak bisa bergerak leluasa. Akhirnya saya mendapat
jalan untuk lebih memudahkan orang-orang perempuan itu
datang menghadiri rapat-rapat kami. Mereka mengenal
banyak tari-tarian setempat. Laki-laki melarang istri
mereka keluar rumah jika sendiri-sendiri, tetapi tidak
jika mereka pergi bersama-sama. Lalu kami membentuk
kelompok-kelompok kesenian, menari dan menyanyi, yang
tidak terlarang bagi kaum perempuan. Tetapi kami tidak
berhenti di situ. Kelompok-kelompok ini lalu kami beri
isi. Kami berdiskusi tentang soal-soal sehari-hari
bersama mereka. Dengan sangat mudah kita bisa mendidik
perempuan tentang soal-soal ekonomi melalui kegiatan
arisan. Sekali kita mulai bicara tentang bagaimana
yang sebaik-baiknya perempuan membelanjakan uangnya,
seketika itu tibalah kita pada soal tentang kenaikan
harga-harga. Dari situ lalu bisalah kita bicara
tentang siapa yang bertanggungjawab dalam persoalan
harga tersebut. Lalu bisalah sudah kita mulai bicara
secara langsung tentang pendidikan politik.

Sesudah akhirnya mereka mengerti tentang apa cita-cita
Gerwani, banyak orang-orang perempuan yang memberi
dukungan kuat pada kami, walaupun mereka itu semuanya
beragama Islam. Mereka membenci suami mereka yang
berpoligami, dan senang menghadiri rapat-rapat kami
untuk membahas persoalan itu. Mereka juga sangat
senang belajar bagaimana membuat kue-kue, dan membahas
masalah situasi politik. Yang paling menarik untuk
anak-anak gadis ialah hak menikah atas dasar suka sama
suka, sedangkan untuk ibu-ibu khususnya masalah
perjuangan melawan poligami. Juga kaum buruh perempuan
merasa senang memperoleh dukungan kami untuk tuntutan
mereka, agar tersedia balai penitipan anak dengan
biaya pembayaran yang rendah.

Setahun kemudian anak muda Pemuda Rakyat itu meminta
saya kawin dengannya. Dalam kebimbangan, saya minta
agar ia mau menunggu. Ia berasal dari Jakarta. Tetapi
kedua orangtuanya telah pindah menetap di sini. Saya
mencari nasihat dari teman-teman saya. Semuanya
berpendapat agar saya menerimanya. Maka dalam tahun
1963 kami pun kawin. Saat itulah tahun-tahun yang
paling berbahagia dalam kehidupan saya. Setahun
kemudian lahir anak laki-laki kami. Saat-saat
menjelang kelahiran anak kami, suami saya mengerjakan
semua pekerjaan kerumahtanggaan: menyapu, memasak,
mencuci. Sesudah bayi lahir ia pun sering mengganti
popok anaknya sebelum berangkat bekerja. Ia selalu
membantu saya sebisa-bisanya, sampai saya menjadi
cukup kuat untuk bekerja lagi. Tetapi ketika itu sudah
bulan Oktober 1965.

Saya benar-benar merasa sangat sedih bahwa semua
pengorganisasian yang telah kami selenggarakan dengan
amat berhati-hati, semua usaha membangun gerakan dari
bawah, telah hancur berantakan sama sekali. Saya sudah
biasa banyak bepergian, entah dengan kereta api atau
bis, jika kendaraan itu ada. Tetapi jika harus pergi
ke pedalaman, betapa pun jauhnya, kami harus berjalan
kaki. Di dalam kota pun saya berjalan kaki.
Kadang-kadang saja saya bersepeda, tetapi umumnya
berjalan kaki. Kami sudah biasa hidup dengan semangat
berbakti. Tidak pernah kami berangan-angan: ah, besuk
harus ada cukup makanan di periuk, atau, ah, saya
ingin punya rumah yang bagus. Siang-malam kami sibuk
dengan pekerjaan dan pekerjaan. Jika saya harus pergi
berkendaraan, cukuplah jika karcis sudah di tangan.
Dan di sana nanti sepiring nasi untuk saya sudah
selalu akan tersedia.

Pagi-pagi kami masak seadanya, lalu makan, dan
kemudian segera berangkat bekerja. Seringkali kami
baru di rumah kembali sesudah jam 11 atau 12 tengah
malam. Di tengah perjalanan pulang kami membeli
makanan apa saja. Tidak pernah saya memikirkan soal
lain satu pun, kecuali sejumlah soal yang sudah ada di
kepala, dan bagaimana harus memecahkannya. Kami tak
banyak berpikir tentang uang, walaupun saya sendiri
menjadi kepala balai penitipan anak-anak itu. Tetapi
uang sama sekali tidak cukup pada saya, juga pada
wakil saya, kepala balai penitipan anak. Karena itu
saya mengambil pekerjaan sedikit, sebagai penata-usaha
sebuah sekolah.

Saya mengambil kursus lima bulan di Jakarta untuk
mendapat ijazah pengelola balai penitipan anak-anak.
Walaupun saat itu saya sudah mengepalai balai semacam
itu di sini. Saya berangkat ke Jakarta ketika anak
kami masih berumur dua bulan. Sekarang ijazah itu
tinggal secarik kertas yang mubazir saja.

Hubungan dengan Jakarta umumnya sulit. Sekali satu
bulan saya mengirim laporan, tetapi jawaban baru
datang setelah berbulan-bulan kemudian. Tetapi mereka
mengirimi kami segala macam rekomendasi. Misalnya
dinasihatkan agar di sekitar tanggal tertentu kami
mengorganisasi demonstrasi anti-kenaikan harga, atau
mengirim delegasi pada gubernur, apabila
kegiatan-kegiatan itu telah direncanakan oleh Jakarta.
Sepanjang mengenai persoalan politik nasional, umumnya
mereka mengikuti garis Partai. Tetapi untuk persoalan
perempuan, mereka merumuskan garis mereka sendiri.

Lawan kami yang terpenting ialah orang-orang Muslim
fanatik. Diperlukan waktu yang lama untuk bisa
meyakinkan orang, terutama jika ia telah berpegangan
teguh pada asas-asas agama tertentu. Di dalam Front
Nasional ini kami banyak bekerja bersama dengan
Perwari dan Kowani. Semuanya ini baru saja hendak
mulai tinggal landas, ketika 'peristiwa' itu terjadi.
Terjadi dengan sangat tak terduga-duga, juga di
tengah-tengah segala-galanya.

Ketika kami tahu apa yang telah terjadi di Jawa, kami
melarikan diri ke kota yang terdekat. Di sinilah suami
saya terbakar hidup-hidup ketika mereka membakar
kantor PKI. Dengan membawa anak laki-laki kami, saya
melarikan diri ke Jakarta. Kakak perempuan saya janda
seorang perwira tentera yang tewas dalam sebuah tugas.
Tidak bisa hidup bersandar pada uang pensiun, ia
bekerja pada sebuah kantin angkatan darat. Saya pun
bisa diterima bekerja di situ. Mereka memperingatkan
saya agar kawin lagi.
Kamu masih muda, kata mereka. Dan hanya punya anak
satu. Orang akan menggunjingkan kamu, kalau kamu tidak
mau bersuami lagi.

Demikianlah. Demi berjaga-jaga agar tidak menjadi
pergunjingan, untuk kedua kalinya saya kawin, walaupun
saya tidak mencintai laki-laki yang menjadi suami saya
itu. Ketika anak saya dengannya berumur dua tahun,
anak perempuan, tiba-tiba suami saya menghilang. Saya
tanyakan kepada setiap orang, yang saya kira tahu
duduk perkaranya, tetapi tidak pernah lagi saya
mendengar kabar beritanya.

Kemudian kakak saya menjadi ketakutan bahwa orang akan
menjadi tahu tentang kami, dan dia akan kehilangan
pekerjaan dan segala-galanya. Lalu kakak itu
melaporkan saya. Ketika saya ditahan, anak perempuan
saya tinggal bersama kakak di Jakarta. Sedangkan anak
laki-laki, yang ketika itu bersama saya, tidak ada
seorang pun yang mengurusi. Neneknya sudah terlalu tua
dan pikun untuk bisa mengurusi hidupnya dan
mengirimnya ke sekolah. Anak itu berusaha menghidupi
dirinya dengan menjual koran dan bakso di sepanjang
jalan.
Di penjara banyak di antara kami yang diperkosa.
Dipukuli, disiksa, disetrum, dan dibakar dengan rokok.
Beberapa tahun kemudian, sesudah mendapat kunjungan
Palang Merah Internasional, keadaan menjadi sedikit
lebih baik. Saya belajar memijit, dan membuat
kerajinan tangan yang bisa dijual, untuk membeli
sedikit tambahan jatah makan.

Setiap sesama tahanan di penjara tahu, bahwa jika
kelak bebas saya harus mencari hidup sendiri dan dua
anak saya. Karena itu mereka mengumpulkan apa saja,
untuk saya, semampu mereka masing-masing. Beberapa
yang telah lebih dahulu bebas, memberi saya beberapa
periuk dan kompor. Tetapi saya sedikit-sedikit juga
menabung sisa hasil penjualan kerajinan tangan,
sehingga selama hari-hari pertama bisa membeli beras
sekedarnya.

Selama minggu-minggu pertama sesudah bebas, saya hidup
dari merajin barang sulaman, sambil mencari pasien
yang mau dipijit.
Sekarang saya sudah lulus berkali-kali ujian memijit
dan tusuk jarum, dan saya punya cukup pasien untuk
bisa hidup.

Tetapi keprihatinan saya pertama-tama terhadap anak
laki-laki saya. Saya keluar pada hari Sabtu. Hari
Minggu saya ketahui di mana dia, dan hari Senin ia
bersekolah. Tetapi ia sangat tertinggal di sekolah,
sehingga saya harus mengirimnya ke asrama. Ia sangat
merasa malu, karena dalam umur 19 tahun masih harus
bercelana pendek bersekolah SMP. Tahun depan ia akan
selesai dari SMP., lalu boleh pulang dari asrama dan
masuk SMA, dan memakai celana panjang. Dengan begitu
tidak perlu lagi merasa malu dilihat oleh tetangga.

Anak saya yang perempuan juga ketinggalan. Sudah
berumur dua belas, seharusnya sudah kelas lima, tetapi
ia masih di kelas tiga. Tetapi dia akan naik. Sekarang
dia maju.

Saya senang. Sekarang saya sudah dapat mengatasi,
dengan dua anak dan pekerjaan memijit. Tetapi saya
masih harus sangat hati-hati. Saya tidak bisa
mengambil pasien di rumah sendiri. Teman saya
mendengar, ia pernah menjadi pembicaraan kalangan
pejabat, karena menerima tamu terlalu banyak. Padahal
mereka itu orang-orang sakit! Ia diancam menutup
praktik. Karena itu biasanya saya yang pergi,
mendatangi rumah pasien-pasien saya.

Walaupun kami sudah dibebaskan, tetapi kami belum
warga negara penuh. Saya masih harus selalu melapor
setiap waktu. Misalnya, jika saya akan pergi ke
Surabaya, saya memerlukan lima setempel di secarik
kertas, yang harus saya perlihatkan kepada petugas
keamanan di Surabaya. Jika saya melanggar, saya akan
dikenai tahanan rumah.

Tetapi itu tidak terlalu buruk. Saya masih bisa hidup
dengan itu. Yang membuat saya sangat sedih, bahwa di
sekolah anak-anak saya diajar hal-hal yang busuk
tentang Gerwani. Saya merasa anak laki-laki saya
menyembunyikan sesuatu terhadap saya. Akhirnya suatu
hari ia mendekat dan bertanya, 'Ma! Mengapa Mama
menjadi anggota organisasi begitu, yang begitu bejat
akhlaknya, dan menghancurkan negara? Apa Mama juga
pelacur? Kata orang-orang semua anggota Gerwani
pelacur dan perempuan-perempuan jahat.' Bagaimana saya
harus menjelaskan kepadanya, untuk apa kita hidup? Dan
apa yang dahulu kita cita-citakan? Saya masih melihat
bayangan kebingungan dan rasa malu pada matanya.
Apakah ia masih akan mengerti hidup saya, Mamanya?

Wajah Ibu Marto mengkerut sedih ketika ia mengucapkan
kata-katanya itu. Mendadak jari-jarinya berhenti
bekerja ...
Juga perempuan-perempuan lain meminta saya agar
mengembalikan sejarah mereka kepada mereka dan
saudara-saudara mereka. Mereka tidak mau mati dengan
versi masa lalu mereka, yang disusun dalam kampanye
teror massal sesudah terjadinya kup. Tetapi sejarah
yang menyusul itu bukannya hak perempuan-perempuan
'tua' saja. Generasi muda kaum perempuan dan laki-laki
Indonesia, yang telah digiring untuk mempercayai versi
militer mengenai kejadian-kejadian itu, dan atas dasar
itu pulalah masyarakat di mana mereka hidup disusun,
juga mempunyai hak untuk ditunjukkan kepada uraian
yang bertujuan menumbangkan sejarah militer Indonesia
itu.

Catatan

1.Saya pakai istilah 'Keluarga Komunis', dengan maksud
meliputi PKI dan ormas-ormas kaitannya, yaitu Gerwani
(Gerakan Wanita Indonesia), Pemuda Rakyat, SOBSI
(Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), BTI
(Barisan Tani Indonesia), Lekra (Lembaga Kebudayaan
Rakyat), dan HSI (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia). Dalam
tahun 1964 dikatakan keluarga ini terdiri dari sekitar
27 juta anggota (HR 20 Agustus 1965). Angka ini harus
dibaca dengan hati-2, oleh karena kenyataannya banyak
terjadi keanggotaan rangkap. [ kembali ]
          
2.Antara tahun 1950-54 organisasi ini bernama Gerwis.
Saya pakai Gerwani untuk menyebut organisasi ini
secara umum, dan hanya memakai sebutan Gerwis jika
dimaksud khusus tentang periode tersebut sampai
Kongres Ke-1 tahun 1954. [ kembali ]
          
3.Tidak diketahui dengan pasti, berapa banyak orang
yang terbunuh pada saat itu. Para ilmuwan sekarang
seperti Vatikiotis (1993) dan Anderson (1994)
mengemukakan angka satu juta. Lihat juga Cribb (ed.)
1990. [ kembali ]
          
4.Lihat laporan Howard Jones (Dubes AS untuk Indonesia
selama tujuh tahun sampai Juni 1965) yang
memperlihatkan keterlibatan AS dalam politik dalam
negeri Indonesia. Bagi Amerika dampaknya jelas lebih
dari sekedar fakta, digantikannya pemerintah yang
bersikap bermusuhan dengan yang bersahabat. Kejadian
itu juga melukiskan tentang kekalahan besar baik
Moskow maupun Beijing, '[d]an salah satu hasil yang
paling menggembirakan dari tindakan Indonesia atas
prakarsa sendiri itu ialah pendekatan antara negeri
ini dengan Amerika Serikat' (Jones 1971:403). Bagi AS,
Suharto adalah 'pahlawan yang menggagalkan Indonesia
menjadi Negara Komunis' (Jones 1971:412). [ kembali ]
          
5.Lihat Bab 11 untuk uraian mengenai arti adegan
gara-gara. [ kembali ]
          
6.Tapol, kependekan dari tahanan politik; dan napol
dari narapidana politik. Tapol yang tidak pernah
diadili itu dibebaskan tahun 1979, empat belas tahun
sesudah kejadian tahun 1965, namun masih harus selalu
membawa KTP bertanda demikian. Beberapa orang napol
baru dibebaskan sesudah hukuman mereka daluwarsa.
Mereka yang menunggu hukuman mati masih tetap di dalam
penjara. Pada tahun 1987, sebuah Peraturan Pemerintah
(No. 5 tahun ini) membatalkan pengurangan hukuman
seumur hidup menjadi dua puluh tahun, setelah lima
tahun 'berkelakuan baik'. Lihat Hersri 1993 dan
Pramudya Ananta Toer 1988 dan 1995 untuk pengalaman
tapol di konsentrasi kamp di Pulau Buru, dan Havelaar
1988 untuk kisah kehidupan keluarga eks-tapol. [
kembali ]
          
7.Jabatan yang secara resmi terlarang bagi eks-tapol
termasuk menjadi pegawai negeri, tentara, dan
perusahaan- perusahaan vital. Mereka juga dilarang
bekerja yang bisa menyebabkan berhubungan dengan orang
banyak, seperti menjadi wartawan, guru, dan pendeta.
Dasar hukum peraturan-peraturan ini ialah
Undang-Undang Anti-Subversi 1975 (Keputusan
Pangkopkamtib No. 06/Kopkam/XI, berkenaan dengan
"Surat Keterangan Tidak Terlibat G30S/PKI'), dan
Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 32 tahun 1981
berkenaan dengan 'Bimbingan dan Pengawasan Eks-Tapol
dan Napol Gerakan 30 September PKI'. Lihat juga Manai
Sophiaan (1994) untuk uraian tentang cara bagaimana
rezim Suharto berhasil menangkal setiap kritik sosial,
dengan menunjuknya sebagai 'bahaya laten' Komunis. [
kembali ]
          
8.Lihat juga karangan Kees van Dijk dalam
Internationale Spectator bulan Oktober 1994, No. 10,
'Een verschijningsverbod in Indonesi‘' (Larangan
penerbitan di Indonesia). [ kembali ]
          
9.Serangkaian pemogokan di Sumatra Utara dalam paroh
pertama 1994 dikatakan 'digerakkan oleh pimpinan
serikat buruh, yang di antaranya mempunyai keluarga
yang terlibat PKI'. Seorang pemimpin buruh terbunuh
(IFM thn XVIII (3) Mei 1994). Pemogokan dipimpin
serikat buruh merdeka SBSI (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera
Indonesia) yang masih terlarang. Pemerintah hanya
mengakui SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia),
suatu serikat buruh yang menerima konsep perlunya ada
harmoni antara majikan dan buruh. [ kembali ]
          
10.Dalam makalah tahun 1985 yang berjudul 'The
Perfumed Nightmare' saya tunjukkan, bahwa di bawah
Jendral Suharto Angkatan Darat telah membikin kampanye
di sekitar peranan yang dituduhkan pada Gerwani dalam
kup 1 Oktober 1965. Belum lama yang lalu Leclerc
(1991), dalam sebuah makalah tak diterbitkan, telah
mengangkat tema yang sama dengan memusatkan
perhatiannya pada monumen yang dibangun di Lubang
Buaya, tempat terjadinya pembunuhan para jendral. Tema
ini akan saya urai dalam Bab 11. [ kembali ]
          
11.Perwari, Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia,
didirikan segera sesudah proklamasi kemerdekaan.
Seperti akan saya urai dalam Bab 7, selama waktu yang
panjang organisasi ini tetap bersemangat radikal dan
lantang membela hak-hak kaum perempuan, khususnya
dalam perkawinan. Dewasa ini Perwari telah
'dijinakkan', kegiatan-kegiatannya yang menjurubicarai
perempuan miskin tidak dimungkinkan, dan
keanggotaannya menjadi merosot hebat. Gejala terakhir
ini terutama disebabkan oleh kenyataan, bahwa setiap
istri pegawai negeri atau tentara harus menjadi
anggota organisasi istri-istri tentara dan karyawan,
yaitu Dharma Wanita dan Dharma Pertiwi. [ kembali ]
          
12.Untuk uraian tentang Dharma Wanita dan Dharma
Pertiwi lihat Wieringa 1985. Dalam karangan belakangan
saya membicarakan 'feminisme yang keguguran' di
Indonesia (1988b), dan lebih belakangan lagi saya
tulis dua karangan yang membandingkan Gerwani dengan
PKK (1992; 1993a). lihat juga laporan yang diterbitkan
oleh tim Indonesia untuk Proyek Sejarah Perempuan
DGIS/ISS (Wieringa et al. 1985; Wieringa (ed.) 1990).
Lihat juga Suryakusuma (1990) untuk Dharma Wanita. [
kembali ]
          
13.Makalah ini diterjemahkan Hersri ke bahasa
Indonesia sebagai 'Impian Buruk Berbau Harum'. Sejak
1985 beredar di Indonesia sebagai bahan bacaan
samizdat. [ kembali ]
          
14.Sukarelawan Gerwani yang dilatih untuk Angkatan
ke-5 berjumlah tak lebih dari 70 orang; lihat Bab 11.
[ kembali ]
          
15.Lihat Southwood & Flanagan (1983) untuk pembahasan
tentang Angkatan Ke-5. [ kembali ]
          
16.Nomor-nomor wawancara 96, 97, 100, 121 dan 122.
Marhaenis. [ kembali ]
          
17.Ini organisasi yang sama. Tahun 1964 Wanita
Demokrat Indonesia mengganti namanya menjadi Gerakan
Wanita Marhaenis. [ kembali ]

The Politicization of Gender Relations in Indonesia

Saskia Wieringa

Introduction

The course of our history has been stood on its head
by `historians' who serve the military power ... We
who have been tortured and defeated should not allow
ourselves to become desperate. We must fight to live.
The young generation has to study and know what really
happened in this period long gone by. History must be
written in a sincere way, so that the coming
generations will not understand it wrongly. (Doc IX
1992: 22)

The `history' referred to in the above quote covers
the half-century since Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed
Indonesian independence, and in particular the period
around 1965 when Sukarno's Old Order was replaced by
Suharto's New Order. The ones `tortured and defeated'
once belonged to the Indonesian Communist Party, the
PKI, or to one of the other organizations of the
`Communist family', (1) such as its women's
organization, Gerwani (2) (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia,
Indonesian Women's Organization). Suharto rose to
power by creating a campaign of unprecedented
violence, legitimized by accusations of sexual
debauchery allegedly committed by members of Gerwani.
The New Order is not only built on the deaths of an
estimated million (3) innocent people who were
massacred in the last months of 1965 and the first
months of 1966, but also on the suppression of the
power women had acquired in the preceding decades, a
power which their adversaries conceived of through
sexual metaphors.
Little attention has been given to this crucial period
in Indonesian modern history, both abroad and
internally as John Legge wrote, `perhaps because it
was Communists who were being killed the conscience of
the outside world seemed comparatively undisturbed by
what must rank, in any assessment, as one of the
bloodiest massacres in modern history' (Legge 1972:
399). There is little doubt as to the relief the US
must have felt when in the midst of the Vietnam war
Sukarno, whom they considered an international
troublemaker who had become dangerously close to
delivering Indonesia into Communist hands, was
replaced by a right-wing general who put the country
firmly on a capitalist road. (4) As a recent analyst
of the Suharto government, Vatikiotis (1993: 34), put
it this way:
`Indonesia, the nightmare of US foreign policy
analysts in the 1960s suddenly became burning proof
that not all regimes born out of a barrel of a gun are
bad'.
In this study I will argue that another reason why the
West kept silent is its inability to comprehend the
machinations behind and the ramifications of the
campaign of mass unrest and murder waged after the
`first' coup of 1 October 1965. This campaign and its
aftermath I consider the `second', sneaking coup which
brought Suharto to power. Most commentators ignore the
existence of a second coup or declare this crucial
period in Indonesian history `incomprehensible'
(Törnquist 1984: 54). A few authors recognize that
Suharto's ascent to power came about in two steps
(Southwood and Flanagan 1983; Pohan 1988; Vatikiotis
1993).
However, the mechanisms behind the ramifications of
the second coup are ignored:

Suharto came to power in the confused and hitherto not
fully explained aftermath of an abortive coup ...
Suharto and a small group of supporters seized
opportunities as they presented themselves without
planning too far in advance. (Vatikiotis 1993: 2 & 22)

In these accounts the October 1 1965 coup was the
major event to be explained, and this somehow resulted
in Suharto's eventual coming to power. As a
consequence, Suharto's clever manipulation of public
opinion - the subterfuges and lies he constructed to
create a condition of societal chaos, resembling a
gara-gara scene in the wayang (5) - are ignored.
Vatikiotis maintains for instance that people around
Suharto, notably younger officers and radical students
(backed by units of the special forces under the
command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo) `probably
pushed Suharto into seizing power' (Vatikiotis 1993:
240).
The ideological campaign and the mass murders on which
the New Order are built are seen as deplorable, but
isolated occurrences: the prelude to re-establishing
order and the reconstruction of Indonesia's economy
was a brief but bloody period of further turmoil. The
New Order exploited the highly polarized state of
society left by Sukarno to dispose of its opponents
and provide an outlet for some cathartic bloodletting.
 (Vatikiotis 1993: 33)

While the West kept aloof for its own reasons,
opposition in Indonesia was battered or skilfully
manoeuvred into silence by the ruthless repression of
the regime.
Not only were hundreds of thousands of innocent people
massacred, tens of thousands were detained, some of
them for over twenty years. Only a handful of those
detained were ever brought to trial.
The suffering of the survivors continues, and even now
these tapol and napol (6) must carry identity papers
stamped with `ET' (ex-political prisoner) on them.
This effectively bars them from most kinds of
employment. (7) Their children, grandchildren and
other close relatives are also still affected by
related restrictions on their employment or study.
They must produce documentation that they live in a
`clean environment' (i.e. that they have no ET
relatives) to be accepted. Many ex-tapol still have to
report regularly to the military authorities.
But the effect of government repression does not stop
with the victims themselves or their families.
Suharto's campaign after the 1 October coup was not
only intended to wipe out any trace of Communism in
Indonesia and to stir up such mass resentment against
Sukarno's policy that the President had to step down.
It was also constructed to create a mental climate,
the ideological justification for Suharto's New Order.
Therefore I disagree strongly with such statements as
`residual feelings about this period have not coloured
popular perceptions of Suharto's rule' (Vatikiotis
1993: 34). Indeed, such `residual feelings' form the
very foundation of his regime, which is supported not
only by the physical terror exercised by the army, but
especially by the effectiveness of the belief that
anything related to social criticism is subversive,
Communist and ultimately linked to the sexual
perversion of `our' women. I suggest that the
political passivity of Indonesia's population should
not so much be seen only as a consequence of the
`political stability and economic prosperity'
(Vatikiotis 1993) that the New Order has brought, but
also as arising from the memories of the social
disorder with its sexual overtones, the ensuing mass
murder and the continuing repression thereafter. To
ensure that the official picture is not disturbed, the
regime still keeps a close check on the press. As
recently as June 1994 three periodicals were banned:
Tempo, Detik and Editor.
(8) Thus the traumatic 1965-66 period in Indonesian
history marks the change from the Old Order of
President Sukarno to the New Order of President
Suharto. The New Order state is built on a male,
military model of discipline and repression in which
any reference to social inequality is denounced as
being inspired by or related to `Communist
subversion'.
(9) The myth of the birth of the New Order was
consciously created by General Suharto and is
continually recreated, in campaigns of indoctrination
(in which amongst others a film version of the
so-called `betrayal' by the PKI is shown). This
campaign is built on sexual metaphors, especially the
male fear of castration, which (in particularly
gruesome colours) depict the role the women's
organization Gerwani (linked with the PKI) supposedly
played in that coup. To date, analyses of the New
Order state have ignored the elements of sexual
imagery underlying Indonesia's presentday political
configuration.
(10) The implications are wide and involve a constant
process of indoctrination which amounts to the
brainwashing of a whole nation into believing the
power-holders' view of their collective past and to
refrain from questioning the policy of the New Order
state. Talking about women's emancipation, having a
vision of greater social justice, has become suspect,
for it is associated not only with `Communism' but
with `Old Order thinking' in general. As a leader of
Perwari, (11) said: `If I speak about the vision I
have about the Indonesian women's movement, if I refer
to any goals I might want to achieve, or discuss
women's emancipation, I am immediately accused of
being a `person of the Old Order'. This government
really educates people to ignorance. People can only
be free if they can think, isn't it? Here there is no
freedom, there is no way we can say or think what we
want' (interview 73, 31 January 1984).
This study therefore is not only of historical
interest. The gender analysis presented here of the
events in 1965-66 is directly relevant to an
understanding of the machinations of the New Order
state in general and particularly of the way women's
subordination is being used as a justification of the
continued patriarchal, military basis of the
totalitarian state President Suharto has built.
This is in fact the reason why I became interested in
the topic of the present study. In the late 1970s I
was struck by the docility and the level of male
dominance of the major presentday women's
organizations in Indonesia, especially the
organizations of government wives (Dharma Wanita) and
of wives of military men (Dharma Pertiwi), as well as
the state-sponsored, nationwide organization of Family
Welfare Guidance (PKK). (12) I subsequently learnt
that they were built on the ruins of a history of
active and independent women's organizations. As I
pointed out in 1985, these new organizations were
constructed by the military to resubordinate
Indonesian women:

Any concern which is now voiced about their difficult
social and economic situation is branded as political.
Such concerns are thus by implication left-wing, and
`leftist', linked with `women' opens up the whole
Pandora's box of associations with ritual killings,
and sexual orgies. (Wieringa 1985:)
(13) Initially spurred on by Sukarno himself
Indonesian women had participated actively in the
national independence war. After independence a
process of restoration of male power took place.
During the first years of Sukarno's rule, women
remained vocal subjects in the Indonesian political
arena, attacking the bastion of male domination from
two sides. In the first place they assaulted the male
prerogative of polygyny, a struggle they lost, not
least because President Sukarno himself demanded the
right to have more than one wife. In the second place,
a part of the movement, Gerwani, claimed a place for
women in the centre of politics.
This move had a number of consequences. To start with,
they incurred the wrath of the other women's
organizations, which maintained that women's public
place was not in politics but in the social sphere.
Further, Gerwani, by linking itself more and more
firmly to the PKI (which had little interest in the
`woman question') lost many of its original feminist
points of view. In the third place, as I will argue,
Gerwani's move into terrain hitherto considered male
territory triggered fears among traditional groups in
Indonesia, especially devout Muslims, which in turn
provided a fertile ground for Suharto's campaign of
sexual slander in late 1965.
(14) To understand how the present-day women's
organizations functioned both as a pillar of the New
Order regime and as an instrument to resubordinate
women, I felt I needed to study the period of the Old
Order and the birth of the New Order state. While I
was probing into this history I realized the extent to
which sexual imagery and the subordination of women
surrounded the genesis of Suharto's regime. This is
not to suggest that sexual metaphors were the only
factor contributing to the mass murders and the ascent
of Suharto. Other factors - apart from the economic
chaos, which led to the great anxiety both the army
and the Communists felt included the assassination
attempts on Sukarno (May 1978), Sukarno's illness, and
his call to set up a Fifth Force. Although this Fifth
Force meant little more than rhetoric in the
mid-1960s, the army was deeply disturbed at the
prospect of having some 21 million peasants and
workers armed, independent of any army control.
(15) But suggestions of sexual perversion did set the
powder keg off. I felt that to understand the depth of
the crisis into which Indonesia was plunged in 1965
not only a class but also a gender analysis had to be
provided. The gender analysis presented here will
enlighten certain aspects of Indonesian modern
political history which so far remained mysterious to
many analysts, posing questions on issues which have
been largely ignored.
The following pages unravel a history which was hidden
on three levels. The first level deals with the
history of Indonesian feminism as such, which has
known many more radical and courageous moments than
presentday writers give it credit for. Secondly a
prohibited history will be presented, that is the
history of Gerwani. Its ex-members were killed,
imprisoned and otherwise silenced, its documents
destroyed in Indonesia. Fortunately libraries in The
Netherlands and the US contain the sources on the
basis of which the past of Gerwani could be
reconstructed. Thirdly, a reading of the events of
1965 and 1966 based on a gender analysis of that
period will reveal certain aspects of the birth of the
New Order which so far have been either suppressed (by
the Indonesian military) or ignored (by analysts of
Indonesian modern history).
The focus of this book is on Java, in part because it
is the most populated island of Indonesia, but mainly
because it is the political centre of the country.
Sukarno actively promoted the Javanization of the
Indonesian political culture, a policy in which the
PKI followed him. Under Suharto this policy continues.

The main point of my argument centres around the
period between 1950 and 1965, the Old Order, with an
extension until 1967, when Sukarno granted Suharto de
facto power over Indonesia. As the developments during
the Old Order have been introduced by the national
awakening of Indonesian society during the last
decades of colonial rule and the Japanese occupation I
have also paid attention to this period.

The structure of the book is as follows. The research
process is dealt with in the first chapter. The next
chapter explains my theoretical framework, which is
built on the concept of gender as an analytical tool
to understand women's movements and organizations and
the political manipulation of women's subordination.
The following historical chapters deal respectively
with Indonesia's history of women's organizations
until independence, the political development of the
Old Order state and the women's movement of that
period. The first of three chapters on Gerwani deals
with its history in general and some organizational
issues. The next two focus on Gerwani's politics and
its ideology respectively. The underlying question
posed in these two chapters is whether any
justification for the accusations hurled at Gerwani
after October 1965 can be found in the ideology and
practice of the organization. My conclusion is that as
far as sexuality was concerned Gerwani could be
considered a rather conservative organization. In the
last chapter, the `first coup', of 1 October, is
analysed and a day-to-day account is given of the way
in which the first phase of the second, sneaking coup,
the campaign against Gerwani and the PKI was built up.

To introduce the themes mentioned above and to
illustrate the dedication and aspirations of Gerwani
members, this introduction ends with an interview with
a Javanese cadre. (16) Almost twenty years after the
`events' of 1965 it was still very dangerous for
ex-Gerwani members to be seen with foreigners. But in
this case the interviews were easier to arrange,
because I had severe back pains at the time and Ibu
Marto, as I will call her here, was a well-known
masseur and acupuncturist, skills she started to
acquaint herself with in prison. We met in the house
of a mutual acquaintance. I used to be massaged by her
all morning; she related her story in bits and pieces
while she tried to fix my back. Every time a painful
spot in my body was hit we would stop the
conversation. At times we didn't talk at all, the
silence filled with the images her story had conjured
up in the small room and I just let her strong,
experienced fingers touch me all over, from my hair to
my toes. If someone would pass by or enter the room
there were just the masseur and her patient,
discussing back troubles.

My family had no leftist background. I was the only
one in our household who joined a progressive
organization. A cousin of mine was a member of PKI and
he encouraged me to join the Pemuda Rakyat when I was
seventeen years old.
I liked it so much there. We would do all sorts of
things collectively; there would be dancing and
singing, and we would also stage plays with a
political content. Also, courses on household issues,
such as cooking and sewing were organized and of
course all the time we had political discussions.
After a few years I joined Gerwani at the
neighbourhood (ranting) level. There the leaders
noticed me because I listened well and asked questions
and helped in organizing the activities. I joined a
cadre course and started working at branch (cabang)
level. I was very enthusiastic and worked hard so I
was elected to regional (daerah), and in the end to
the central (pusat) level.
All in all three times I attended a training course.
The longest one was in Jakarta. There we were prepared
for one month for the work in the various regions
where we would be sent. The curriculum included
political education, speeches of Sukarno and of Aidit
and discussions about organizational skills and
household issues. We would also get leadership
training. In the afternoons we studied texts of Marx,
Lenin, Stalin, Engels and of course some chapters from
Sarinah, the book Sukarno had written. The central
leadership had all those texts collected in a reader.
We would often discuss the history of our
organization. I joined in the mid-1950s, after the
name was changed into Gerwani. You know, Gerwis, as it
used to be called, was a bit sectarian. Very few women
from the lower classes had joined. The organization
was considered to be too red, too PKI, too extreme.
Actually we felt that was not true. Those who knew
Gerwis in the old days liked it much better than when
we had grown so big. But the men thought so. So at the
1954 congress we became Gerwani, with a more flexible
attitude, especially to women's issues, softer,
smoother (luwes).
The emphasis on women's issues declined, while
economic, social, political and cultural issues gained
more prominence.
What I did like very much of the work in those years
was the contact we established with the peasant women.
If I went to a village I would contact a woman, maybe
a friend or a relative of someone I had known
elsewhere, and introduce myself. I am from Gerwani do
you know what that is? Usually they wouldn't know, and
I would tell about the issues we fought for. Most
women were drawn to our organization because of our
stand on polygamy.
The second issue the female peasants were interested
in was low wages. In general they liked the idea of
women's freedom, for the women resented that their
wages were lower than those of the men. Once a woman
had become a member, she was asked to look for a
friend and so on until there was a small group. These
groups were the basis of the organization for in their
meetings the women would start to understand their
rights and the feudal system. For it is the feudal
system which causes the suffering of Indonesian women.

We would read about it in the newspaper, Harian
Rakyat, and in Berita Gerwani, and then we would
discuss those articles we liked. We hardly ever read
Api Kartini; that was non-bloc, independent, it had no
colour. That was not interesting for the women in the
villages or in the neighbourhoods in the cities.
We were proud of our organization, for Gerwani led the
struggle for the improvement of women's lives, against
price rises, for higher wages. It was nice to be in
the forefront and to see that we really could do
something.
We were also very active here in the city, especially
among the workers. The female labourers usually were
members of SOBSI and in their neighbourhood they
joined Gerwani. Many women were members of both
organizations. That was easy, for there were many
issues concerning the fate of women labourers in which
we cooperated. For instance SOBSI and Gerwani joined
hands in the fight for menstruation leave. If women
were fired because they insisted on their legal right
to a menstruation leave both Gerwani and SOBSI would
fight for them.
Gerwani was also very active in the struggle against
illiteracy. We set up so many literacy classes. And we
fought for women's political rights, that more women
would become members of the national or regional
parliaments, or that they could become village head or
minister as easily as men. Especially in the villages
many disagreed with those rights. There were Islamic
groups who felt that was very controversial. They
didn't want to give women any rights at all. There
were also landlords who were very conservative.
In the one-sided actions in the 1960s women joined
actively. They did not just jeer from the sidelines.
In Kediri and in Jengkol, the women faced the tractors
of the landlords who tried to oust them from their
land. And they were shot at by the army.
All these actions aroused much aversion in the
villages, that is true. That is probably why so many
women were killed: the Gerwani members were much too
independent. They hated Gerwani, wanted the women only
to be active in the social field. They could hold an
arisan occasionally, that was all right, all the other
women's organizations did so. But in Gerwani the women
would also be politically active. Yes, that was
intensely disliked.
I often wondered how it could all go so wrong. One
thing is that Sukarno was not consistent in his
dealings with the feudal remains in our society. That
is the source of the troubles we got. We joined him in
the National Front, which was anti-imperialist. But he
didn't keep up his promises, for instance in
implementing the land reform law. The PKI did and we
joined the Party in this issue. The role of Gerwani in
the one-sided actions was very strong; it has almost
completely been forgotten now. Also the papers at the
time didn't write so much about our actions. The men
always wanted to be seen as more militant than the
women.
We sided with Sukarno in this Malaysia confrontation.
But actually that was not very attractive to us; it
just drew the attention away from the national
problems. So we were a bit reluctant at first, but in
the end we joined enthusiastically and sent
volunteers. The PNI women did so too, the Wanita
Marhaen and the Wanita Demokrat, (17) and also some
other women's organizations.
I myself was not in Java at that period. In 1962 I was
sent to another island, on my own. I often felt very
lonely, for I didn't understand the language, the
people nor the culture. I had to learn to feel at home
in such a different surrounding. I lived with other
cadres of the PKI and the Pemuda Rakyat in one big
house. One boy of the Pemuda Rakyat often helped me.
At times I would feel so miserable that I would cry.
He would then comfort me, explain things to me and
help me out if necessary. Those first few months I
often felt so low that I wanted to go back home. It
was also difficult for me that I was not used to live
as a young girl alone with strange men. People
gossiped so much. I had to defend myself all the time.

The region I was sent to was difficult. It had a proud
history of resistance against the Dutch and they
didn't like Jakarta very much either. Islam was very
strong, the men were arrogant. I, as a stranger, a
Javanese woman, should not push myself at all. I
should never attempt to be seen as the teacher who
knew everything. So I waited until they came to me
with their problems. The cadres who worked there had
had very little training and had very little idea what
Gerwani actually stood for, what it wanted. During the
meetings I would find out who was most clearheaded.
Then I would approach that woman and gradually try to
explain a little about the organization, its
activities and so on. But I should never be seen as
the leader; that should be someone from the region
itself.
It was very difficult to adjust myself, for I was not
used to living in such a strictly Islamic area where
women could not move about freely. In the end I found
a way to make it easier for the women to come to our
meetings. They had many original dances in the area.
The men would forbid their wives to go out of the
house but not if they went in a group. So we organized
cultural groups, to dance, to sing and those groups
the women were allowed to join. But we didn't stop
there, we gave these groups a content, we would
discuss their daily problems with them. You can very
easily educate the women on economic issues via the
arisan. If you start discussing what the women could
best use their money for you immediately arrive at the
problem of the price rises. And then you could discuss
who were responsible for that. So then you could start
straight away with political education.
When the women finally understood what Gerwani wanted
many women strongly supported us, however Islamic they
all were. They hated the polygamy of their men and
they enjoyed meeting and discussing these issues. They
also liked it very much to learn how to make cookies
and to discuss the political situation. What appealed
most to the young people was the right to marry as
they liked and to the women, especially the struggle
against polygamy. The women workers were also happy to
be supported in their struggle and to have a cręche
where they could leave their children for a very small
sum.
After one year the boy of the Pemuda Rakyat asked me
to marry him. I hesitated, asked him to wait. He came
from Jakarta; his parents had moved here. I asked my
friends for advice. They all said that I should do it,
so in 1963 we married. Those were the happiest years
of my life. After one year our son was born. The
period around the delivery my husband did everything
around the house, he would sweep, cook, wash clothes.
And after the child was born he would often change the
diapers before he would go to his office. He would
always help me as much as he could, until I was strong
enough to cope again. But then already it was October
1965.
I am really sick at heart that all our careful
organizing, our efforts to build up the movement from
the grassroots, has been so totally destroyed. I used
to travel a lot, with trains or buses if these would
be available. If we would go to the interior, we would
have to walk long distances. In the city I also
walked. Sometimes I could ride a bicycle, but more
often I had to walk. We used to be so dedicated; we
never thought: ah, tomorrow I must have some food in
my pot, or I want a nice house. Day and night we were
busy with our work. If I had to travel it was
sufficient that I had a ticket. Once there there would
always be a plate of rice for me.
In the morning we would cook some food, eat it and
then we would be on our way. Often we would not come
home before 11, 12 at night. We would have picked up
some food along the way. I never devoted a single
thought to anything else but the problems we had and
how to solve them.
We did get paid a little bit of money, I myself as the
chair of the cręches, and my vice chair, but that was
in no way sufficient. So I had a small job, did the
administration of a school.
I went to a course of five months intended for cręche
leaders in Jakarta while I was already the chair of
the cręche here. I went there with my two-months-old
son. Now the certificate is not valid any more.
In general communication with Jakarta was difficult.
Once a month I would send a report but the answer
would come only months later. But they did send us all
kinds of recommendations. We were for instance advised
to organize an anti-price rise demonstration around a
certain time, or to send a delegation to the governor,
if that was planned in Jakarta. As far as national
politics were concerned they generally followed the
party line, but for women's affairs they charted their
own course. Our major adversaries were fanatical
Muslims. It takes very long to convince people,
especially when they have certain strict religious
principles. Here within the National Front we
cooperated a lot with Perwari and Kowani. All this
just started to get off the ground when the events
happened. It was so unexpected, so in the midst of
everything.
When we understood what was happening in Java we fled
to a nearby city. There my husband was burnt alive
when they set fire to the PKI office.
With my son I then fled to Jakarta. My elder sister is
the widow of an officer who had been killed on a
mission. She couldn't live off her pension and had
secured a job at one of the army canteens. I also set
to work there. They admonished me to remarry. You are
young, they told me, you have only one child, it will
arouse suspicion if you don't accept a husband. So to
protect myself against gossip I married my second
husband although I didn't love him. When the child I
had by him, a daughter, was two years old, all of a
sudden my husband disappeared. I asked anyone whom I
thought might know anything about him but I never
heard anything from him any more.
Then my sister got afraid people would find out and
she would lose her job and everything. She turned me
in. When I was arrested my daughter stayed with my
sister in Jakarta. My son, who was at the time with
me, had no one to take care of him. His grandmother
was too old and confused to be able to provide for him
and to see him through school. He had to survive by
selling newspapers and bakso on the street.
In prison many of us were raped. We were beaten and
tortured with electricity, and with cigarettes. After
a few years, after the Red Cross had visited us, it
became a little better. I learnt massage and made some
handicrafts that I sold for a bit of food.
Everyone in the prison knew that I would have to fend
for myself and my children after I would be released,
so they collected whatever they could.
Some friends who had already been released gave me
some pots and a stove. I had also been able to save a
little bit of money by selling my handicrafts so I
could buy some rice for the first days.
During the first weeks I was free I lived off the
embroidery I produced, while I tried to get some
patients to be massaged. Now I have passed several
exams for massage and acupuncture and I have enough
patients to be able to live.
But my first concern was my son. On Saturday I was
outside, on Sunday I had found out where he was and on
Monday he was at school. But he was very much behind
and I had to put him to boarding school. He was very
embarrassed that with his nineteen years he still had
to wear shorts to go to SMP (junior high school). Next
year he will have finished his SMP; then he can come
home to go to SMA (senior high school) and he can wear
trousers. Then he will no longer be shy to be seen
like that in his neighbourhood.
My youngest child is also behind. She is already
twelve and she should have been in the fifth form, but
she is only in the third form. She will pick up; she
is doing well now.
I am fine, I can manage now with my two children and
my massage. But I still have to be very careful. I
cannot take private patients at home. A friend of mine
learnt that he was being discussed in government
office: he received too many guests. But these were
his patients! He was warned to stop. So I usually go
to my patients myself.
Although we are released we are not full citizens yet.
I still have to legitimate myself constantly. For
instance if I have to go to Surabaya I need five
stamps on a piece of paper and then I have to show
that to the police in Surabaya. If I will not do that
I will get house arrest.
Actually that is not the worst thing. I can live with
that. What really makes me so sad is that my children
at school learn such ugly things about Gerwani.
I realized my son was holding something back for me.
Finally he came to me and asked, `Ma, why did you
become a member of such a group, so morally depraved,
bringing ruin to the country? Were you a whore too?
Everybody said that all Gerwani members were whores
and bad women.'
How can I explain to him what we lived for, what our
ideals were? I still see the confusion and shame in
his eyes. How will he ever understand my life?

Her face twisted with pain when she said that. Her
hands momentarily stopped moving.

Other women too asked me to return their history to
them and their relatives. They did not want to die
with the version of their past constructed in the
campaign of mass terror following the coup. But the
history which follows is not only of interest to the
`old' women; the younger generations of Indonesian
women and men who have been led to believe the
military version of the events on the basis of which
the society they live in was constructed also have the
right to be exposed to the following account which
aims to subvert this military history of Indonesia.

Notes

  1.I use the term `Communist Family' for both the PKI
and its associated ormas, (organisasi masa, mass
organizations), Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita, Indonesian
Women's Movement),Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth),
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All
Indonesian Trade Unions Federation), BTI ( Barisan
Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers' Front), Lekra
(Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, League of People's
Culture) and HSI (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia,
Indonesian Association of Scholars). It was claimed
that in 1964 this family consisted of some 27 million
members (HR 20 August 1965). This figure has to be
read with caution, as there were many cases of double
membership. [ back ]
      
  2.Between 1950-54 the organization was called
Gerwis. I refer to the organization in general as
Gerwani, and use the term Gerwis only when referring
specifically to the period until the First Congress
1954. [ back ]
      
  3.It is not known exactly how many people were
actually murdered at the time. Present day scholars
such as Vatikiotis (1993) and Anderson (1994) use the
figure of one million. See also Cribb (ed.) 1990. [
back ]
      
  4.See the account of Howard Jones (US ambassador to
Indonesia for seven years prior to June 1965) gave of
US involvement in Indonesian internal politics.
For Americans the impact goes far beyond the fact of a
friendly government replacing a hostile one. It
represents a major defeat for both Moscow and Peking,
`[a]nd one of the happiest results of Indonesia's
acting on its own is the rapprochement between that
country and the United States' (Jones 1971: 403). For
the US, Suharto was `the hero who saved Indonesia from
becoming a Communist State' (Jones 1971: 412). [
back ]
      
  5.See Chapter 11 for an explanation of the meaning
of the gara-gara scene. [ back ]
      
  6.Tapol is short fortahanan politik, political
prisoner, napol for narapidana politik, convicted
political prisoner. Thetapol, who had never been
tried, were released in 1979, fourteen years after the
events of 1965 and still must carry identification
papers stamped to this effect. The few convicted napol
were released after their sentences expired. Those on
death row are still in prison. In 1987 a Government
Instruction (No 5 of that year) withheld the reduction
of life sentence to twenty years, after five years of
`good behaviour'. See Hersri 1993 and Pramoedya Ananta
Tur 1988 & 1995 for the experiences of tapol in the
concentration camps on the island of Buru, and
Havelaar 1988 for an account of the lives of families
of ex-tapol. [ back ]
      
  7.Functions which are officially closed to the
ex-tapol include the civil and armed services, and
vital enterprises. They are also not allowed to take
jobs which might bring them into contact with the
population, such as journalists, teachers and priests.
The legal foundation for these regulations is the 1975
Anti-Subversion Law (Decision of the Pangkopkamtib No
06/Kopkam/XI, related to the `Surat Keterangan Tidak
Terlibat G30S/PKI', or Letter of Information of
Non-involvement in the PKI 30 September Movement') and
the Instruction of the Ministry of Home Affairs No 32
of 1981 related to the `Guidance and Supervision of
the Ex-Prisoners and Convicted Prisoners of the PKI 30
September Movement'. See also Manai Sophiaan (1994)
for an account of the way the Suharto regime manages
to stifle any social criticism by pointing to the
`latent danger' of Communism. [ back ]
      
  8.See also the article by Kees van Dijk in
Internationale Spectator of October 1994, No 10, `Een
verschijningsverbod in Indonesië'. [ back ]
      
  9.A series of strikes in North Sumatra in the first
half of 1994 was said to be `inspired by trade union
leaders some of whom had relatives who were linked to
the PKI'. A trade union leader was killed (IFM jrg
XVIII (3) May 1994). The strike was led by the
independent trade union SBSI (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera
Indonesia) which is still prohibited; the
governmentonly recognizes the SPSI (Serikat Pekerja
Seluruh Indonesia),a union which accepts the notion
that there should be harmony between employers and
their employees. [ back ]
      
  10.In a paper in 1985, entitled `The Perfumed
Nightmare' I demonstrated that the army under General
Suharto had constructed this campaign around Gerwani's
alleged role in the 1 October 1965 coup. Recently,
Leclerc (1991) in an unpublished paper picked up the
same theme, focusing on the monument built at Lobang
Buaya, the site at which the generals were murdered. I
will elaborate this theme in Chapter 11. [ back ]
      
  11.Perwari, Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia,
Union of Women of the Indonesian Republic, was
established right after the proclamation of
independence.
As I will elaborate in Chapter 7, for a long time the
organization remained a radical and vocal advocate of
women's rights, especially in marriage. At present the
organization is `tamed', its activities on behalf of
poor women have been made impossible and their
membership has been greatly reduced. This last
phenomenon is largely due to the fact that all wives
of civil servants or military employees are obliged to
join the two organizations of army and civil servants'
wives, Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi. [ back ]
      
  12.For an account of Dharma Wanita and Dharma
Pertiwi see Wieringa 1985. In a later article I
discussed Indonesia's `aborted feminism' (1988b), and
more recently, I wrote two articles comparing Gerwani
and the PKK (1992; 1993a). See also the reports
published by the Indonesia team of the DGIS/ISS
Women's History Project (Wieringa et al. 1985;
Wieringa (ed.) 1990). See also Suryakusuma (1990) for
Dharma Wanita. [ back ]
      
  13.This paper is translated into Indonesian as
`Impian Buruk Berbau Harum'. Since 1985 it has
circulated in Indonesia's samizdat literature. [
back ]
      
  14.The Gerwani volunteers trained for this Fifth
Force amounted to no more than some 70 women; see
Chapter 11. [ back ]
      
  15.See Southwood & Flanagan (1983) for a discussion
of the Fifth Force. [ back ]
      
  16.The interview numbers are 96, 97, 100 121 & 122.
 [ back ]
      
  17.This is the same organization. In 1964 the Wanita
Demokrat Indonesia changed its name to Gerakan Wanita
Marhaenis. [ back ]

Self-Criticism by the Indonesian Communist Party, 1966

Historical Document

From: Revolution/Winter/Spring 1987

Starting in October 1965 and continuing into 1966,
pro-U.S. fascist militarists unleashed a massacre of
horrible proportions against the Indonesian people.
Several hundred thousand Communist Party of Indonesia
(PKI) members and sympathizers as well as masses not
involved in any political activity were murdered in
cold blood. The number of people shot in the streets
or arrested, tortured, and killed in prison is still
not known with any accuracy. The massacre resulted in
the crushing of the PKI, the fall of the Sukarno
government, and the rise to power of a right-wing
military clique led by Suharto which still holds sway
in Indonesia today.
If the U.S. imperialists were not directly involved in
Suharto's coup (and there is some evidence that they
were), they openly applauded the fascist takeover in
Indonesia. "We must say it's refreshing to read of
young Moslems burning down Communist Party
headquarters for a change and shouting 'Long Live
America,"' said a Chicago Tribune editorial in October
1965. In July 1966, when the immensity of the
bloodbath in Indonesia was already becoming clear,
Time declared that the ousting of Sukarno was "the
West's best news for years in Asia."
Sukarno had presided over a coalition government
contained various forces, including the PKL Despite
the nationalist rhetoric and some actions reflecting
national bourgeois interests, Sukarno certainly did
not stand for new democracy and genuine independence
from imperialism. Under Sukarno, Indonesia, with its
rich oil reserves and strategic position in Southeast
Asia, remained under imperialist domination and was a
prized neocolony for the U.S. But by the mid- '60s the
U. S., neck deep in trouble in Vietnam, needed an
outright lackey regime in place in Indonesia. The
clique of right-wing generals under Suharto lit the
bill to a tee.
The responsibility for the monstrous crime of several
hundred thousand murders must be laid squarely at the
doorsteps of the Indonesian reactionaries and their
U.S. imperialist masters. At the same time, it's true
that the PKI was extremely vulnerable to such an
onslaught, and no effective, organized resistance to
Suharto and the massacre was ever built. By the mid-
'60s the core of the PKI leadership had become rotten
with years of revisionism. The PKI put forward a wrong
view of the state and in practice participated in and
glorified Sukarno and the coalition government, which
decidedly was not under proletarian leader- ship. The
PKI also went down the revisionist path on the
question of the process of revolution, seconding the
thesis of a "peaceful road to socialism" advocated by
the Soviet revisionists who came to power in 1956.
These and other serious errors were summarized and
criticized in two documents by forces who were
attempting a revolutionary regroupment of the PKI:
'Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party" (August
17, 1966) and "Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist
Party" (september 1966). In 1968 China's Foreign
Languages Press published a pamphlet, titled People of
Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist
Regime. The pamphlet contained excerpts from the two
documents as well as an editorial from Hongqi (Red
Flag), magazine of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Panty. In this issue of Revolution
we are reprinting large sections from this pamphlet.
What happened in Indonesia in the mid- '60s has many
particularities relating to that country, to the
specific array of class forces involved, and to that
period of time.
But the PKI summations are right to the point, for
example, in emphasizing the importance of Mao Tsetung
Thought. As the Declaration of the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement points out, "Without
upholding and building on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung
Thought it is not possible to defeat revisionism,
imperialism and reaction in general." This and many
other points made in the PKI summations are still very
relevant today and warrant close study, including in
relation to events in the world within the past year.

January 1987

From: People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to
Overthrow the Fascist Regime

- Editorial of Hongqi (Red Flag), No.11, 1967 -

After staging the counter-revolutionary 1965 coup
d'etat, the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing military
clique, faithful lackey of U.S. imperialism and
anti-communist ally of Soviet revisionism, established
a fascist dictatorship of unprecedented ruthlessness
in Indonesia.
For the past year or more, it has followed an
out-and-out traitorous, dictatorial, anti-communist,
anti-China and anti- popular counter-revolutionary
policy.
It has imposed a white terror in Indonesia on an
unprecedented scale, slaughtered several hundred
thousand Communists and revolutionary people and
thrown into prison another several hundred thousand
fine sons and daughters of the Indonesian people. All
Indonesia has been turned into one vast hell. By
engaging in bloody suppression, it attempts in vain to
wipe out the Indonesian Communist Party and stamp out
the Indonesian revolution.
This clique cherishes an inveterate hatred for
socialist China, which resolutely supports the
revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people. It
has repeatedly carried out serious provocations
against the Chinese people, whipped up anti-China,
anti-Chinese campaigns and practised inhuman racist
persecution against overseas Chinese. It has vainly
tried to sabotage the traditional friendship between
the Chinese people and the overseas Chinese in
Indonesia on the one hand and the Indonesian people on
the other, and to prevent the Chinese people from
supporting the Indonesian people's revolution.
In the final analysis, the many kinds of persecution
against the Indonesian Communist Party and the
Indonesian people by the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing
military clique will only serve to hasten the arrival
of the upsurge in the Indonesian revolution and speed
its own doom. The heroic Indonesian Communists and
people can neither be cowed, suppressed, nor wiped
out. The determination of the Indonesian people to
make revolution is unshakable, so is the Chinese
people's determination to support their revolution. No
reactionary force on earth can obstruct this.
At present, the Indonesian Communists and
revolutionary people are regrouping their forces for a
new battle. The August 17, 1966 Statement of the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Indonesian Communist Party and the Self-Criticism it
endorsed in September, which were published by the
magazine Indonesian Tribune not long ago, are a call
to the Indonesian Communists and the Indonesian
working class, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals
and all anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary
forces to unite and engage in a new struggle.
The two documents of the Political Bureau of the
Indonesian Communist Party are a telling blow at U.S.
imperialism and its flunkeys, the Suharto-Nasution
fascist military dictatorial regime, and the
revisionist leading clique of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, and a tremendous encouragement to
the revolutionary people of Indonesia.
In these two documents, the Political Bureau of the
Indonesian Communist Party sums up the experience and
lessons of the Party in leading the Indonesian
people's revolutionary struggle, criticizes the Right
opportunist errors committed by the leadership of the
Party in the past, points out the road for the
Indonesian revolution, and lays down the principles
for future struggle.

     From: Statement by the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party
August 17, 1966

The Main Problem of Every Revolution Is The Problem of
State Power

The statement declares that it is an absolute
condition for every revolutionary, and even more so
for every Communist, to grasp the truth that "the main
problem of every revolution is the problem of state
power".
The oppressed classes, in liberating themselves from
exploitation and oppression, have no other way but to
make a revolution, that is to say, overthrowing by
force the oppressor classes from state power, or
seizing state power by force. Because, the state is an
instrument created by the ruling classes to oppress
the ruled classes.
But, for a genuine people's revolution in the present
modern era, it is not enough just to wrest the power
from the hands of the oppressor classes, and to make
use of the power that has been wrested. Marx has
taught us that the destruction of the old
military-bureaucratic state machine is "the
prerequisite for every genuine people's revolution"
(Lenin, State and Revolution). A genuine people's
revolution will achieve decisive victory only after it
has accomplished this prerequisite, while at the same
time it sets up a completely new state apparatus whose
task is to suppress by force and mercilessly the
resistance put up by the overthrown oppressor classes.

What should the August Revolution of 1945 (1) have
done with regard to the state power?
As a prerequisite, the August Revolution of 1945
should have smashed the colonial state machine along
with all of its apparatuses that had been established
to maintain colonial domination of Indonesia, and not
merely transferred the power to the Republic of
Indonesia. The August Revolution of 1945 should have
established a completely new state, a state jointly
ruled by all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
classes under the leadership of the working class.
This is what is to be called a people's democratic
state.
The statement points out that due to the absence of
the working class' leadership, the Republic of
Indonesia was inevitably a state ruled by the
bourgeoisie, despite the participation of the
proletariat. A state with such a class character can
never become an instrument of the 1945 August
Revolution. Without the dictatorship of people's
democracy, the August Revolution of 1945 did not have
an instrument to defeat its enemies, and consequently
was unable to accomplish its tasks, namely the
complete liquidation of imperialist domination and the
remnants of feudalism.
The Communists' voluntary withdrawal of a cabinet led
by themselves in 1948 had opened up the broadest
opportunity for the reactionary bourgeoisie led by
Muhamad Hatta to make the state power fall into its
hands. This reactionary bourgeoisie then betrayed the
August Revolution by unleashing white terror, the
Madiun affair, (2) as a prelude to the restoration of
the Dutch imperialist interests through the conclusion
of the despicable agreement of the round-table
conference, which turned Indonesia into a
semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.
The statement says that the resurgence of the
revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people in
continuing the fight against the oppression by
imperialism and the remnants of feudalism after the
round-table conference, had gained certain political
victories of partial and reform nature, which had led
to the lessening of the anti-democratic character of
the bourgeois power.
It was a great mistake to assume that the existence of
such a government signified a fundamental change in
the class character of the state power. It was equally
incorrect to assume that the above-mentioned facts
marked the birth and the development of an aspect
representing the interests of the people, or of a
pro-people aspect, within the state power. Such an
error, that was formulated in the "theory of two
aspects in state power", led to the conclusion that
according to the before-mentioned facts, within the
state power of the Republic of Indonesia there existed
two aspects, the "anti-people aspect" consisting of
comprador, bureaucrat capitalist and landlord classes
on the one hand, and the 'pro-people aspect' composed
mainly of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat
on the other hand.
According to this "two-aspect theory", a miracle could
happen in Indonesia. namely that the state could cease
to be an instrument of the ruling oppressor classes to
subjugate other classes, but it could be made an
instrument shared by both the oppressor classes and
the oppressed classes. And the fundamental change in
state power, that is to say, the birth of a people's
power, could be peacefully accomplished by developing
the "pro-people aspect" and gradually liquidating the
"anti-people aspect".
The statement points out that hoping for a fundamental
change in state power. to usher the people into the
position of power, through the victory of the
"pro-people aspect" over the "anti-people aspect" in
line with the "theory of two aspects in state power".
was but a pure illusion. The people will be able to
gain power only through an armed revolution under the
leadership of the working class to overthrow the power
of the comprador bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat
capitalists and the landlords which represent the
interests of imperialism and the remnants of
feudalism.
The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in
practice deprived the proletariat of its independence
in the united front with the national bourgeoisie,
dissolved the interests of the proletariat in that of
the national bourgeoisie, and placed the proletariat
in a position as a tail-end of the national
bourgeoisie.
To return the proletariat to its position of
leadership in the liberation struggle of the
Indonesian people, it is absolutely necessary to
rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in
state power", and to do away with the erroneous view
with regard to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and
revolution.

The Road To a Completely Independent and Democratic
New Indonesia

The statement indicates that the main contradiction in
the present Indonesian society is still the same with
what existed at the outbreak of the August Revolution
of 1945, that is to say, imperialism and the remnants
of feudalism are involved in a contradiction with the
masses of the people who desire full independence and
democracy.
Thus the target of the revolution remains the same:
imperialism and the remnants of feudalism. Classes
which are the enemies of the revolution, in the main,
are also the same: imperialism, the compradors, the
bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords. The driving
forces of the revolution, too, are still the same: the
working class, the peasantry and the petty
bourgeoisie.
The statement says that after the imperialists no
longer directly hold political power in Indonesia,
their political interests are represented by the
comprador bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat capitalists and
the landlords who are holding the state power in their
hands.
Therefore, only by overthrowing the power of the
domestic reactionary classes can the overthrow of
imperialism and the remnants of feudalism be
concretely realized. This is the primary task of the
present stage of the Indonesian revolution.
The statement points out that today, the Indonesian
people are faced by the military dictatorship of the
Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and
their accomplices, which is the manifestation of power
of the most reactionary classes in our country.
The absence of democracy for the people, and the
suppression by force of arms of every revolutionary
and democratic movement, inevitably compel the whole
people to take up arms in order to defend their
rights. The armed struggle of the people against the
armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and
constitutes the chief
form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by
taking the road of armed struggle, the Indonesian
people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the
armed counter-revolutionaries, as a pre- condition to
realize their aspiration for which they have fought
for scores of years: independence and freedom.
The statement maintains that the armed struggle to
defeat armed counter-revolution, as a revolution, must
not be waged, in the form of military adventurism, in
the form of a putsch, which is detached from the
awakening of the popular masses.
The statement emphasizes that since the present stage
of the Indonesian revolution is essentially an
agrarian revolution by the peasantry, the armed
struggle of the Indonesian people, too, essentially
will be the armed struggle of the peasants to liberate
themselves from the oppression by the remnants of
feudalism. The armed struggle against the armed
counter-revolution can never be lasting and in the end
will surely be defeated, unless it is essentially an
armed struggle of the peasants in realizing the
agrarian revolution. And the armed struggle of the
peasants to realize the agrarian revolution will only
succeed in achieving a complete victory, and in really
liberating the peasantry from the oppression by the
remnants of feudalism, only when it is waged under the
leadership of the proletariat, and when it is not
limited to just overthrowing the power of the
landlords in the countryside, but is aimed at smashing
the entire power of the internal
counter-revolutionaries who are now represented by the
military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals
Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices.

From: Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party
September 1966

Indonesian Tribune published in its January issue
(No.3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian
Communist Party (P.K.I.) in September 1966. The
self-criticism is entitled 'Build the P.K.I. Along the
Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic
Revolution in Indonesia".
The self-criticism says that the disaster which has
caused such serious losses to the P.K.I. and the
revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people after
the outbreak and the defeat of the September 30th
Movement(3) has lifted up the curtain which for a long
period has hidden the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.
The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest
responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and
mistakes of the Party during the period under review.
Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious
attention to and highly appreciates all criticisms
from cadres and members of the Party given in a
Marxist-Leninist spirit, as well as honest criticism
from Party sympathizers that have been expressed in
different ways. The Political Bureau is resolved to
make self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way, putting
into practice the teaching of Lenin and the example of
Comrade Musso in unfolding Marxist-Leninist criticism
and self-criticism.
The self-criticism says that under the situation where
the most vicious and cruel white terror is being
unleashed by the military dictatorship of the
Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto, it is
not easy to make as complete criticism and
self-criticism as possible. To meet the urgent
necessity, it is necessary to point out the main
issues in the ideological, political and
organizational fields, in order to facilitate the
study of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party
during the current rectification movement.
With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau
presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau
expects all members to take an active part in the
discussions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the
Party leadership, critically analyse them, and do
their utmost to improve this self- criticism of the
Political Bureau by drawing lessons from their
respective experiences, collectively or individually.
The Political Bureau expects all members to take firm
hold of the principle: "unity - criticism - unity" and
"learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and
curing the sickness to save the patient, in order to
achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology
and unity among comrades". (4) The Political Bureau is
convinced that, by holding firmly to this correct
principle, every Party member will take part in the
movement to study and surmount these weaknesses and
mistakes with the determination to rebuild the P.K.I.
along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen
communist unity and solidarity, to raise the
ideological, political and organizational vigilance,
and to heighten the fighting spirit in order to win
victory.

The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in
the period after 1951, the self-criticism says,
certainly had as their source the weaknesses in
ideological field, too, especially among the Party
leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary
theories with the concrete practice of the Indonesian
revolution, the Party leadership adopted the road
which was divorced from the guidance of the most
advanced theories. This experience shows that the
P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing a core
of leadership that was composed of proletarian
elements, which really had the most correct
understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not
fragmentary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued
to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave
rise to Right opportunism that merged with the
influence of modern revisionism in the international
communist movement. This was the black line of Right
opportunism which became the main feature of the
mistakes committed by the P.K.l. in this period. The
rise and the development of these weaknesses and
errors were caused by the following factors:
First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism
in a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the
Party, especially among the Party leadership.
The rectification and study movements which from time
to time were organized in the Party were not carried
out seriously and persistently, their results were not
summed up in a good manner, and they were not followed
by the appropriate measures in the organizational
field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and
file, and never at unfolding criticism and
self-criticisms among the leader- ship. Criticism from
below far from being carefully listened to, was even
suppressed.
Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology
along two channels, through contacts with the national
bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front
with them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party
cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party
obtained certain positions in governmental and
semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number
of Party cadres who occupied certain positions in
governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the
centre and in the regions, created "the rank of
bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real
channels for reformism". (5) Such a situation did not
exist before the August Revolution of 1945.
Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our
Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central
Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved
a report which supported the lines of the 20th
Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of
"achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary
means as the line of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road",
one of the characteristics of modern revisionism, was
further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of
the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the
Party Constitution: "There is a possibility that a
people's democratic system as a transitional stage to
socialism in Indonesia can be achieved by peaceful
means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I. persistently
strives to transform this possibility into a reality."
This revisionist line was further emphasized in the
Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and was never
corrected, not even when our Party was already aware
that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the
leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road
of modern revisionism.
The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the
P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the
modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone,
it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself will
automatically be free from errors of Right
opportunism, the same as what the modern revisionists
are doing. The experience of the P.K.I. provides the
lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest danger in
the international communist movement, is also the
greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern
revisionism is not "a latent but not an acute danger",
but a concrete danger that has brought great damage to
the Party and serious losses for the revolutionary
movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must
not in any way underestimate the danger of modern
revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless
struggle against it. The firm stand against modern
revisionism in all fields can be effectively
maintained only when our Party abandons the line of
"preserving friendship with the modern revisionists".
It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the
modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also
made revisionist mistakes itself, because it had
revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle,
state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I.
leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the
theoretical field against other "revolutionary"
political thoughts which could mislead the
proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had
voluntarily given concessions in the theoretical
field.
The P.K.l. leadership maintained that there was an
identity between the three components of Marxism:
materialist philosophy, political economy and
scientific socialism, and the so-called "three
components of Sukarno's teachings" - They wanted to
make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working
class, the property of the whole nation which includes
the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

The Main Errors in the Political Field

The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right
opportunism in the political field which are now under
discussion include three problems: (1) the road to
people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of
state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy
of the national united front.
One of the fundamental differences and problems of
disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern
revisionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing
the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that
socialism can only be achieved through the road of
proletarian revolution and that in the case of
colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries
like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved by
first completing the stage of the people's democratic
revolution. On the contrary, revisionism dreams of
achieving socialism through the "peaceful road".
During the initial years of this period since 1951,
our Party had achieved certain results in the
political struggle as well as in the building of the
Party. One important achievement of this period was
the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian
revolution. It was formulated that the present stage
of the Indonesian revolution was a new-type bourgeois
democratic revolution, whose tasks were to liquidate
imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to
establish a people's democratic system as a
transitional stage to socialism. The driving forces of
the revolution were the working class, the peasantry
and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the
revolution was the working class and the principal
mass strength of the revolution was the peasantry. It
was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was
a wavering force of the revolution who might side with
the revolution to certain limits and at certain
periods but who, at other times, might betray the
revolution. The Party furthermore formulated that the
working class in order to fulfil its obligation as the
leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary
united front with other revolutionary classes and
groups based on worker-peasant alliance and under the
leadership of the working class.
However, there was a very important shortcoming which
in later days developed into Right opportunism or
revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come
to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means
and the main form of struggle of the Indonesian
revolution.
The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has
provided the lesson concerning the main form of
struggle of the revolution in colonial or
semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the
people's armed struggle against the armed
counter-revolution. In line with the essence of the
revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the essence
of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle
of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under the
leadership of the working class. The practice of the
Chinese revolution is first and foremost the
application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete
conditions of China. At the same time, it has laid
down the general law for the revolutions of the
peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal
countries.
To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the
Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the
Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian
revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of
struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against
the armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the
armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the
leadership of the proletariat.
All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve
the principal means and the main form of struggle, and
must not in any way impede the process of the ripening
of armed struggle.
The experience during the last fifteen years has
taught us that starting from not explicitly denying
the "peaceful road" and not firmly holding to the
general law of revolution in colonial or semi-colonial
and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got
bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal
struggle. The Party leadership even considered this to
he the main form of struggle to achieve the strategic
aim of the Indonesian revolution. The legality of the
Party was not considered as one method of struggle at
a given time and under certain conditions, but was
rather regarded as a principle, while other forms of
struggle should serve this principle. Even when
counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot the
legality of the Party, but has violated the basic
human rights of the Communists as well, the Party
leadership still tried to defend this "legality" with
all their might.
The "peaceful road" was firmly established in the
Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central
Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a
document which approved the modern revisionist line of
the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation,
when the revisionist line was already firmly
established in the Party, it was impossible to have a
correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and tactics.
The formulation of the main lines of strategy and
tactics of the Party started from a vacillation
between the "peaceful road" and the "road of armed
revolution", in the process of which the "peaceful
road" finally became dominant.
Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I.
was formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959).
It reads, "To continue the forging of the national
united front, and to continue the building of the
Party, so as to accomplish the demands of the August
Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the
Party, the slogan "Raise the Three Banners of the
Party" was decided. These were: (1) the banner of the
national united front, (2) the banner of the building
of the Party, and (3) the banner of the 1945 August
Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to
people's democracy in Indonesia.
The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three
Banners of the Party were the three main weapons to
win the people's democratic revolution which, as
Comrade Mao Tsetung has said, were "a well-disciplined
Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using
the method of self- criticism and linked with the
masses of the people; an army under the leadership of
such a Party: a united front of all revolutionary
classes and all revolutionary groups under the
leadership of such a Party" .(6)
Thus the second main weapon means that there must be a
people's armed struggle against armed
counterrevolution under the leadership of the Party.
The Party leadership tried to replace this with the
slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945 August
Revolution".
In order to prove that the road followed was not the
opportunist "peaceful road", the Party leadership
always spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility
of a "peaceful road" and the possibility of a
non-peaceful road. They held that the better the Party
prepared itself to face the possibility of a
non-peaceful road, the greater would be the
possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing so the
Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party
members, the working class and the masses of the
working people the hope for a peaceful road which in
reality did not exist.
In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the
whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the
masses of the people to face the possibility of a
non-peaceful road. The most striking proof of it was
the grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak
and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within
a very short space of time, the counter-revolution
succeeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of
thousands of Communists and non-communist
revolutionaries who found themselves in a passive
position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.l.
and the revolutionary mass organizations. Such a
situation surely would never happen if the Party
leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary
road.
The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism
that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed
struggle abroad, but must carry out the Method of
Combining the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla
warfare in the countryside (especially by farm
labourers and poor peasants) revolutionary actions by
the workers (especially transport workers) in cities,
and intensive work among the enemy's armed forces".
The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in
studying the experience of the armed struggle of the
Chinese people. were considered seeing only its
similarities with the conditions in Indonesia. On the
contrary, the Party leadership put forward several
allegedly different conditions that must be taken into
account, until they arrived at the conclusion that the
method typical to the Indonesian revolution was the
"Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle".
To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical
mission, to lead the people's revolution against
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. the
Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the
revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the
Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and
hold aloft the banner of armed people's revolution.
Following the example of the glorious Chinese
revolution. the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must
establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn
the backward villages into advanced. consolidated base
areas, into great military. political, economic and
cultural bastions of the revolution".
While working for the realization of this most
principal question we must also carry out other forms
of struggle; armed struggle will never advance without
being coordinated with other forms of struggle.
  
                                               * * * *
*

The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party
leadership was also reflected in their attitude with
regard to the state, in particular to the state of the
Republic of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.
Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the
task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of
1945 failed, should have been the education of the
Indonesian working class and the rest of the working
people, so as to make them understand as clearly as
possible the class nature of the state of the Republic
of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I.
should have aroused the consciousness of the working
class and the working people that their struggle for
liberation would inevitably lead to the necessity of
"superseding the bourgeois state" by the people's
state under the leadership of the working class.
through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I.
leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to
the illusion among the people about bourgeois
democracy.
The self-criticism says that the climax of the
deviation from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state
committed by the Party leadership was the formulation
of the "theory of the two aspects in the state power
of the Republic of Indonesia".
The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the state
power in the following way: