http://www.feer.com/_0009_21/p20region.html
Issue of September 21, 2000
TIMOR
The Fight in East Timor
By Bertil Lintner/MALIANA, BOBONARO and MEMO, EAST
TIMOR
Issue
cover-dated September 21, 2000
An Australian soldier holds his
finger tightly on the trigger of his automatic rifle, watching
with
his unit for movement in the brush across the stream that
separates East and West Timor. The threat is real. Two UN soldiers, a New
Zealander and a Nepalese, have been killed since late July by
pro-Indonesian East Timorese militiamen who have managed to sneak
across what has become one of the most heavily defended borders
in Southeast Asia.
Lt.-Col. Brynjar Nymo, the Norwegian spokesman for the UN
peacekeeping force in Dili, says that as many as 150 militiamen in
eight to 10 groups, each of five to 30 men, have managed to cross
the 170-kilometre border from West Timor over the past few months.
Maj. David Thomae of the 6 Royal Australian Regiment in Maliana--a
town that was almost completely destroyed in violence last
year--calls these groups "a completely new type of militia.
Last year, they were armed with pipe guns and machetes. Now they
carry automatic rifles and hand grenades."
Few people in the border areas doubt the militias are receiving
support from the Indonesian military and powerful politicians in
Jakarta. Most militia members appear to have had some training in
basic guerrilla warfare.
Local villagers are scared. Maria Soares, a young woman in the
hilltop border town of Bobonaro, says people "don't dare to go
to their fields in the hills, so we are short of food."
Nymo says the numerous refugee camps in West Timor are "the
power base of the militias," and their claim to legitimacy is
based on the population they control there.
Since last week's murders forced the pullout of UN aid workers
from the refugee camps, border security has been tightened, with
more Indonesian troops in West Timor, but the remote hills of East
Timor's western region are no less tense.
East Timor has been divided into three sectors for peacekeeping
purposes: West, with 2,200 men from Australia and New Zealand,
with
smaller contingents from Fiji, Nepal and Ireland; Central, with
1,026 men from Portugal and a company of Kenyan troops; and East,
with 1,636 men from Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea.
The most important sector is, of course, Sector West, nearest the
border: Some peacekeepers complain that because the Portuguese in
Sector Central do very little patrolling, militias are safe once
they have managed to cross Sector West. One 30-man militia group,
the largest known, managed to reach Same in Sector Central.
Maj. Thomae says militia activity near the border has increased
markedly over the past few months. "We patrol the area
constantly," he says, "and our aim is to isolate the
militias in their mountain hide-outs, to restrict their
movements."
The UN wants to prevent the militias from reaching the local
population. It seems to be working. On a recent UN mission on
September 1, Australian troops had surrounded rebels hiding out
on a
mountaintop above Maliana. In order to avoid a raid and
possible casualties, troops dropped leaflets by helicopter, urging the group
to surrender.
The aim of the militias, UN spokesmen say, appears to be to
"wait out the UN," which is supposed to pull out after
next year's elections. The people of East Timor see that as an
invitation to disaster. As Efren de Guzman, a Filipino Jesuit
priest
in Maliana, says: "The UN should not leave. When the
peacekeepers leave, how can the local people defend
themselves?"
East Timor does have its own defence force: the remaining
elements of Falintil, the armed wing of pro-independence group
Fretilin. And Falintil's commanders may have a unique insight into
the tactics of the militiamen. By using the East Timor
mountains as a base for ambushes, the militias are copying Falintil's
guerrilla
tactics during its struggle against the Indonesians.
Domingos Pacheco, a farmer in Bobonaro, says that "we have
no security, and the UN's peacekeeping force doesn't know the
terrain here. They need help from the Falintil to find the
militias'
hide-outs."
But under the UN's present mandate, interaction with Falantil is
limited. Falintil keeps one liaison officer at the UN
peacekeeping-force headquarters in Dili, and three in each of the
three sectors. Local commanders in the field also seem to be in
favour of more active Falintil participation in tracking down the
militias.
Falintil participation is a very delicate issue, especially if Falintil
fighters and UN forces start to work together in the border
area. Indonesia would consider that a provocation, and could
step up
support for the militias. Force spokesman Nymo says the first step
might be to assign Falintil liaison officers at the company level,
not just the sector level.
In fact, the UN presence may have weakened Falantil. When the
first international peacekeeping force, Interfet, arrived in
September last year, it was under instructions to disarm "all
armed factions," including Falintil. After Falintil refused, a
compromise was reached, and the force's remaining 1,500 men
were put in a cantonment in the small town of Aileu in the hills south of
Dili. There they are allowed to retain their guns, but must leave
them in the camp when they travel.
Many Falintil troops have been reposted to their local areas or
given leave to return to their families, according to a recent
study
prepared by the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College,
London.
A year of cantonment has demoralized the group. "Falintil
finds itself marginalized," the King's College report says. The
remarkable discipline the fighters showed last year is gone, and
members of the group have resorted to smuggling, theft and
extortion, according to the report.
It is also difficult today to determine who is Falintil and who
is not. Several influential Falantil commanders have left Aileu,
guns in hand, and taken up residence in the Baucau area in a group
that calls itself the Sagrada Familia, or Sacred Family.
Falantil will need support to establish itself as a proper defence force
when the UN departs. But the UN cannot provide any
training to Falintil, says Nymo. For Falintil to become a proper
force, either the mandate will have to change, or Falintil will
have
to reach bilateral agreements with the defence forces of
individual
countries.
Even if the UN's mandate is not extended, East Timor would need
bilateral defence agreements with countries such as Australia.
Defence analysts in Canberra say Australia has to be prepared
for a
long stay in East Timor.
On September 1, the situation remained tense. UN armoured
personnel carriers moved closer to the mountain above Maliana
where
the militiamen were ensconced, and Black Hawk helicopters
ferried supplies. And nervous residents, watching the operation, begged the
peacekeepers not to leave East Timor.
***********************************************
Check out the now active INDONESIA-POLICY and INDONESIA-DOCS lists
on the Indonesia Publications homepage: http://www.indopubs.com
***********************************************