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Current Issues Brief 17 1999-2000
_________________________________________________________________
Indonesia's Future Prospects: Separatism, Decentralisation and the Survival of
the Unitary State
Grayson Lloyd
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
27 June 2000
_________________________________________________________________
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
A Survey of Current Events in Indonesia
(I) Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and Challenges
Early Challenges to the Unitary State
(II) Decentralisation in Indonesia
(III) Demands for Independence
(a) Papua
(b) Aceh
(IV) Australia, the Region and Indonesia's national unity
Conclusion
Endnotes
[INLINE]
Major Issues
This paper argues that the unitary state of Indonesia, while
experiencing a period of deep political, economic and national
identity crisis at the moment, is unlikely to disintegrate.
Historically the Indonesian nation-state has evolved from colonialist
boundaries and developed in an unorthodox fashion. Yet the territorial
integrity of Indonesia has survived numerous regionalist and
separatist campaigns in the past. For it to do so in the future in
part requires domestic political stability in Indonesia, the effective
implementation of a program of decentralisation to cater to
regionalist concerns and the sensitive handling of the concerns of
genuine independence movements in Aceh and Papua and anywhere else
they may arise.
It is easy, (although perhaps misleading) to believe that the resolve
of Indonesians to stay together as a nation will overcome concerns
about national disintegration or disunity. Indonesia's more than five
decades of statehood have been moulded in part by military force, in
part by political and administrative control (colonialism) from the
centre and partly through the consistent application of
assimilationist policies intended to unify (not always successfully)
social, cultural and ethnic differences. The problems of regional
autonomy and independence movements now threatening Indonesia's
national unity are the legacy of this history. President Abdurrahman
Wahid, under increasing domestic pressure on a number of fronts, is
being forced to walk a fine line on the questions of regional
autonomy/decentralisation. Jakarta must exhibit sufficient control
from the centre to somehow elicit cooperation from the regions.
The post-Soeharto transition towards democracy and civil society in
Indonesia has illustrated the fragility underlining Indonesia's
national slogan of Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). In the
last couple of years calls have increased for Indonesia to adopt a
federalist or decentralised system and to devolve more powers to
regional areas in part to stymie separatist and independence
movements. In April 1999 former President Jusuf Habibie sparked the
decentralisation process with the signing of two important laws
designed to promote regional autonomy and fiscal balance between the
centre and regions. Unlike President Soeharto's heavy-handed approach,
President Wahid has adopted an approach in Papua and Aceh based on
political dialogue designed to achieve a compromise on the basis of
extensive special autonomy. Whether or not this approach succeeds is a
moot point, especially given the changeability of the Wahid mind-set.
The Government seems disinclined to move to the granting of full
independence in either province and it remains uncertain just how far
the independence movements in both are prepared to push the issue
especially given the continued threat of military retaliation.
Introduction
There are a myriad issues causing genuine concern in post-Soeharto
Indonesia although none is more important than the survival of the
unitary state and the potential for national disintegration. At this
time of significant economic and political crisis in Indonesia, the
administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid in fact faces two rising
and parallel challenges.
The first challenge is the requirement to implement an ambitious
decentralisation program designed to deal with demands for regional
autonomy but which is likely to stretch the administrative and
political resources of the Government. The struggle for more economic
and decision making parity between the highly centralised and often
authoritarian Government in Jakarta and the resource laden but
ostensibly disenfranchised and under-financed regions has shadowed
Indonesia's development as a nation.
The second challenge involves coping with demands for independence in
Aceh and Papua, which of all of Indonesia's restive provinces are the
areas with the most obvious and credible independence credentials at
the moment. Despite renewed calls for independence from activists
within both regions the central Government in Jakarta is unlikely to
sanction independence in either province. For varying reasons both
Aceh (where there was recently signed a humanitarian pause between the
Government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)) and
Papua (scene of the recent landmark Papuan People's Congress) are
important test cases for Indonesia's national unity. Given its history
of close association with the Republic, especially during the 1945-9
revolutionary period, many observers in Indonesia fear that the
secession of Aceh would mark the beginning of the decline of the
Indonesian state. However, it does not necessarily follow that
independence by one or both regions would precipitate the domino-like
collapse of the Indonesian nation-state especially given the paucity
of genuine independence (not to be confused with devolutionist)
movements in other provinces. As the East Timor case demonstrated, the
Indonesian nation-state is capable of shrinking without collapsing.
This Paper is divided into four distinct parts. After a brief survey
of recent developments in the reform and political process in
Indonesia, part one addresses the question of the formation of
Indonesia's unitary state and the challenges it has faced particularly
in the first few decades after independence. Part two surveys the
issue of decentralisation in Indonesia and the challenges facing this
process in the future. Part three focuses on the struggle for
independence in Papua and Aceh. Part four reviews the significance of
these issues for Australia and the region.
A Survey of Current Events in Indonesia
In this reformist political period, the Indonesian nation is
struggling to effectively integrate an infant democratic system
presently lacking cohesion. Indeed it is a difficult task for an
administration that has been in place for less than a year to
institute a democratic system after more than thirty years of
authoritarianism. While the economy is showing some signs of
improvement, the ramifications from the Asian financial crisis of
August 1997 are still widely evident and will persist for some time to
come. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed
restructuring and rehabilitation of Indonesia's banking and corporate
sectors is under way but much remains to be done. The scale of
reconstruction required in the judicial system-needed to
institutionalise an equitable justice system and to restore the faith
of foreign investors-is, quite simply, staggering. Both of these
processes-legal reform and corporate and bank restructuring-are
complicated by the uncertainty of the domestic political situation.
The Indonesian military (TNI) is a disillusioned organisation
increasingly sidelined from formal politics.(1) None the less, despite
the broad ranging reform process experienced by the military in the
last few years, it retains a significant potential to influence
political events in Indonesia through its territorial organisation.
The military's territorial units are dispersed throughout the
archipelago essentially partnering organs of civil Government. As such
the TNI is able to rationalise interference in local politics on the
basis of maintaining 'stability'. This is likely to have significant
ramifications for the democratisation process in Indonesia. The
possibility of increased regional autonomy in Indonesia may result in
greater regionalism in the TNI and hence division along ethnic,
religious and regional lines.(2) Further complicating the future
position of the TNI is the ambiguity over its dual function role
(dwifungsi).(3) This has directly contributed to the sense of
political uncertainty and regional instability in Indonesia.
President Abdurrahman Wahid has been under siege recently following
the sometimes controversial and perplexing dismissals of various
ministers and advisers. The President's health and leadership skills
have come under intense parliamentary and public scrutiny-especially
from People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Speaker Amien Rais, and also
from assorted radical Islamic groups. The Government appears to be
foundering amid allegations of corruption and perceived errors of
judgement against the background threat of a coup. Dealing with calls
for regional autonomy/independence and instituting an effective
decentralised system assume an ever more pressing position on the
Government's agenda. To date President Abdurrahman Wahid's response to
the issues of separatism and decentralisation has been cautious. There
is no sense that Jakarta's elite has a blueprint for overcoming
regional pressures-indeed perhaps none exists. However it is crucial
in addressing this issue that sustained economic development and
durable political stability is achieved. The lack of both does not
augur well for future endeavours to resolve regionalist issues or to
lessen the sense of crisis pervasive in Jakarta at the moment.
(I) Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and Challenges
The Republic formed in Indonesia had a rather unsettled beginning.
This was in part a reflection of the arbitrary nature of its
colonially determined boundaries and the ethnic and cultural diversity
of its people. Indonesian nationalism evolved quite rapidly after the
'liberation' of the Netherlands Indies by the allies at the end of the
Second World War. However, the growth of virulent anti-colonialist
(anti-Dutch) nationalism was tempered by the sizeable political and
administrative gulf between Java and Sumatra and the outer islands.(4)
The constitution of the new Republic established on 17 August 1945
made some concession to the autonomy demands of the outer islands by
creating seven provinces, although it moved away from regional
autonomy.(5) The Republic at this point bore little resemblance to
current day Indonesia. Control had been assumed in Java, much of
Sumatra and somewhat less securely in Bali and South Sulawesi,
although the youth movement (pemuda) was challenging the Dutch
elsewhere notably in Sumatra.
There was deep suspicion among Republican leaders of the Federal model
developed by the Dutch in early 1946. The model proposed a federal
system encompassing four states: Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Eastern
Indonesia each with differing degrees of autonomy. Republican leaders
believed the federal idea represented a tactical policy of divide and
rule designed to split the nationalist movement and prey on outer
island suspicions and mistrust of Java.(6) It was viewed as a means of
extending Dutch influence after the transfer of sovereignty to the
Republic-making the federated states puppets of the colonial
regime-and thus, as one observer has noted, ensuring that support for
the unitary state became an article of nationalist faith.(7) It has
been observed elsewhere that such a model did not accord with Javanese
perceptions of the unified nature of authority and power.(8) Full
sovereignty was transferred to the newly created Federal Republic of
Indonesia (Republic Indonesia Serikat, RIS) in December 1949. In less
than a year the federalist model, viewed by Republicans as a necessary
short-term compromise, was replaced by the unitary Republic proclaimed
in August 1945.
Early Challenges to the Unitary State
The anxiety with which many among Indonesia's leadership elite view
the question of threats to the nation's unity is sourced in the
tumultuous nature of the first decade and a half after the Republic's
birth. The distinguished American anthropologist Clifford Geertz has
written:
Archipelagic in geography, eclectic in civilization and
heterogeneousin culture, Indonesia flourishes when it accepts and
capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when it denies and
suppresses it(9)
This statement is as pertinent to the reforming Indonesia of today as
it was to the period of parliamentary democracy and Guided Democracy
in Indonesia during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s.
Furthermore in many respects the Indonesian social and political
system is as vulnerable now as it was during the traumatic events in
1965-66 which brought President Soeharto to power. The collapse of
Soeharto's authoritarian regime on 21 May 1998 produced a vacuum of
political authority in Indonesia. Indonesia is searching for a figure
capable of filling this vacuum and advancing the causes of democracy,
civil society and justice in the present environment clouded by
economic hardship and fragile national unity. In such an environment
calls to be aware (sadar) of threats to the nation's well-being assume
a greater resonance than they did under President Soeharto's
authoritarian regime where they were widely viewed as techniques for
maintaining political control.
The decade and half after independence was characterised by sporadic
regional dissidence, calls for greater local autonomy and what one
observer described as 'centrifugal pulls of an economic system which
the Jakarta Government appeared quite unable to control.'(10) In the
early days of the Republic the authority of the central Government was
challenged by various movements particularly, but not exclusively, in
areas where the power of the Government in Jakarta was incomplete or
non-existent. In the South Moluccas, for instance, resistance to the
central Government was led by pro-federalist elements unhappy with the
dismantling of the Dutch-sponsored federal state in 1950. The
Government eventually managed to overcome this revolt by military
force.
In West Java a Darul Islam insurgency began in 1948 and persisted as a
movement of regional, social and religious discontent which the
Government was largely powerless to stop until the death of the
movement's leader in 1962. In 1953 a serious regional revolt broke out
in Aceh with political, economic and religious origins. In South
Sulawesi a rebellion influenced by Darul Islam and led by Kahar
Muzakkar began in 1951 and continued until 1964. In these last two
cases, the central Government created a considerable degree of
animosity by appointing outsiders to important positions over local
men (anak daerah).(11)
However perhaps the most significant post-revolutionary threat to
Indonesia's unity emerged with the PRRI-Permesta regionalist challenge
in 1957-8 in Sumatra and Sulawesi. These revolts posed a direct
challenge to the power and authority of the central Government. And
while they were easily crushed, the revolts none the less marked the
end of Indonesia's relatively brief flirtation with parliamentary
democracy, thus heralding the re-emergence of the 1945 presidential
constitution and the era of President Sukarno's Guided Democracy
(demokrasi terpimpin). Ostensibly from this point in the late 1950s
the power of the central Government in Indonesia has been all
pervasive, particularly in establishing uniformity in education,
health and numerous other areas extending down to the village level.
With the exception of the Fretilin-led struggle in East Timor,
regional and independence movements in Indonesia struggled throughout
the New Order period to attract domestic understanding or consistent
international support.
The regionalist cause in Indonesian history has generally followed a
well-worn path. Whether conceived religiously, ethnically or on a
broader nationalistic basis it tends to espouse the feeling that the
present system has not justly distributed the resources derived from
the people and argues against the decision making process in the
nation-state as the preserve of a narrowly defined elite. Invariably
regionalist campaigns are also influenced by local power struggles
between religious or political moderates and radicals and by those who
dislike domination by the centre (Java). Separatist movements,
however, are typically more complex than simple regionalist
demonstrations of angst against the centre. They propound the cause of
independence on the basis of long held cultural, social or historical
distinctiveness, and often possess an international element. Such
factors are evident in the cases of Aceh and Papua which have retained
long-term relevance, and have been treated as serious threats to the
long-term stability of the Indonesian nation-state.
Contrary to the argument of numerous media reports predicting
otherwise, East Timor's independence has not been a catalyst for
general state collapse in Indonesia. Fears sponsored by the armed
forces and ultra-nationalists that the loss of East Timor would
trigger the disintegration of the unitary state have so far proved
unfounded. That said, the independence movements in Aceh and Papua
have certainly been rejuvenated by events in East Timor. However East
Timor was a special case. Its people are overwhelmingly Catholic, it
was never a part of the Dutch East Indies (the precursor to the
Indonesian Republic), and moreover the United Nations did not
recognise the territory's absorption into Indonesia. In nationalistic
terms Indonesia is thus no less Indonesian after the loss of East
Timor-indeed it may be more so.(12)
In other areas, such as oil-rich East Kalimantan and the similarly oil
abundant Riau in Central Sumatra, the problems centre on regional
autonomy and the ever-present regional demand for a larger return on
oil or other revenues from the central Government. In Maluku
(especially Ambon and Halmahera), and West Kalimantan the central
Government is faced with provinces afflicted by widespread
inter-communal violence and disorder. These are neither separatist nor
independence campaigns, however they do represent a continuing
challenge to the maintenance of national unity.
Indonesia has not yet reached the point where it can take its national
unity for granted. In reality it is unlikely to arrive at such a
point, but it does not follow that Indonesia will fracture and
collapse. There are at least two significant reasons why this is
unlikely to happen. The first is that no political, economic or other
agenda in Indonesia would be served by disintegration.(13) The second
is that many if not most Indonesians recognise that the economic and
social justice benefits achieved by remaining united-challenging
though this is in the present climate-outweigh the potential
consequences of disintegration.(14) But the resolve of Indonesians to
stay together as a nation is not in itself sufficient. This resolve
will need to be accompanied by sensitive Government policies and a
genuine desire to overcome real and widespread problems.
The Indonesian nation was constructed in an arbitrary manner and given
the very considerable heterogeneity of its ethnic groups and cultures,
and the spread of the people across an elongated archipelago, it is
surprising that Indonesia has remained 'unified' for as long as it
has. During the authoritarian New Order (1966-98) period this unity
was enforced from above. The New Order's veto on discussion of racial,
ethnic and religious issues (so-termed 'SARA' issues) combined with
pervasive administrative control from the centre together maintained
the veneer of national unity.(15) Observers of the Indonesian
situation find themselves caught between warning of the fragility of
the nation's territorial integrity and celebrating the staggering
nation-building achievement that has taken place. President Sukarno's
mantra was nation building-a vision he pursued with much gusto.
President Soeharto was described as the one who could fulfil the
nation's potential; in a way giving substance to Sukarno's vision.
However, the results on this front were mixed. The challenge for
Abdurrahman Wahid is to maintain Indonesia's status as a unified
state.
(II) Decentralisation in Indonesia
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. Its people
are dispersed over an elongated archipelago consisting of thousands of
islands. These factors, together with the archipelago's tremendous
ethnic and cultural diversity, mean that Indonesia requires an
effective system of local governance. Along with its neighbour
Malaysia, Indonesia appears to meet the criteria for a federal
structure. However for reasons outlined earlier, Indonesia's
experience of such a system has left a lasting distaste.(16) In April
1999 the administration of President Habibie signed two very important
laws to promote regional autonomy. The first was Law 22/1999 on
regional Government, and the second, Law 25/99 on balancing finances
between the central and regional Governments. Before examining the
nature and likely ramifications of these laws a little background is
required.
In 1903 the Dutch Government introduced a form of decentralisation in
Indonesia to increase the efficiency of Government administration.(17)
Nearly two decades later district level Governments were established
to create more representative administrations. However the concept of
decentralisation has experienced a rather vexed history in Indonesia.
Debate on the issue has been inconsistent and vague despite broad
agreement on the need for regional autonomy in a country the size of
Indonesia. During the Sukarno era, from the late 1950s until the
mid-1960s, instead of promoting democratic Government decentralisation
became a mechanism promoting political stability.
It was only with Law 5/1974, set forth nearly three decades after the
proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, that Indonesia
developed a more concerted approach to decentralisation. However
implementation of this law under the Soeharto administration might be
conservatively described as gradual. This law established the legal
basis for the current system of regional/local Government and
emphasised the mobilisation of the regions in the effort of national
development.(18) The law embodied three principles for the
distribution of Governmental functions: (i) decentralisation of
responsibilities to 'autonomous' provincial and local Governments
(i.e. kotamadya and kabupaten level); (ii) de-concentration of
activities to regional offices of central ministries at the provincial
and local level; (iii) co-administration whereby provincial and local
Governments carry out activities on behalf of the central Government.
The essence of the law was designed to rein in local autonomy by
emphasising obligations to the central Government over regional
rights.(19) The law governed both the administrative structure of the
central Government and the gradual spread of regional autonomy without
intending to provide every province with autonomous Governments.
Regional autonomy was an almost incidental detail. Law 5 was
ostensibly intended to promote national stability through the
promotion of an authoritarian structure extending from Jakarta to
village level Indonesia.
Law No. 5 was not designed to govern central-local financial
relationships for which purpose a follow up law was intended. Debate
on this issue has been complicated by a lack of consensus within the
Government on the form of decentralisation to be pursued and by the
issue of the distribution of national resources between regions.(20)
This has been a sensitive issue given the central Government's
dependence on resources from certain outer islands and the subsequent
spending of these revenues in more densely populated and less well
endowed regions such as Java.(21) The issue of regional autonomy
triggered a debate between supporters of the existing unitary system
(notably the Megawati Soekarnoputri headed Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle, PDI-P) and those advocating an examination of a
federalist alternative (especially the leader of the National Mandate
Party, PAN, Dr Amien Rais).
In this context the legislation introduced by the Habibie
administration in April 1999 proposed a radical model of extending
broad regional autonomy within the existing unitary constitution. The
two basic levels of governance under Law 22/99 on regional Government
are the central Government headed by President Abdurrahman Wahid and
the autonomous local Governments of Kabupaten (districts) and
Kotamadya (cities).(22) The implication of Law 22 is that there is a
division of powers and responsibilities between these levels of
Government that is not strictly hierarchical.(23) Reinforcing this
position, and contrary to the manipulated elections of the Soeharto
period, it provides for the (supposedly free) election of provincial
governors and district heads.
The powers under Law 22 decentralised authority over all fields except
foreign affairs, defence, security, justice, monetary and fiscal
policy, religion and certain economic policy areas.(24) Interestingly
the powers under the law are devolved to the 300 or so districts
throughout Indonesia and not to the 26 provinces.(25) Provincial
Governments will handle central Government affairs in the regions and
any tasks not able to be dealt with by the district administrations
because of lack of appropriately trained personnel. Doubt has already
been raised by some ministers in the central Government over the state
of readiness at the district level to undertake activities many
ministers see as better carried out by the central organisation in the
name of a 'national' policy.(26)
Law 25/99 on balancing finances between the central and regional
Governments is the corollary of Law 22. Basically, if properly
implemented, it will allow regional Governments to secure a
considerable portion of the revenues produced in their regions. Under
the new law the regions would be permitted to retain 80 per cent of
revenues from forestry, fisheries and general mining, 15 per cent from
oil and 30 per cent from natural gas.(27) Also within the scope of the
law is a re-allocation of 25 per cent of the central Government's
budget to the regions based on needs and economic potential. Although
intended as a means of placating the resource-rich regions (East
Kalimantan and Riau for instance) which have been consistently milked
for huge profits by Jakarta with little local benefit, it is easily
imaginable how this policy will result in a decrease in funds flowing
to resource-poor regions.(28)
The problem with both laws is that they have yet to be implemented and
this exacerbates their ambiguity and lack of clarity and certainty.
Full implementation of regional autonomy is expected to occur in 2001.
A number of potential problems will need to be addressed in the
interim. Perhaps the most obvious is the capability of district
Governments-in skill and personnel terms-to cope with the full range
of powers conveyed to them under the new laws. Concerns also arise
over the potential for powerful foreign or domestic interests to exert
economic pressure on individual district Governments on matters
relating to mining or forestry contracts and negotiations. Even more
fundamental is the likelihood of jurisdictional disputes arising
between local and central Government officials. Examination will now
focus on the second part of Indonesia's parallel crisis-independence
movements in Papua and Aceh.
(III) Demands for Independence
(a) Papua
At the Hague Round Table conference in August 1949 the status of West
New Guinea (or Irian Jaya as it came to be known under Indonesian
control) was not included in discussions leading to the transfer of
sovereignty from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia. Dispute over
the exercise of sovereignty in the territory continued well into the
1960s. As tensions increased between Indonesia and the Netherlands in
the early 1960s, culminating in a brief military engagement in 1962,
the international climate moved against the Netherlands. Australia,
which until late 1962 had been supportive of Dutch policy on the
issue, now followed the lead of the United States and urged the Dutch
to form an agreement with Indonesia regarding the future of West New
Guinea. An agreement was signed in New York in 1962 under which West
New Guinea was placed under UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)
awaiting an 'act of self-determination in accordance with
international practice.'(29) (See forthcoming Current Issues Brief,
'Is West Papua Another East Timor?' by Dr. J. R.Verrier).
In 1969 the so-termed 'Act of Free Choice' took place designed to
determine the future status of West New Guinea. Predictably the 1025
delegates from West New Guinea selected by the Indonesian Government
decided in the popular consultation to join the Republic of Indonesia.
Since the transfer of the territory of Papua (as it is now referred to
by the Indonesian Government) to effective Indonesian control in May
1963 armed Papuan rebels have conducted military-style operations
against the Indonesian Government. In the early 1960s those opposed to
Indonesian rule in Papua formed the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi
Papua Merdeka, OPM). In 1971 the OPM announced the formation of a
Provisional Republic of West Papua New Guinea, and proclaimed
independence for the territory. Over the last three decades the OPM
have conducted a dual policy of an intermittent guerrilla campaign and
an international propaganda effort. While portrayed as a rag-tag bunch
of terrorists by the Indonesian Government, the OPM has none the less
managed to be a continuing source of irritation to the Indonesian
Government despite its disorganisation and frequent leadership
changes.
Unlike the campaign waged by the East Timorese, the OPM has never
managed to attract international diplomatic support for its struggle.
Private views aside, no Government has publicly disputed Indonesia's
sovereignty in Papua.(30) The nature of the armed struggle in Papua is
considerably different from Indonesia's past experiences with armed
separatism such as the Darul Islam movement and the PRRI Permesta
Revolt and indeed from the successful independence campaign waged by
Fretilin in East Timor. While in the past there has been a tendency to
dismiss the struggle in Papua as merely a problem of national
integration, such is clearly not the case now. The fall of President
Soeharto marked an increase in demands for independence in Papua.
Papua is a resource, particularly mineral, rich territory. It
contributes far more to the national budget than it receives in
return, which is a source of considerable angst given the widespread
poverty in the province. Its natural wealth has also been a major
attraction to foreign companies such as the Freeport-McMoran mining
company. Tom Beanal, a leader in the Amungme tribe and Vice-Chairman
of the newly formed Papuan presidium, has tried in vain to sue
Freeport for billions of dollars in compensation.(31) Of the nearly
two million people who inhabit Papua, between 750 000-850 000 were
born outside the territory.(32) In Jayapura (recently renamed Port
Numbay) 80 per cent of the population are non-indigenous people.(33)
The development of a Papua-wide identity is a relatively recent
phenomenon notwithstanding the cultural and historical distinctiveness
of the Papuan position in the Indonesian state. Awareness of this
identity has been heightened by transmigration schemes operated by the
central Government which dramatically altered the ratio of
non-indigenous inhabitants in Papua and further increased the numbers
of non-Papuans in the civil service. Papuan identity was further
accentuated, and separatist sympathies heightened, by the brutality of
the operations of the Indonesian military in the territory.
From the late 1990s leadership of the independence struggle
transferred from guerrilla fighters to prominent figures in Jayapura
and elsewhere who viewed the change in leadership in Jakarta as
offering new prospects.(34) A delegation of 100 Papuan leaders met
with President Habibie in February 1999 where they openly demanded
independence-a remarkable indication of the changed times. Numerous
independence-related flag-raising ceremonies were conducted throughout
Papua in the second half of 1999. The Abdurrahman Wahid administration
has pursued a similar dialogue-based approach maintaining lines of
communication with the Papuan nationalists. There appears little
doubt, however, that if offered independence the overwhelming majority
of Papuans would support such a proposal.
As the People's Congress of Papua which opened in Jayapura on 29 May
2000 indicated, Indonesia's new laws on regional autonomy and
financing will be inadequate to overcome the deep anti-Indonesian
feeling in Papua. Abdurrahman Wahid's 'act of good faith' to change
the name of the province to Papua in a ceremony on 1 January 2000, was
misinterpreted by many Papuans as an indication of his preparedness to
move further on the issue. Abdurrahman Wahid was initially supportive
of the Congress, provided it with funding and had intended to attend.
His attitude toward the OPM has been quite progressive given the
history of relations between the organisation and the Indonesian
Government. He has been sensitive to details such as the flying of the
OPM flag (provided it was not flown higher than the Indonesian flag)
and has encouraged the expression of views. However, in defiance of
warnings from Jakarta, the People's Congress ended with a declaration
stating that the Papuan people reject the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and
demand the United Nations revoke UN resolution No. 2504 of 19 December
1969. In essence Papua was declared to be no longer a part of the
Republic of Indonesia and a quasi-legislative institution-a
reformulated Papuan presidium-was formed. As the Secretary-General of
the Congress, Thaha Alhamid, noted, ' West Papua has been an
independent nation since 1 December, 1961.' (35) This is the date on
which the territory was granted independence from the Netherlands.
The Indonesian President was clear in his response to this
declaration, noting that a state within a state was not an option and
independence would not be countenanced. The Indonesian Government was
particularly concerned about the appeals made at the congress to
international powers (the Netherlands, the United States and the
United Nations) to reassess their recognition of Indonesian rule in
Papua.(36) In an apparent bid to appease calls for independence in
Papua the Indonesian Government agreed to set up a body to investigate
human rights violations.(37)
However this offer was quickly followed by the likelihood that
Indonesia would send armed police reinforcements to Papua in the wake
of the declaration by the People's Congress. What is most needed in
Papua at the moment is for the central Government to prudently assess
how best it can accommodate the aspirations of the Papuan people.
Blanket rejection of independence by the central Government, or
excessive military involvement, will likely exacerbate problems of
national disunity. One problem for the central Government, however, is
that it cannot be certain of the intentions of the Indonesian
military. There are suspicions in some quarters that the current
escalation of events in Papua is not entirely related to Papuan
demands for independence but rather a part of a campaign to
de-stabilise the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid. Those pushing
for independence in Papua face a difficult struggle. While
approximately 60 per cent of the population is Protestant, the
campaign for unity and sovereignty is complicated by the diversity of
the population speaking hundreds of different languages and dispersed
over mountainous terrain.(38) None the less the Indonesian Government
is right to be concerned about events in Papua. Indonesia's Minister
for Regional Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, believes Papua is a more serious
independence threat than Aceh because of the Christian basis in the
province which, he believes, is more likely to garner Western sympathy
than Islamic Aceh.(39) This is particularly the case given the
lingering resentment in Papua of the events surrounding the 'Act of
Free Choice' in 1969.
(b) Aceh
Aceh is a province containing some four million people and vast
resources of oil and natural gas. Indonesia is the world's leading
exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and forty per cent of the
country's LNG comes from Aceh's northern coast.(40) For decades the
Acehnese have seen a much greater proportion of their resources
siphoned to the central Government than have been remitted back to the
province.
In Aceh armed resistance opposed rule from Jakarta as early as 1953
only to fade and re-emerge in the late 1970s. The fact that Acehnese
supporters of the Darul Islam movement in 1953 proclaimed the Islamic
State of Indonesia in Aceh (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) is not
particularly surprising. Aceh has enjoyed a long history of Islamic
identity, a trade based economy and resistance to colonial intrusion.
After a thirty year war the Sultan of Aceh eventually surrendered to
the Dutch in 1903 who established a civilian administration in the
region allowing the Acehnese a good deal of autonomy. Aceh was the
only major region to remain almost entirely free of Dutch control
during the 1945-9 independence struggle in Indonesia.(41) Many
Acehnese felt that their role during the national revolution and their
historical separateness would be recognised in the formation of an
Indonesian state. Aceh confirmed its 'nationalist' credentials by
refusing to participate in a Dutch-sponsored conference to establish a
state of Sumatra. In early 1949 the central Government appointed
military governor of Aceh, Tengku M. Daud Beureueh, noted in response
to the proposal for Aceh to become self-governing in a Dutch sponsored
federal system: '... we have no intention of establishing a Great Aceh
state as we are Republican spirited... The Acehnese people are
convinced that separate independence, region by region, state by
state, can never lead to enduring independence.'(42)
The Acehnese were none the less united behind the creation of an
Islamic state. This perspective was at odds with the national trend in
Indonesia which was against the creation of an Islamic state for the
nation as a whole. Relations between Aceh and the central Republican
Government deteriorated when the latter moved to dissolve the province
of Aceh and incorporate Aceh in a larger province of North Sumatra.
With this policy in place by the early 1950s, the Acehnese felt their
autonomy and identity threatened by the appointment of many Javanese
and non-Acehnese to senior positions in the new province. The TNI
units in Aceh were replaced by non-Acehnese units. Many Acehnese
resisted the changes, but the situation was complicated by the lack of
unity within the Acehnese community stemming from the divisive social
revolution in Aceh in 1946-7.(43)
A considerable transformation took place in Aceh between 1950 and the
establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia in 1953. This involved a
central Government crackdown on dissent and a de-Islamisation
campaign. The remainder of the decade was a turbulent period. Leaders
of the Aceh rebellion had no intention of separating the region from
Indonesia but envisaged it as an autonomous province. In 1955 the
State of Aceh (Negara Bahagian Aceh, NBA) was announced and an
Acehnese Government was established under the authority of Tengku M.
Daud Beureueh. Negotiations between the NBA and the Indonesian
Government continued until 1957 with Tengku M. Daud Beureueh calling
for a separate state. In April of that year a cease-fire was agreed
including a package promising a separate province and promotion of
Islam. The rebellion in fact persisted and fluctuated in intensity for
the next four years until August 1961. Despite occasional expressions
of dissatisfaction over the status of the province Aceh remained
relatively trouble free until the launching of the Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and the proclamation of the independent
state of Aceh in 1976. This decision by GAM's leader, Tengku Hasan M.
di Tiro, was based on several factors at least. The first was a
realisation that a federalist structure was not going to solve Aceh's
problems. The second was dissatisfaction with the New Order
Government's lack of commitment to development in the territory and
its emphasis on policies of assimilation.
The activities of GAM continued on an episodic basis throughout the
1980s. In truth GAM is now a small group whose main architect, Tengku
Hasan M. di Tiro, lives in self-imposed exile in Sweden. The campaign
for independence is now increasingly led by student groups. None the
less in response the Indonesian military initiated a severe
counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh in the late 1980s. In fact between
1989 and 1998 Aceh was placed under military rule, during which period
special army units engaged in the routine torture and murder of
suspected members of the Free Aceh movement.(44) Since the start of
the 1990s the Acehnese had come to feel increasingly threatened by the
migration of Indonesians from other provinces attracted by economic
opportunities in Aceh.(45) The fall of the Soeharto regime raised the
possibility of change and as a consequence military atrocities were
widely publicised and head of the Indonesian armed forces, General
Wiranto, apologised to the Acehnese for abuses committed by his
troops. President Habibie promised an investigation into human rights
abuses, and many Acehnese held out hope for a change in their
fortunes.
Habibie's focus wavered, however, as preoccupation with the power
struggle in Jakarta left little time for attention on Aceh. And
despite the public apology, military abuses and a terror campaign
continued unabated in Aceh. The terror campaign conducted by the
Indonesian military in Aceh far from crushing dissent, in fact
broadened the wide cross-section of resentment in the territory
against Indonesian rule. In other words, many students and people who
would otherwise not have associated themselves with GAM reacted in
unity against the brutality of Indonesian rule in Aceh via the forum
of GAM. The commission appointed by President Habibie in mid-1999 to
inquire into human rights abuses in Aceh eventually brought a number
of cases to trial in April-May 2000. However, the long delay in
arranging a trial and the absence of high-ranking culprits meant that
the process lacked credibility.
Large scale strikes and demonstrations were held throughout the
province in support of a referendum on independence. A particularly
large demonstration occurred supporting this goal in Banda Aceh on 13
November 1999. Aceh's historical distinctiveness, revolutionary
history and 'national' struggle, comparatively high ethnic homogeneity
(relative to other areas in Indonesia) and strong Islamic underpinning
elicited considerable support for its cause among many Indonesians. It
is doubtful, however, if this positive feeling extended to support for
Aceh's independence. While sympathetic to the cause, Abdurrahman Wahid
prevaricated on the question of independence which did not endear him
to many Achenese.
In a rather desperate attempt to keep Aceh within the fold the
Government compromised and offered to hold a referendum on the
implementation of Islamic law-a move which fell well short of Acehnese
demands. The Government's negotiations with the Acehnese (which
included intervention by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad) has been complicated by the diverse strains of political
opinion within the province. The Government has focused attention in
this respect on the Islamic religious leaders (ulama) in an attempt to
reduce the efficacy of the students, GAM and other pro-independence
forces.(46) In May 2000 an agreement was reached for a 'Humanitarian
pause' in hostilities in Aceh. (47)
This agreement may lead to more talks and perhaps the realisation on
the part of the Indonesian military that the Aceh issue will not be
resolved militarily. Yet herein lies the paradox for Aceh and
Indonesia. While ever there is a prospect for Acehnese independence
Indonesia's national integrity remains under threat and the military
(or the police who now have responsibility for internal security) will
be involved. However to conceive of Aceh as an independent democratic
state within the Indonesian nation, a distant but not implausible
possibility, the central Government in Indonesia must lessen its
emphasis on national unity enforced by the military.(48) While Aceh
has a number of legitimate grievances, the future of the territory
will be determined in significant part by the attitude in Jakarta and
need not involve independence. An autonomous Aceh, for instance within
a broader federalist state, may preserve Aceh's sense of place.
(IV) Australia, the Region and Indonesia's national unity
Fears of the break up of Indonesia, partly validated by the
independence campaigns in Aceh and Papua, an uncertain
decentralisation process, a central Government lurching from one
crisis to another and the increased frequency of outbreaks of
inter-communal violence heighten concerns among Indonesia's
neighbours. The absolute priority for ASEAN leaders and for the
Australian Government (and the United States for that matter) is the
stability of the Indonesian nation-state. The security and stability
of the Southeast Asian region is contingent upon the survival of the
unitary state of Indonesia even if this assumes a slightly different
form in the future. While it needs to be considered, the alternative
is a confronting possibility. The emergence of an independent Islamic
Republic of Aceh, for instance, and its potential impact on Islamic
insurgency in the southern Philippines and Thailand would be of
obvious concern. Potentially huge scale refugee flows to Malaysia,
Singapore, Australia and other areas in the wake of the fracturing of
Indonesia would be extremely worrying.
However for Australia, lingering ill-feeling within the Indonesian
elite over the East Timor episode means that many suspicions have to
be overcome to convince Indonesia of the genuineness of Australia's
support for Indonesian national unity. The situation in Papua looms as
another important test case for relations between Australia and
Indonesia. A number of individuals within the elite in Jakarta believe
that Australia is fomenting the independence movement in Papua.(49)
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has explicitly refuted
such allegations saying on 30 May, 'Australia has always [supported]
and continues to support and to recognise the integration of West
Papua within the Republic of Indonesia'.(50) Prime Minister Howard
asserted that Australia 'fully and unequivocally supports the
sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia'.(51) On this point Australia's
foreign policy appears to have bipartisan support as opposition leader
Kim Beazley noted in a speech in Jakarta on 2 May, 'Australia respects
Indonesia's territorial integrity and is aware of the difficulties of
maintaining stability in such a diverse and widespread grouping of
islands.'(52) It is conceivable Australia will face future challenges
to this position, particularly if border disputes intensify between
Indonesia and PNG. For the moment, Australia can do little but
reinforce its support for Indonesia and hope that the
decentralisation/regional autonomy process in Indonesia proceeds
relatively smoothly.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Indonesia is in a chronic state of crisis.
However, the Indonesian nation-state is unlikely to disintegrate at
the moment. This situation could change in the future if the authority
of the Abdurrahman regime wanes, if the decentralisation laws fail
when implemented and if Aceh and Papua succeed in their bids to
achieve independence. In the interim the outbreaks of inter-communal
violence in Maluku province (especially Ambon and Halmahera) and West
Kalimantan and in other areas exacerbate the sense of crisis. The
nature of Indonesia's national unity is unusual because the basis for
this unity has rested at least as much upon geographical propinquity,
historical accident and cultural and ethnic homogeneity imposed from
above as it has on a sense of national togetherness. The Indonesian
nation-state was the product of a colonial regime and has henceforth
evolved in piecemeal fashion. There is a fundamental need for
sensitive Governmental policy making in order to preserve national
unity in Indonesia. There is a reasonable prospect that given creative
policy initiatives on this issue, and other factors notwithstanding,
Indonesia can maintain its national integrity even if in a slightly
altered form.
Endnotes
1. In an official seminar in September 1998 a so-termed 'new
paradigm' was adopted by the military foreshadowing a dramatic
reduction (but not abandonment) of its political role.
2. Greg Sheridan, 'Neighbours' Priority is a Stable Archipelago', The
Australian, 11 September 1999.
3. Following a seminar in 1965 the Indonesian army produced the
doctrine of the Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) of the armed forces
endorsing their dual role as a military and social-political
force.
4. In 1938 the Dutch administration sought to decentralise their
administration by creating three autonomous regional Governments
in Sumatra, Borneo and the 'Great East'. During the interim allied
administration, and indeed the Japanese occupation prior to this,
the outer islands were governed separately from Java and Sumatra.
5. These were East, West and Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, Maluku (including West New Guinea) and Sunda Kecil. See
Ron May, 'Ethnic Separatism In Southeast Asia', Pacific Viewpoint,
vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 29.
6. J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia:
A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, 1961, p. 8.
7. ibid.
8. B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture' in C.
Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia Cornell University
Press, Ithaca 1972, p. 23.
9. Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution' in Old Societies and
New States, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1963.
10. J. A. C. Mackie, 'Integrating and Centrifugal Factors in
Indonesian Politics Since 1945', in J. A. C. Mackie ed.,
Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, Canberra: Research School of
Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980.
11. ibid., Mackie, p. 672. As Mackie notes, in the eyes of those in
the central Government revolutionary records did not compare with
educational attainment or bureaucratic seniority.
12. A similar argument is proffered in Donald Emmerson, 'Will
Indonesia Survive?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, May-June
2000.
13. Robert Cribb, 'Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the
Disintegration of Indonesia', Australian Journal of International
Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, p. 175.
14. ibid., p. 177. Cribb further argues that the impact of
globalisation and the trend toward small state development in
international relations are unlikely to make much of an impact in
Indonesia.
15. SARA refers to Suku, Agama, Ras and Antar-golongan-basically
ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations public
discussion of any of which was taboo during the New Order.
16. Nick Devas, 'Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralization?',
Public Administration and Development, vol. 17, 1997, p. 354.
17. Terence H. Hull, 'Striking a Most Delicate Balance: The
Implications of Otonomi Daerah for the Planning and Implementation
of Development Cooperation Projects', Final Report of the AusAID
funded ANU-LIPI project on Population Related Research for
Development Planning and Development Assistance, 3 December 1999,
p. 2.
18. ibid., p. 2.
19. M. Morfitt, 'Strengthening the Capacities of Local Government:
Policies and Constraints', in C. MacAndrews, ed., Central
Government and Local Development in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 59.
20. Devas, op. cit., p. 355.
21. Booth, ed., Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and
Performance in the Soeharto Era, Oxford University Press,
Singapore 1992.
22. Law 22 was the initiative of the Minister for Regional Autonomy,
Ryaas Rasyid, when he was Director General of the Department of
Internal Affairs.
23. Hull. op. cit., p. 3.
24. The decentralisation is embodied in Article 7, (1) of Law 22. The
economic policy areas include macro-development planning, state
economic institutions, development of human and natural resources
and high technology.
25. Indonesia now has twenty-six provinces with the loss of East
Timor.
26. See the statement by the Indonesian Minister for National
Education quoting research from Gajah Mada university concluding
that only 5 out of 300 Kabupaten were prepared for the new
autonomy status (Jakarta Post, 2 November 1999).
27. International Crisis Group Report, 'Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic
But Not Acute', 31 May 2000.
28. It is estimated that application of the fiscal law will
dramatically alter provincial economic relations and induce
bankruptcies among the less well financially endowed regions.
International Crisis Group Report, p. 19.
29. R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific
Viewpoint, vol.31, no. 2, 1990, p. 40.
30. ibid., p. 43.
31. Theys Eluay is Chairman of the presidium. Before the formula for
revenue sharing was fixed, Papua had demanded a share of the
overall revenue range of between 75-80 per cent. This roughly
approximates the figure the regions will be allowed to keep of
forestry, fishery and mining resources under proposed Law 25.
32. Louise Williams, 'Strangers In Their Own Land', The Age, 10 July,
1998.
33. ibid.
34. International Crisis Group Report, op. cit., p.21.
35. 'West Papuans Declare Independence from Indonesia', The Jakarta
Post, 5 June 2000. Papua is the name now used by the central
Indonesian Government to refer to the area previously referred to
by the Indonesian Government as Irian Jaya. Some Papuans refer to
the territory as West Papua.
36. Lindsay Murdoch, 'Military Threat to Curb Self Rule Move', Sydney
Morning Herald, 6 June 2000.
37. 'Indonesia Promises Probe into Rights in Irian Jaya', The Sunday
Canberra Times, 11 June 2000.
38. Donald K. Emmerson, 'Will Indonesia Survive?', Foreign Affairs,
vol. 79, no. 3, May-June 2000, p. 101.
39. ibid., p. 105.
40. ibid., p. 98
41. R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific
Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 35.
42. Semangat Merdeka, 23 March 1949, quoted in Dua Windhu
Kodam-I/Iskandar Muda, p. 154.
43. Aceh's domestic political situation at this time was complicated
by a struggle between Islamic conservatives and reformists. In
early 1946 extremist members of the All-Aceh Religious Scholars'
Association, (PUSA) purged elements of the traditional aristocracy
in Aceh.
44. International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.
45. International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.
46. Ed. Aspinall, 'Whither Aceh?', Inside Indonesia, no. 62,
April-June 2000.
47. This agreement was intended as a symbolic recognition by the
Indonesian Government of Tengku M. Hasan di Tiro's position,
although it is understood implicitly by the Indonesian Government
that he no longer has effective control over events in Aceh.
48. Anthony Reid has argued that Indonesia can survive Aceh becoming a
state if it does not remain hostage to its military. See Anthony
Reid, 'Which Way Aceh?', Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March
2000, p. 36.
49. Peter Hartcher, 'West Papua Shaping as Howard's Next East Timor',
Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2000. The argument is taken
to extraordinary lengths by some who feel that Australia wishes to
see the fracturing of the archipelago as a way of limiting
Jakarta's future power in Southeast Asia.
50. Robert Garran, 'W Papuans to Stay Put: Canberra', The Australian,
31 May 2000.
51. ibid.
52. Kim Beazley, 'Australia and Indonesia: Neighbours in Geography,
Neighbours in Democracy' Address to the Australia-Indonesia
Business Council, Jakarta, 2 May 2000, p. 8.
[LINK]
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