From _Scorched Earth Operation" to _Humanitarian Operation_
(A note on the conduct of international NGOs and UN institutions in
post-referendum Timor Lorosa_e)
"Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink beer, discotheque, how
can humanitarian workers want to stay here_, an indigenous leader said
when he was asked for his comments about the lack of health services by
international NGOs and UN institutions in sub-district Alas, Same.
"Do you have an identity card? Does your institution have any experience
in distributing food materials in this area?_ This was the question asked
by WFP (World Food Program) staff when a local/national NGO which has
operated for a long time in Timor Loro sa_e saw him in his office to
arrange coordination for distributing food in Baucau, Timor Lorosa_e.
I. Introduction
The Scorched Earth operation in Timor Lorosa_e by the pro-integration
militia and Indonesian military caused extraordinary damage. Lives and
property were lost as a result of that operation. From the international
political perspective, it can be said tha t the UN representative office
in the area at that time was slow in taking action. As a result of the
_ignorance politics_ of the international community (UNAMET and UN in
particular), the militia and the Indonesian military freely launched their
operatio n after the announcement of the result of the ballot on September
4, 1999. After becoming the victim of this scorched-earth operation, now
Timor Lorosa_e faces a new operation, i.e. _humanitarian operation_.
The destruction of Timor Lorosa_e after the referendum has created new
problems. Even though it has to be admitted that Timor Lorosa_e was able
to drive away Indonesian military, it appears that the destruction was
meant to open a road for several groups to launch another _operation_ in
Timor Lorosa_e. Under the facade of humanitarian aid, various
international NGOs as well as intergovernmental institutions are competing
to carry out their programs in this burned-down country.
The flood of humanitarian aid through different NGOs and intergovernmental
agencies in Timor Lorosa_e does not necessarily end the chain of misery of
the East Timorese. On the contrary, it appears like it will become a new
chain which will tie the East Ti morese to external dependence in
perpetuity.
The number of international NGO operating in Timor Lorosa_e has reached
about thirty. There are also a number of intergovernmental agencies, such
as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, and WFP. While the local NGOs are only
about 20. These humanitarian organizati ons have come with all sorts of
programs, like food distribution, health service, shelter, refugee
service, distribution of seeds and many others.
It is interesting to examine how these international organizations have
coped with the crisis in Timor Lorosa_e. Before we discuss the various
problems faced by the NGOs and intergovernmental agencies in carrying out
the humanitarian operation, we will fi rst discuss the politics of
humanitarian aid.
II. Politics of Humanitarian Aid
History notes that there has been enormous amount of humanitarian aid
given to African countries. Whenever there is an upheaval, as a result of
internal or external politics, various groups, international NGOs and UN
agencies, each with its own method, en tered the conflict under the name
of humanitarian aid. Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and many other
countries in that continent have become a frequent recipients of a
_humanitarian operation._ Despite the abundance of aid, the mortality rate
in the region due to starvation and disease has not decreased; it has
actually increased.
We can identify several specific problems that arise when humanitarian aid
is distributed through international NGOs as well as through UN agencies.
The source of the problems are as follows :
First, the problem of transparency in financial matters. In executing
their programs, most international NGOs make use of funds supposedly given
to the government of the country suffering from the catastrophe. For
instance, in 1989 Mozambique suffered fro m serious conflict which led to
starvation. International NGOs and UN agencies began to enter the conflict
area and address the problem. Apparently, the largest single source of
funding for this operation was taken from the aid/grant given to the
governme nt of Mozambique.
Second, the problem of dependence. Bangladesh is an excellent case study
of the effects of humanitarian operations organized by international NGOs
and UN agencies on the country_s self-sufficiency. For some time, the
society was flooded by humanitarian re lief so that when the aid stopped,
the society was shocked and was not ready for self-sufficiency. Besides,
such an operation often times marginalizes people in the remote areas due
to the ineffective mechanism of distribution. The aid, on the contrary, e
nriches certain groups of people in either urban or suburban areas, and
make the poor become dependent on the nouveau riche.
Third, problem of lack of coordination. Many international NGOs and UN
agencies conduct their operation in different places with a minimal
coordination with local organizations. As a result, local/national NGOs or
other potential groups within the society become _second class_ people.
Even worse, in order to carry out their programs, the local NGOs have to
beg from the international NGOs or UN agencies to get their share of the
aid granted to the local government for handling the catastrophe in their
own country. At this point it seems like the governments which pledge
their support or international donor agencies are more interested in
contracting the humanitarian work to international NGOs, especially those
which have special connection with the UN as w ell as various UN agencies
themselves. Thus, the aid or grant promised to the local government in
turn is mostly spent by institutions outside the country which suffers the
catastrophe. It is often the case that the donor coun! ! try even looks
to the international NGO itself to carry out the humanitarian operation
and design the blueprint of the program. Therefore, international NGOs and
UN agencies involved in humanitarian relief works are often defined as
Private Voluntary Orga nization (PVO). As Joseph Hanlon observes in
Mozambique, many international NGOs, such as World Vision or Care
International, act more like big enterprises or transnational corporations
that have branches in different countries. As such, the interest of t hese
NGOs are disbursal of money, distribution of food, and emergency aid. For
the overhead cost of the institutions, they can either receive interest
from the aid/grant aside from their own fundraising effort. Without
consulting local/national NGOs, thes e multinational institutions design
and attempt to launch colossal projects, but these might not be the
priority of the target groups they think they would help.
Fourth, the problem of _hidden message._ Many big international NGOs have
a hidden agenda to send to the target groups in the countries facing
problems. For instance, World Vision, when operating in Mozambique, was
part of the US government effort to sabo tage the FRELIMO government. It
is an evangelical, anti-Communist organization that was opposed to the
socialist government and in favor of the bandits and terrorists of Renamo.
It openly stated that Renamo should seize power from the government. World
Vi sion also has close relationship with repressive military regimes in
Central America. Another example is the work of Care International,
especially Care USA, which assisted the US government gather intelligence
in Mozambique during the 80s. In some cases these international NGOs have
more complete information about the society than the local groups, even
the government of the country where they work. This information is first
shared with the US government as the donor country,! ! instead of the
local organizations or governments.
II. The Case of Timor Lorosa_e
How have international NGOs and UN agencies operated in Timor Lorosa_e
after the Indonesian military left the area? As it was mentioned before,
international NGOs and UN agencies swarmed into the area, operating from
the capital city of Jakarta or Darwin, and attempted to reach the remotest
areas in Timor Lorosa_e. They either worked to aid Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) or provide general humanitarian assistance.
In order to understand the conduct of these international organizations or
institutions in Timor Lorosa_e several factors need to be considered :
1. Misleading Perspective
Misleading perspective is the fundamental problem of all humanitarian
operation of the international NGOs in Timor Lorosa_e. These institutions
perceive that the East Timorese at this moment _need food,_ so all they
have to do is just provide them with fo od. They have an assumption that
the East Timorese are not able to organize themselves to overcome the
emergency situation and they need _help_ to get the food. With such a
perspective all they care about is dumping food in an area. The East
Timorese now are good at inquiring _when is the rice going to be
distributed?_ instead of _when are we going to be able to produce our own
rice or corn?_ Aside from the misleading assumptions on providing aid,
there is also a degrading perspective about the East Timor ese in general.
In their eyes, the East Timorese are only capable of menial work.
Therefore, in these organizations East Timorese are purely treated as wage
workers and there is no attempt to transfer the knowledge or technolo! !
gy to the local people. The use of _local_ in this humanitarian operation
is limited to the hiring wage workers (about whom more will be said
below). There is no partnership and no cooperation between the
international agencies and the East Timorese; the latter are viewed only
as passive recipients of the activity of the former.
2. Lack of Communication with East Timorese
It is bad enough for the international agencies to view East Timorese as
passive recipients; it is even worse for them not to consider these
passive recipients worthy of being told basic information of the aid they
can expect to receive. Similar to experi ences in other places,
international NGOs and UN agencies involved in the humanitarian operation
in Timor Lorosa_e tend to treat the local NGOs as second class people. A
large part of the problem is that the international agencies simply do not
communicat e with the very people they are supposed to be helping.
One example occurred last year during the UNHCR/IOM repatriation program
from Jakarta, Indonesia. On October 25, 1999 about three hundred East
Timorese, some of whom had lived in Indonesia for years and some of whom
were refugees who had fled the post-bal lot violence, came to the
Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta with all their cargo for repatriation to
East Timor. After waiting for several hours, they heard from the UNHCR
staff that the flight was canceled. No further information was provided as
to why the flight was canceled and when the next flight would be. When the
refugees asked the UNHCR staff about it, they said they did not know and
suggested that the East Timorese get all their luggage and return to their
original place. UNHCR did not appear to ca re that among the refugees
there were people who had to hid and disguise themselves while they were
in Jakarta to avoid being chased by pro-integration militia and the
Indonesian military. The international staff simply did no! ! t bother
to communicate with the refugees to figure out what to do. The flight was
delayed for 24 hours and the refugees were left with nothing, not even
food. UNHCR and IOM staff were not even present at the airport most of the
time.
What happened in Jakarta was just a minor problem compared to the
treatment of refugees within Timor Lorosa_e. After arriving in Dili, many
of them were left without any information at the emergency shelter for a
long periods of time. People were packed i nto the Don Bosco dormitory in
Dili where the facilities, such as bathrooms and kitchens, were minimal.
Some of the refugees were severely sick but they had to wait for days,
sometimes weeks, to return to their original place. The only bit of
information the refugees learned from the UNHCR was that the UNHCR would
wait until the number of people from a particular zone reached 100 before
transportation would be provided. _We can_t go home because our total is
less than one hundred people, that_s UNHCR requ irement,_ a refugee from
Same told us when we saw her at the Don Bosco shelter.
Once the refugees were in East Timor and at Don Bosco, it was not clear
whose responsibility they were. Apparently, other international NGOs
besides the UNHCR were supposed to be responsible for health care but they
provided very little. We went to visit Don Bosco shelter and one refugee
from Ermera who suffered from malaria shared her story, _Four days ago
they gave me six tablets, but after two days the medicine was gone and I
haven_t yet recovered_. This is only one of many, many complaints we heard
fr om the refugees who slept on a tarpaulin mat for a long time at Don
Bosco dormitory in Dili.
Refugees in other places had a different story. On December 28, 1999 about
400 refugees from Atambua arrived in Beikala village, Hatudu sub-district,
Ainaro district. They said that from Atambua they had been transferred to
Suai district and had stayed th ere before leaving for Ainaro. They had
been in Timor Lorosa_e for weeks but it seemed like there was no
coordination between UNHCR and other international NGOs working for
humanitarian relief. The UNHCR had dropped off the refugees in the village
without making any arrangements with other organizations for the delivery
of aid. The refugees had received a certain amount of rice when they were
in Suai. But once they were taken to Beikala they only had about one to
two kilograms of rice left for each person . They did not know where to go
because all their houses were burned down. They also did not know where to
get food. In Beikala itself there is no public shelter, because the only
elementary school in the village was burned do! ! wn. None of the
international NGOs responsible for distributing food and providing shelter
for the refugees were around Beikala. A CNRT local leader commented that
probably the area was not a priority for the international institutions.
Meanwhile the UNHC R made it sound like the repatriation was a great
success even when the refugees were treated more like luggage. They
dropped off the refugees and provided no explanation as to where they
should stay if they do not have houses anymore and where to obtain food in
the transition period. The refugees began to panic as the rainy season
started.
A similar case happened to refugees from Lolotoe sub-district, Bobonaro
district who returned from Atambua in November 1999. On November 26, 1999,
because the road was damaged, UNHCR dropped off the some 300 refugees in
the middle of the road in Tapo vill age, about 30 km before entering
Lolotoe area. This was the second time they had been dropped off without
explanation. Before that they had to wait in Maliana for several days.
They were left with no food and none of the international NGOs accompanied
the se refugees. After waiting for several days and no action taken by
UNHCR, finally the people from the village chartered a private car owned
by the locals to carry the refugees to Lolotoe. It turned out that there
was no problem with the road at all; their vehicle could pass through
without any hassle. Each family of the refugees had to spent at least Rp.
500,000 to rent the cars.
Other case was the repatriation of the _Indonesian people_ from West Timor
to Kampung Alor area in Dili on January 1, 2000. Without consulting other
parties, such as CNRT, churches, or UNTAET, UNHCR brought back the
Indonesians who used to live in Timor L orosa_e. They fled the area along
with other refugees before the scorched earth operation. A youth in
Kampung Alor said that repatriation of these Indonesian people took place
at the wrong time. The East Timorese were anxiously waiting for their
family me mbers to come home, but what they saw was the return of
unexpected _guests._ The East Timorese were understandably in an emotional
state. For them, most of these _guests_ were the beneficiary of the
_integration cake_ during the occupation of the Indonesi an military. The
UNHCR did not realize that people actually began to suspect that the UNHCR
had intentionally arranged the repatriation of the Indonesians in order to
prolong the conflict within the East Timorese society. Such! ! a
careless action created new problems. Again, UNHCR behaved as if it was
just transporting _units,_ lifeless bits of unthinking flesh.
3. Inadequate knowledge of East Timor_s needs
Before the international agencies had stepped onto the island, they had
already devised a six-month plan. They had not made any assessment about
the real problems in the field. As a result, some of their programs have
not been able to be implemented and s ome have been implemented in poor
fashion.
There has been a lack of knowledge about the rice needs of the society. In
some places refugees received rice several times. Meanwhile, in other
places refugees or the local population did not receive rice at all. In
Waitama village, Uatulari sub-district , Viqueque district, since December
1999, the local population has not received anything. According to them,
they still have a small supply of rice, but it is insufficient and not all
families have rice, only those who work in the ricefields. They complai
ned that international NGOs do not seem to have comprehensive data about
the local conditions. Just because some families have a supply of rice,
the CNRT, international NGOs, and UN agencies assume that everybody has a
sufficient supply of food. Besides, they also think that the people can
fulfill other needs such as a medicine, toiletries, spices, and cooking
oil. In reality, these are rare items in the villages.
In Atelari village, Baucau sub-district, Baguia sub-district where the
population is mostly Moslem and Protestant, the people have not received
any aid. This is because the distribution of rice was coordinated by WFP
with Caritas International as the impl ementing partner. Caritas only gave
aid to Catholic community groups in accordance with the data compiled by
the Catholic church which understandably did not have data about the
Moslems and Protestants. Besides the problem of unequal distribution of
rice, the coordination with local leaders is also minimal; the CNRT
leaders in various regions have complained about the unequal distribution
of rice in their regions.
The distribution of corn seed for planting was done in a very careless
manner. The seed was distributed when the planting season was largely
over. So the people began to eat the seeds, not knowing that the seeds
were covered with chemicals and were not me ant as food. The sacks of
seeds did have printing on the outside warning against ingestion of the
seeds but the people were either illiterate or did not know the language
of the warning. As a consequence, many people became sick.
Because the international agencies only had pre-packaged programs, they
could not respond to what the people actually needed. For instance, in
certain villages in Maliana and Baucau, the people cultivate rice, not
corn. What they need is mechanical equipm ent to start working on the rice
field. But none of the international NGOs and the UN agencies were geared
to meet this need. The people of Maliana complained that there were
neither tractors nor draft animals to work on the field, _Our oxen and
water buf falo were either killed or taken away by the militia and
Indonesian military,_ a farmer from Ritabou village, Maliana told us when
we saw him in his house. It is ironic that there are so many vehicles
being transported to Timor Lorosa_e for use by the int ernational agencies
-- some are even left unused in the warehouse. But there are no tractors
which are crucial to East Timor_s ability to overcome the food crisis.
Part of the reason the international agencies lack adequate knowledge of
the society_s needs is due to their lack of cooperation and coordination
with local organizations. The international agencies have divided up East
Timor between themselves; certain a gencies are responsible for certain
zones. They then expect East Timorese NGOs, who have always worked
throughout the country, to follow the bureaucratic divisions they have set
up. East Timorese NGOs are also supposed to restrict their work to
particular zones. When a national NGO came to the WFP office to coordinate
the distribution of rice, he was asked by the WFP official _What is the
identity of your NGO? Does your institution have any experience in
distributing rice in Baucau?_ As if there were any NGOs in East Timor that
had specialized in rice distribution in the one district of Baucau!
The international agencies running the rice distribution, WFP and World
Vision, have set up a rigid bureaucracy that East Timorese NGOs and small
foreign NGOs have had difficulty working through. Their proposals to
distribute rice are not handled quickly. Usually, it is not even clear
when the proposal might be processed. These unnecessary delays have led to
prolonged waits by many communities for rice deliveries.
NGOs have continued distributing food in regions where villagers are
engaged in cultivating crops instead of helping the ongoing production
process. In Aileu the population wants to harvest their rice but none of
the international agencies have any progra m to assist them. In Turiscai
the population has saved a considerable amount of coffee, but due to the
collapse of the distribution network and the lack of transportation, the
people do not know where to sell the coffee. A similar problem occurred in
Bubu susu village, Manufahi district. According to the community leader
there, about 40 tons of coffee are stored there but the community does not
know how to market it. They raised the issue to the international NGO
operating in the area and they were told th at there is no program for
marketing coffee for the time being.
International agencies are now in East Timor following their pre-packaged
project proposals. They are not adapting their work to the particular
needs of East Timorese society.
4. Dependency on foreign aid
Humanitarian aid has begun to engender a problem of dependency. This
phenomena is not due to the aid itself, but the manner in which it has
been distributed. The lack of aid for cultivating rice or selling coffee
noted above has meant that villagers have not been able to provide food
and income for themselves. Without the needed aid to do their own work,
they are left dependent on rice deliveries.
The method of rice delivery has actually encouraged people not to work in
the fields in the villages. Because of the unpredictability of supplies in
the districts, people have decided to stay in Dili to obtain rice. Many
people do not want to return to th eir villages to work in their farm
where they would be able to contribute to East Timor_s own food
production.
In Liqui_a, several fishermen groups tried to organize themselves into a
cooperative. They submitted their proposal to a Japanese international
NGO, Peace Winds, working in the area. These fishermen groups never got
any response from Peace Winds. _Maybe f ishermen affair is not part of
their concern,_ they complained when we asked for comments. If the
fishermen were aided to get new boats (to replace the ones destroyed),
they would be able to earn income and would not be wholly dependent on
food aid from W FP and World Vision. But the international agencies don_t
have any program for fishermen.
5. Lack of Transparency in Finances
Most people of Timor Lorosa_e do not know that the international NGOs and
UN agencies are carrying out their operations by using the money pledged
by the World Bank-led consortium. This is money meant for the interests of
_the people of Timor Lorosa_e._ T hrough an agreement between the World
Bank and donor countries in Tokyo on December 16-17, 1999 a grant of US$
520 million for three years has been pledged for Timor Lorosa_e. But there
is no information about how this money is being spent and how much of this
grant is going to fund the operations of the international NGOs and UN
agencies. Meanwhile, these international NGOs and UN agencies act like
_saviors_ who have come by virtue of their own fundraising.
People have no idea where they money is coming from for these
international agencies nor any idea about their budgets. One international
agency, World Vision, told a group of East Timorese that it had no money
to transport rice to their village but that t he villagers could transport
the rice themselves from the warehouse to their village. This was the
experience of the community from Leorema village, Bazartete sub-district,
Liqui_a. World Vision claimed it did not have a vehicle. On January 6,
2000 the vi llagers, on their own, chartered four trucks for eight million
rupiah (about $1,150) to get their share of rice from World Vision
warehouse located in Liqui_a city. Why is it that ordinary villagers were
able to find four vehicles to rent while World Visi on could not? And why
is it that World Vision, in possession of far greater resources than such
villagers (who used their last savings for the charter), could not afford
the transportation?
We, like all East Timorese, are disturbed to see the way in which the
international agencies are spending money. The cost of maintaining the
foreign staff is obviously very high with cars, houses, hotel rooms
(reportedly near $200 per night), imported fo od and beer, transportation
in and out of the country. If the foreign staff consisted of a small core
of necessary officials such expenses would be unobjectionable but the size
of the staff appears terribly bloated. If the international agencies
relied on more East Timorese staff they could save money, put earnings in
the hands of East Timorese, and gain far more diligent and hard-working
employees.
6. Mistreatment of Workers
As noted above, the local component to the international agencies consists
only in the drivers, servants, cooks, and menial laborers they hire. Even
in this aspect of relating to local East Timorese society, the
international agencies have showed themselv es to be incompetent. Again, a
large part of the problem is the refusal of the international agencies to
communicate with the workers, to summon the human decency to consider
these workers as people who deserve explanations about the terms of their
work. All the workers that we have spoken to have complained that they
have not received explanations about their wages, working time, or any
other aspect of their work. We find no reason to justify the kind of labor
practices that the international agencies ha ve followed even if the
country is in a crisis period.
a. Use of day labor: The international agencies treat nearly all their
warehouse workers as casual, day laborers. Workers are only told to report
at a certain time in the morning. If there is work they will be called, if
there is none, they will not be ca lled. This means that if workers invest
money in the transportation to get to and from the warehouse, there is no
guarantee they will be hired for the day.
b. Late payment or no payment of wages: Some workers have worked for many
days without receiving a wage. For instance, nine East Timorese working
for the rice warehouse owned by WFP in Viqueque worked from October to
December 1999 without receiving a wage . Each one of them only received
three kilograms of rice as compensation for a month of work. Three other
workers working in the WFP and Timor Aid warehouse in Betano, Same
experienced similar ill-treatment. One said: _We just keep working. Once
we asked about our wage, but that white boss told us to wait, the wage
will be given after we work._ These three workers only got three kilograms
of rice whenever they unloaded rice from the ship and brought it to the
warehouse. After two months, three of them rec eived about one million
rupiah. Workers in Liqui_a have a similar experience. About 10 workers
working in World Vision warehouse since the past two months have not
received wage until the end of December 1999. According to our! ! source
of information, World Vision only paid their wage on January 14, 2000.
During the time they worked, they only received 10 kgs. of rice per month.
There is no contract between the workers and management of World Vision.
Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili went on a hunger strike
in the beginning of January, 2000 to demand a wage increase. They had been
receiving only Rp. 20,000/day but they had to spend about Rp. 6000 to Rp.
7000 for transportation per day and at least Rp. 10.000 for o ne meal. By
the end of the day the workers only had Rp. 2000-Rp. 3000 to bring home.
Cooks working at the kitchen of public hospital in Viqueque have worked
for weeks and they have not received any payment from MSF which is
responsible for managing the ho spital.
c. Physical Abuse: Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili have
actually been physically abused. Some of them were beaten up by the chief
of the warehouse, a foreign staff member of WFP, because they were late in
coming to work.
d. Safety conditions at job site: Workers who work in the rice warehouses
do not get necessary protection such as masks, gloves, boots, etc.
We find it shameful that an organization such as World Vision which has
enough money to pay its foreign staff hundreds or thousands of dollars per
month has such chronic problems in paying its workers about $3 per day at
so many of its warehouses.
7. Lack of Commitment in Providing Services
_Today is a holiday and there is no ambulance here,_ an ICRC doctor on
duty at Bidau hospital responded when several people came to ask for
ICRC_s help to pick up one of their family members who was seriously sick
at home. Eyewitnesses said that at that t ime several ambulances were
parked in the ICRC garage. This is only one of many complaints we have
heard from people about the problems of the health services in East Timor
provided by international NGOs and UN agencies. They seem to behave as if
they mer ely want to reach a certain quota in their working proposal. In
some cases, it appears that they are using the East Timorese patients as
guinea pigs for their projects. Other sources of information indicate that
international NGOs and UN agencies do not w ant to deal with patients with
TB.
There are several international NGOs dealing with health services, such as
Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF), Assistencia Medica International (AMI),
International Medica Corps (IMC), Medicins du Monde France (MDM-F) and
many others. The sad fact is that all of these health care professionals
are concentrated in Dili. Outside Dili, there is a near total absence of
health services. "Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink beer,
discotheque, how can humanitarian workers stay here_, an indigenous leader
s aid when he was asked for his comments about the lack of health services
by international NGOs and UN institutions in Alas sub-district, Same
district.
Another story came from Atabae sub-district, Bobonaro district. MSF is
supposed to take care of health services in that region. MSF staff come
two times per week to the town of Atabae. They do not go to the villages
because they say the village roads are bad. For example, they do not go to
Aidabalete village because of the damaged road so if somebody gets sick in
that village, they will not be able to receive care. Some local nurses
offered to help by distributing medicine to the villages, but the MSF sta
ff do not trust these local nurses. These local nurses complained, _Do we
have to wait until sick persons die before MSF staff will come to our
village?_
Again, in the field of health care, we find that the international
agencies are unable to work with East Timorese people. Perhaps the nurses
are not highly trained but they can deal with basic health problems if
they have the right equipment and medicine. We are fully convinced that
one _barefoot nurse_ or _barefoot doctor_ living year-round in districts
is worth more to the health care of the people than a highly trained
foreign doctor who makes flying visits. This is an old truism but one that
seems to be ignored by all the aid agencies that have arrived here. It
would be better for the international aid agencies to focus on the
training and equipping of such a _barefoot_ medical staff instead of
focusing on their own (irregular) provision of health car e.
There is a strong impression among the people of Timor Lorosa_e that many
relief workers carry out their duty half-heartedly. They perceive that
these foreign relief workers only come to Timor Lorosa_e for an
adventuresome excursion amidst the suffering o f the people.
III. Human Rights Context
In this section we will highlight various forms of human rights violations
that have occurred during the humanitarian operation.
Civil and political rights:
Right to information. The people of Timor Lorosa_e do not receive any
information regarding the basic principles and methods underlying the
humanitarian operation, particularly with regard to the funding for
carrying out the operation. Information about t he programs and its
planning have to be made public so that the target group is aware of the
objectives of the programs.
Right to active participation. From our observation in the field, people
of Timor Lorosa_e are being treated more as the object of this
humanitarian operation instead of partners.
Right to be free from torture. Several workers in the warehouse were
beaten up by a staff at an international NGO supervising the distribution
of rice.
Economic, social and cultural rights :
Right to a fair wage. There is an obscenely large gap between the salary
of foreign staff and the wage for local workers.
Right to information about the job. Workers in the international NGOs and
UN agencies never receive any explanation about their rights as workers.
Right to food. Some of the population receive food aid, but others do not.
This happens because the international NGOs and UN agencies do not have
sufficient information about the situation on the ground and there is a
poor coordination between internatio nal institutions and the local ones.
Social right to remain in one_s social environment. International
institutions do not attempt to make use of the existing social institution
to deal with the problems occurring in the field. They try to work on
their own and ignore the existence of the lo cal institutions.
IV. Recommendation
Given the foregoing description, we believe that there are steps that the
international agencies can take in order to improve the humanitarian aid
work. The general goal must be to empower people, not to treat them as
thoughtless objects who only merit th e privilege of being handed a sack
of rice.
_ In order to make the operation effective, international NGOs and UN
agencies need to coordinate with all potential groups within the society,
the people in general, and national NGOs. The coordination meeting should
not be devoted to rhetoric about _par tnership_ (which is what we have
already received) but about concrete, practical activity.
_ To fulfill the East Timorese right to information, international NGOs
and UN agencies, most importantly UNTAET, should inform the public about
the allocation of the funding granted by the World Bank to Timor Lorosa_e.
_ Humanitarian workers should open their hearts to work together with the
people of Timor Lorosa_e at the grassroots level so that it will not
appear that they only come to this burned down country merely to have a
picnic amidst the people_s suffering.
_ There should be a clarification and dissemination of information as to
time international NGOs and UN agencies working in the field of
humanitarian relief intend to stay in Timor Lorosa_e. This is necessary
for the people to anticipate the departure of these foreign organizations
and the possibility of not receiving relief anymore. There must be a clear
schedule for the build up of East Timorese institutions prior to the
withdrawal of the international agencies.
Dili, 10 January 2000
Compiled by: Working Group for Study and Examination Yayasan HAK Dili
Timor Loro Sa_e
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